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This thesis investigates public sector efficiency (PSE) of decentralized local 
governments in Indonesia. Based on the literature review improved efficiency is 
considered as the main outcome expected from a decentralized system of public 
service provision. Hence analysing public sector efficiency provides the de facto 
measure of the ability of decentralized local government in internalizing the 
benefits of fiscal and political decentralization. In order to identify the 
significance of the effect of 2004 electoral contest, the first democratic election in 
the decentralized Indonesia, efficiency in the public sector is investigated in a 
period from 2005 to 2008. The 2004 electoral contest is considered as an 
important phase of democratization and decentralization in Indonesia as it was the 
first election where voters directly chose leaders at every level of government. 
Political and institutional features which emerged as a result of the 2004 election 
were expected to have an impact on a decentralized system of public service 
provision. 
This thesis employs a two-stage method. In the first stage, non-parametric 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used to generate the efficiency scores of all 
local governments. Several outcome indicators in the education and health sectors, 
infrastructure, poverty mitigation as well as macroeconomic performance are 
taken as a measure of the flow of services that arise from public spending. Hence, 
public sector efficiency is defined as the flow of services per unit expenditure. 
 The second stage of the method aims to investigate public sector 
efficiency against non-discretionary variables involving a measure of fiscal 
decentralization, political and institutional variables, as well as total factor 
productivity growth as a control variable. In order to do so, this thesis employs an 
econometric analysis using fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD). The FEVD 





 In the first stage of the method, the DEA estimate reveals that public 
sector efficiency scores vary across local governments, corroborating the general 
pattern of the regional disparity in Indonesia. That is, poorly developed regions 
have relatively inefficient governments. The DEA calculation locates local 
governments on Java Island at the frontier indicating that these local governments 
are benchmarking others. On the other hand, Papua and Papua Barat emerge with 
the lowest efficiency score over the observation period with a large divergence 
from the frontier. The results also show that the average and the median efficiency 
scores are drifting downwards, while the distance from the lowest score to the 
frontier is increasing. This indicates that the regional disparity in the public sector 
efficiency was increasing over the observation period. 
 The second stage of the method reveals that the ability of a decentralized 
local government to generate local own-revenue is significant in improving public 
sector efficiency. The estimation results show that the degree of fiscal 
decentralization as measured by the ratio of local own-revenue to total public 
spending has a significant positive impact on the PSE. However, given that the 
growth of total factor productivity also has a significant and positive impact on 
the PSE, the result should be seen as a caution that improved PSE might result 
from overall total productivity in the economy. A local jurisdiction that has higher 
total factor productivity will present greater public sector efficiency regardless the 
degree of fiscal decentralization. 
 The second stage estimate also reveals that the formation of the new 
government as an outcome of the first electoral democracy in the decentralized 
Indonesia has nothing to do with the PSE improvement. The lost hegemony of 
Golkar in the decentralized democratized Indonesia, measured as the ratio of seats 
held by Golkar to total seats in the local assembly, does not show any significant 
impact on the PSE. The first electoral democracy might have resulted in a new 
democratic government in Indonesia; however, the new democratic government 
might be merely a continuation of an old structure with new rules on the limits of 
democratization. Accordingly, the new democratic government did not impact on 
improved efficiency in the public sector. 
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 Another significant feature of the formation of the new government in the 
decentralized democratized Indonesia is the rebirth of politik aliran (political 
parties rooted to a particular socio-ideology). Politik aliran is represented by 
Islamic based political parties. These parties held a significant number of seats in 
the legislative councils. The estimation results reveal a negative association 
between political Islam and PSE, even when PKB (Nation Awakening Party) and 
PAN (National Mandatory Party) are included in the measure. Both parties do not 
set Islam as their platform, but affiliate to NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and 
Muhammdiyah, the two largest socio-religious organizations in Indonesia. The 
result may also stand as a confirmation that patron-client affiliation in Indonesia’s 
electoral democracy fails to leverage accountability and hence fails to result in 
improved PSE. 
 The second stage estimate finds evidence that democratic participation did 
not have an impact on the PSE. This contradicts the general representation 
claiming that greater democratic participation is associated with better economic 
performance. The estimates reveal a negative impact of democratic participation 
on the PSE. In the setting of politik aliran, the coefficient estimate is statistically 
significant. It implies that while political Islam may have increased electoral 
participation, the participation has nothing to do with improved PSE. This may 
not be surprising in the case of electoral democracy in Indonesia where electoral 
participation is characterised by money politics, patron-client political relationship 
and unbalanced electoral participation. 
 Many parties flourish in the decentralized democratized Indonesia 
escalating political fragmentation. Using a Herfindahl-Hirschman index as a 
measure of the size-political fragmentation this study finds evidence that while 
citizens may have more options to select parties/politicians to best represent their 
preferences, higher political fragmentation shows ambiguous impact on PSE. 
 The quality of institutional governance and its impact on PSE is 
represented by a corruption perception index and an infrastructure perception 
index. The estimation results reveal evidence that public sector efficiency is 
positively associated with the infrastructure perception index, but fail to find 
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evidence of an effect for the corruption perception index. This indicates that the 
outcome of decentralization is not contingent with a perception about corruption 
as it is prevalent in the decentralized Indonesia. It occurs almost in all levels of 
government and institutions. Thus if decentralization results in improved 
efficiency, it is not due to a corruption lessening but rather due to variations in the 
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The theoretical literature on multi-level government from Tiebout (1956) and 
Oates (1972) to Weingast (2009) emphasizes the advantages of fiscal 
decentralization. Among those advantages are that fiscal decentralization 
promotes competition among sub-national governments to provide attractive tax 
and public service options, promotes political legitimacy and accountability for 
public service provision, and subsequently, promotes public sector efficiency. 
Given these advantages, many countries adopt decentralized public management 
as their public service provision approach. Accordingly, decentralization of fiscal 
activities has become popular in the last two decades and has been widely adopted 
not only by developed countries, but also developing countries. 
 In reality, decentralization is adopted by different countries within 
different perspectives and needs. There is no common approach among countries 
in its implementation. In many cases, over-centralized administration has caused 
dissatisfaction among sub-national governments and decentralization was adopted 
as a reaction. Examples include Indonesia, Mexico and Peru. In other cases, the 
dissatisfaction with centralized administration has strengthened pressures on 
ethnical, historical or political separatist movements. Thus, decentralization was 
adopted as an attempt to stop ethnically motivated pressures for secession in 
Nigeria, political pressures from sub-national governments in Russia, and post-
conflict countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo. Some 
cases of decentralization are induced by a specific motive such as establishing 
fiscal discipline at the state level as in India, improving quality of local service 
delivery by giving more fiscal discretion to local governments in Tanzania, and 
combating poverty by local governments as in Bolivia and Colombia (See Bahl 
2006; IMF Fiscal Affairs Department 2009). 
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 The fact that decentralization in practice is adopted within different 
contexts, institutional arrangements and objectives has caused pessimism with 
respect to decentralization. Among opponents to decentralization is Tanzi  (1996) 
who considers it as a road to wrecks and ruins and Prud’homme (1994) who 
emphasizes that decentralization is harmful rather than helpful. These 
disagreements primarily arise from perspectives on the potential impact of such 
policies in the institutional environment of developing countries. 
 Therefore, the outcome of decentralization does not always fit with the 
theoretical claims. First, there are always externalities arising from spillovers 
between localities that should be taken into account and set against improved 
accountability as a result of decentralization. In political science, it has long been 
familiar that there is a trade-off between accountability and policy coordination 
under centralization (See Seabright 1996; Koethenbuerger 2008; Besley and 
Coate 1999). Second, decentralization may paradoxically diminish accountability 
in a situation where local governments enjoy a degree of cohesiveness with 
central government (Seabright 1996), cohesiveness of interest groups at the local 
level is high and local voter ignorance is also high (Bardhan 2000). In this case, 
local governments are less accountable to marginalised local interests. Third, lack 
of democratic institutions and norms that essentially complement electoral 
democratization have been an obstruction to improved accountability. This 
happens particularly in young democratized countries (See Weingast 2009). 
The recent literature on decentralization is growing into a second 
generation theory. With the groundwork of public choice theory, this literature 
emphasizes on political institution and politicians’ behaviour in its analytical 
framework (See Seabright 1996; Besley and Coate 1999; Qian and Weingast 
1997). Besley and Coate (1999) emphasize the importance refocussing attention 
on the role of decision making institutions rather than the assumption of uniform 
centralized provision in shaping the trade-off between taste heterogeneity and 
inter-jurisdictional externalities. Qian and Weingast (1997) emphasize the 
incentive problem as a critique to the traditional theory of decentralization. 
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In conjunction with a growing literature on decentralization, a number of 
studies have been carried out to empirically investigate the impact of 
decentralization in various countries. These studies attempt to investigate the 
impact of decentralization on various economic variables including economic 
growth (Zhang and Zou 1998; Xie, Zou and Davoodi 1999; Lin and Liu 2000; 
Akai and Sakata 2002; Iimi 2005; Jin and Zou 2005; Thornton 2007) and 
corruption (Fisman and Gatti 2002; Fan, Lin and Treisman 2009). 
Unfortunately, these studies do not find consistent results but conflicting 
arguments on how decentralization affects economic growth and, for example, 
corruption. Dealing with the impact of decentralization on corruption, it is clear 
that there is no simple and general relationship that holds in different contexts and 
different settings. By looking at a cross country analysis, Fisman and Gatti (2002), 
found evidence that decentralization in government expenditure is strongly and 
significantly associated with lower corruption. On the contrary, Fan, Lin and 
Treisman (2009) found evidence that bribery is more frequent in countries with a 
larger number of governments or administrative tiers and a larger number of local 
public employees; and bribery is less frequent  when local or central governments 
receive a larger share of GDP in revenue. In general, the results suggest the 
danger of uncoordinated rent-seeking as government structures become more 
complex. 
With regard to decentralization and economic growth, Zhang and Zou 
(1998) found evidence that higher degrees of fiscal decentralization of 
government spending is associated with lower provincial economic growth in 
China. Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999) found evidence that further decentralization 
in public spending in the United States may be harmful for economic growth. In 
contrast, Lin and Liu (2000) found evidence that decentralization has made a 
significant contribution to economic growth in the mid-1980s China. Akai and 
Sakata (2002) found evidence that decentralization contributes to economic 
growth in the United States. Iimi (2005) found evidence that decentralization has 
a significant positive impact on per capita GDP growth. Using the instrument 
variables technique and the latest cross-country data for the period from 1997 to 
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2001, Iimi argues that when the focus is placed on the latest information on the 
economic situation in the latter 1990s, decentralization, particularly on the fiscal 
expenditure side has contributed to economic growth. Jin and Zou (2005), found 
divergent evidence of the effect of decentralization on economic growth that 
depends on institutional arrangements that prevailed during the observation 
period. A recent study on decentralization and economic growth by Thornton 
(2007) found evidence that the impact of decentralization on economic growth 
depends on the extent of the independent taxing powers available to sub-national 
governments. Using a dataset of 19 OECD member countries, he found evidence 
that when the measure of fiscal decentralization is limited to the revenues over 
which sub-national governments have full autonomy, its impact on economic 
growth is not statistically significant. 
Several issues have been addressed with respect to the conflicting results 
on the correlation between decentralization and economic growth. Among those 
issues are possible misspecification in the empirical estimation model and the 
measurement of decentralization. Another issue dealing with the decentralization 
and economic growth relationship is a lack of knowledge on how decentralization 
promotes economic growth that results in problems in testing its relationship (See 
Martinez-Vazquez 2003).  
Despite the lack of any consistent knowledge of the impact of 
decentralization on economic growth, it is safe to argue that better governance 
with improved public service provision is the main outcome expected from 
decentralized public service provision. The literature on fiscal federalism has 
associated the case of improved public service provision with the more efficient 
resource allocation. Thus decentralized government will lead to the more efficient 
public service provision. Therefore efficiency should become the main focus in 
empirical studies concerning the outcome of decentralization. 
In the economics literature, efficiency is defined as a condition in a 
resource allocation where no one will be made better off without making anyone 
else worse off. This condition is well known as the Pareto efficient condition. In 
managerial practice, efficiency is often used in parallel with effectiveness. Both 
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are used in performance benchmarking including the performance of decentralized 
governments (See O'Dwyer and Ziblat 2006). Both efficiency and effectiveness 
link inputs and outputs. However, they have different meanings although they are 
not always easy to isolate and measure. Accordingly, they are often used 
interchangeably. While acknowledging the difference, this study focuses on 
improved efficiency as the outcome of decentralization as in standard fiscal 
federalism theory. 
- The Nature of Decentralization in Indonesia 
Spreading out geographically over 5,000 km and 17,000 islands, with more than 
300 identified languages and 20 distinct cultural groups; Indonesia is diverse in its 
geographic, cultural, natural, and human resources endowment. This diversity 
signifies that a decentralized system may be as the appropriate way to deliver 
some public services. 
 Although decentralization has long been accepted as part of the 
governmental system in Indonesia, there was no serious effort to implement 
decentralization. Centralization was long viewed as a way of maintaining the 
national unity of the Republic of Indonesia under President Suharto’s 
administration. Any genuine desire to decentralize was suspected as a movement 
toward regional separatism away from the Republic of Indonesia.
1
 
 A serious attempt to implement decentralization was started in 1999 
following the fall of President Suharto. Dissatisfaction with the long standing 
centralized system during more than 30 years of the Suharto regime motivated the 
call for decentralization. Strengthening separatist movements in several natural 
resource rich regions, such as Aceh, Papua, and East Kalimantan also amplified 
                                                          
1
The decentralization policy in Indonesia can be traced back historically to the colonial period, 
starting with the formation of municipalities in 1905, districts in 1910, and provinces in 1920. 
After proclamation of independence, the formation of governmental structures experienced several 
changes which lately returned back to Republic of Indonesia Unity following a presidential decree 
in 1959. The governmental structure of the Republic of Indonesia is split into three tiers 
comprising provincial governments, local governments of kabupaten/kota, and a central 
government at the national level. Regional autonomy issues had been raised by law 5/1974 of 
regional government. However there was no serious effort at its implementation until the fall of 
President Suharto (see the details in Hofman and Kaiser 2004). 
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pressures to achieve broader autonomy for local regions. For that reason, in the 
early period of setting up decentralization, the policy was mostly driven by 
political motives leading to a “big bang” approach in its implementation. The 
enactment of Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999 as the legal basis for decentralization 
was finalised within less than one year, and the implementing regulations were set 
up within one and a half years before the decentralization policy was effectively 
implemented in January 2001. 
The “big bang” approach to establishing decentralization has rapidly 
changed the Indonesian governmental system from a centralized to a decentralized 
one. Law 22/1999 devolved most functions of government to local government 
except national defence, international relations, justice, police, monetary policy, 
regulation and development planning. However, the two laws apparently provide 
delegation mainly for expenditures but not for revenues. Law 34/2000 on regional 
taxation provides unclear additional tax discretion to local government without 
any assignment of a broad-based tax to local government. Even the new law of 
regional taxation number 28/2009 does not provide a broader local tax authority to 
local governments in administering local taxes. Tax bases and tax rates are mostly 
still determined by central government. Hence, there is no tax competition among 
local jurisdictions. From a theoretical perspective, tax competition among local 
jurisdictions might be expected to play a vital role in inducing optimal provision 
of public goods (See Ihori 2009). 
Law 22/1999 was amended by Law 32/2004, transforming inter-
governmental relations in Indonesia toward further democratic transition. The first 
electoral contest in the decentralized Indonesia was conducted in 2004 where 
voters directly chose the President. Since then, the leaders of local government, 
the governor at the provincial level and the bupati/mayor at the kabupaten/kota 
level are now chosen directly by voters.
2
 In the 2009 electoral contest, not only 
were leaders in every level of government chosen by voters but also legislatures in 
every level of government. This transformation symbolizes a significant phase of 
                                                          
2
By Law 22/1999 local government leaders are chosen by respective elected legislatures. Law 
22/1999 has been amended by law 34/2004 altering the local government leaders’ election system 
to direct election where the leaders are directly chosen by voters. 
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decentralization as well as democratization in Indonesia. Not only have public 
services been decentralized to local government but also the authority to select 
local leaders through local elections.  
Decentralization has a wide range of interrelations with democratization. 
Inman and Rubinfeld (2008) argue that decentralization is essential to the 
democratic transition as it helps make democracy self-enforcing. The idea of 
shifting public service provision to the lower level of government necessarily 
needs a power delegation. The power delegation is essential for decentralization 
as local citizens and politicians are supposed to be more informed and involved in 
the local provision of public goods such as education, health, water, poverty 
eradication, and local economic performance, independent of national 
performance. However, an empirical study on decentralization and patterns of 
democracy in Indonesia by Baswedan (2007) found that power and fiscal 
delegation to lower level government does not directly increase local participation 
though such delegation shifts the focus from national to regional political issues. 
Political decentralization along with fiscal decentralization allows 
localities to independently carry out local elections selecting politicians to hold 
local office. Therefore, local electoral contests play an important role in shaping 
the construction of government in each local jurisdiction, independent of central 
government (See Weingast 2009). Decentralization should also allow local 
citizens to have more control over government in regard to public service 
provision. This idea is based on a comparative accountability between central and 
local government where voters are assumed to be more vigilant in local than in 
national government activities (See Khemani 2001; Seabright 1996). Therefore, 
decentralization should theoretically improve accountability and thus increase 
efficiency of public spending within a more compact political process. 
In the case of Indonesia, electoral democracy that has been advanced along 
with decentralization may present “new government” formation in a democratic 
setting. Within a multi-party and proportional representation system, numerous 
political parties have flourished to participate in the electoral contest, leading to 
extensive choices voters can make to shape government. However, whether the 
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formation of new government in the more democratic setting has presented vital 
groundwork for decentralization in favour of improved public sector efficiency is 
not proven. 
Numerous political studies on post-Suharto Indonesia address several 
institutional obstacles that are crucial for political accountability in regard to the 
expected public sector efficiency improvement. Money politics and “politik 
aliran” are the major issues. Money politics refers to a condition where voters will 
exchange their vote for money rather than vote for candidates who will best act in 
their interests. Meanwhile, “politik aliran” refers to a situation where voters select 
a political party on the basis of ideological affiliation. Given the large ideological 
diversity in Indonesia, a number of parties were established on an ideological 
basis leading to a so called “politik aliran” with high political fragmentation. In 
this situation and where democratic norms and institutions are weak, local 
provision of public services might be judged based on the political relationship 
with those in power not by virtue of citizenship. Within these institutional 
obstacles, improved local accountability as an expected result from local electoral 
democracy is uncertain. Eventually, whether decentralization results in improved 
public sector efficiency becomes a big question. 
 
1.2. Objectives 
Given the above background, this study aims to investigate public sector 
efficiency as the outcome of decentralization and democratization in Indonesia. It 
measures efficiency of local jurisdictions in Indonesia from 2005 to 2008 and is 
expected to capture the outcome of the 2004 political contest, the first election in 
the decentralized Indonesia. Specifically the objectives of this study are as 
follows: 
1. To measures public sector efficiency (PSE) across local jurisdictions. 
Several indicators in the most relevant public sector category such as 
education, health, poverty mitigation, and infrastructure as well as 
macroeconomic performance are taken as outcome indicators of service 
flows that arise from local public spending.  
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2. Given advanced electoral democracy in Indonesia, this study then 
investigates political and institutional determinants as well as a 
decentralization measure (own-source revenue as a proportion of total 
revenue) that is expected to have an impact on public sector efficiency. 
3. Based on the results, the study then formulates policy recommendations. 
The PSE score, along with its determinants, provides a guide for local 
government authorities to achieve greater public sector efficiency.  
1.3. Significance of the Study  
This is the first cross sectional study of Indonesia’s local jurisdictions that 
comprehensively measures the link between public sector efficiency and 
decentralization policy. Since decentralization and democratization are correlated, 
this study also investigates whether political and institutional variables as a result 
of electoral democratization in Indonesia have had a significant impact on public 
sector efficiency. Specifically, this study is significant for two reasons: 
1. Whether decentralization results in better public service provision is 
judged by improved efficiency of public service provision. Hence, using 
efficiency measures across local jurisdictions provides evidence of the de 
facto measure of the ability of local jurisdictions to internalize the benefit 
of fiscal and political decentralization. 
2. The theoretical literature on decentralization is shifting toward second 
generation theorems emphasizing political structure, and politician’s 
behaviour as the basis for the success of decentralization. While political 
studies characterise Indonesia as a protracted democratization and 
decentralization process, this study investigates empirically whether 
political and institutional variables as well as decentralization measures 
are factors in increasing public service efficiency at the local level. 
1.4. Outline of the Thesis 
The objectives are achieved in a series of chapters. Chapter 2 contains a review of 
the literature on decentralization policy. The evolving theory of decentralization 
from a traditional standpoint toward the recent generation of decentralization 
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theory is discussed in this chapter. The chapter also reveals a significant literature 
that identifies political incentives as the crux in the political agency relationship 
with regard to fiscal and political decentralization. Chapter 2 also considers the 
literature on improved efficiency as the main outcome of decentralization policy. 
Several empirical studies in relation to public sector efficiency are also discussed 
in this chapter as well as issues in empirical studies concerning methods used in 
accessing and explaining public sector efficiency. 
 Chapter 3 discusses issues and progress in selected public services in the 
decentralized Indonesia including education, health, basic infrastructure, as well 
as poverty mitigation. The discussion aims to motivate the significance of the 
efficiency estimate. 
Chapter 4 contains the theoretical framework for the empirical research. 
Based on the literature review, this chapter formalizes efficiency outcomes as the 
main objective of decentralization. Chapter 4 also highlights political institutions 
as a framework for analysis. In particular, political accountability and political 
agency relationships are put forward as a framework. A micro-foundation model 
for the local government optimization is also discussed in this chapter. 
 Chapter 5 sets out the empirical model. First, the chapter explains the data 
envelopment analysis used in the first stage method. The chapter then provides the 
underlying empirical used model in explaining public sector efficiency. The 
chapter also discusses selected variables used in the second stage with regard to 
the issues in concept and measurement in the context of decentralization and 
political reality in Indonesia. Chapter 5 also discusses in more detail the 
econometric techniques employed in the second stage. Since the data is structured 
in panels, the discussion starts with common approaches to estimating a panel 
data model. However, given that idiosyncratic variables are used in this study, the 
deficiencies in the common approaches to estimating the model are put forward. 
The discussion concludes with the Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD) to 
serve as a reliable estimation technique. 
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 Results from estimating the empirical model are presented in Chapter 6. 
This chapter also provides an interpretation of the results. 
 Finally, Chapter 7 provides the major findings of the research and draws 
out policy implications. The contributions of the study, as well as its limitations, 









The literature on decentralization is large. It is growing into a body in line with 
the world-wide adoption of decentralization policy over the last two decades. 
Coupled with this, decentralization has strong supports from international 
institutions such as The World Bank and IMF. The literature covers theoretical, 
empirical, related issues, as well as policy guidance on practical implementation. 
The literature typically supports decentralized systems of public service provision. 
A decentralized system of public service provision provides a better environment 
for economic development and hence promotes welfare. On the contrary, the 
opponents emphasize the dangers of decentralization in the institutional 
environments in developing countries. Among these opponents are Prud’homme 
(1994) and Tanzi (1996). 
In the theoretical literature, there is a growing “new” literature extending 
and enriching the traditional theory of fiscal decentralization. The new literature is 
wide ranging in terms of its foundations and directions with significant 
contributions not only from the field of economics but also from political science 
and sociology. It is growing towards a second generation theory of fiscal 
decentralization that explicitly accounts for political processes in a setting of 
asymmetric problems of collective decision making and their impact on the 
outcome (Qian and Weingast 1997; Oates 2005; Weingast 2009). 
This chapter discusses the most relevant literature underpinning this study. 
The discussion starts with the evolution of the decentralization theory from the 
traditional theory to the second generation theory (Section 2.2). Given that 
improved efficiency is considered as the main objective of decentralized public 
service provision, Section 2.3 provides a review of empirical studies on public 
sector efficiency. Section 2.4 considers literature on the methodological issues in 
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measuring and explaining public sector efficiency. Specifically the section 




2.2. The Evolving Decentralization Theory towards the 
Second Generation 
Tiebout’s (1956) inter-jurisdictional competition and Oates’s (1972) fiscal 
federalism theorem are considered as the groundwork of the decentralization 
theory. According to Tiebout (1956), each jurisdiction competes with others to 
provide tax and public service options which are attractive to people to live in. 
Thus peoples’ decisions where to live determines the formation of a jurisdiction 
and creates a market-analogue mechanism for public service provision. Thus 
migration between jurisdictions will lead to an efficient public service provision 
by matching supply and demand. 
Empirical investigations to Tiebout’s (1956) inter-jurisdictional 
competition are provided by Brueckner (1982) and Deller (1990). They use 
residential property values as a proxy variable in identifying whether fiscal 
differentials across jurisdictions leads to migration. They argue that a jurisdiction 
that offers the most comfortable tax and public service options attracts more 
residents. Hence, it leads to an increase in residential property values. However, 
both tests suggest that an optimal provision is induced by rational voting 
behaviour rather than peoples’ decision on where to live, and if preconditions for 
migration exist, it does not prove that migration will lead to an efficient public 
service provision. 
According to Oates (1972), public services should be provided by the 
government closest to the citizen as the closer the government to the citizen the 
better the government in internalizing the benefits and costs of the provision. The 
proposition assumes that the closer the government to the citizens, the better the 
government in able to understand the concerns of the citizens. Thus local decision 
making is more responsive to the people for whom the services are intended, and 
                                                          
3
Other literature names it as a semi-parametric method given it combines non-parametric and 
parametric methods (See Khan and Lewbel 2007; Simar and Wilson 2007). 
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hence encouraging fiscal responsibility and efficiency.
4
The theory assumes that 
preferences across regions are diverse. With no inter-jurisdictional spillovers, a 




The traditional theory of decentralization assumes that governments are 
benevolent social planners which always attempt to maximize social welfare. On 
the contrary, the public choice literature views governments as not social welfare 
maximisers, but public officials who have their own objectives induced by 
political institutions that often diverge from maximizing social welfare (Oates 
2005; Weingast 2009; Persson and Tabellini 2000). The public choice tenet 
becomes a major critic of the traditional theory of decentralization and 
concurrently makes significant contributions to the theoretical development.
6
 
The new approaches of the emerging decentralization literature are 
established on the groundwork of public choice theory. In this approach, the 
outcome of decentralization is not only appraised within a trade-off between taste 
heterogeneity and inter-jurisdictional spillovers, but also within different political 
institutions where accountability becomes a critical point determining the relative 
merit of decentralization and centralization. Seabright (1996) suggests that the 
relative merits between decentralization over centralization depend crucially on 
improved accountability. He argues that centralization allows government to reap 
benefits from inter-jurisdictional policy coordination. However, centralization 
diminishes accountability as localities have no way to reward or punish a central 
government as a consequence of non-verifiable information. Centralization 
reduces the probability of a region electing or rejecting a government/politician at 
election time purely according to its own view to the government’s performance. 
                                                          
4
 This principle is well known as a subsidiarity principle originating from Catholic religious 
teaching, and as a general principle of European Union law. 
5
 The theory that puts decentralized provision in favour to uniform centralized provision is well 
known as economic federalism (Inman 1997). 
6
 In respect to the critic coming from public choice literature, Oates (2005) admits that the 





Then, reduced accountability diminishes the government incentive to act for the 
interests of that region. 
Besley and Coate (1999) provide a model in comparing the welfare effect 
between centralization and decentralization. Parallel to the traditional theory of 
decentralization, the welfare outcome depends on the trade-off between inter-
jurisdictional spillovers and taste heterogeneity. With no spillovers and identical 
districts, a decentralized system results in greater welfare. With spillovers and 
identical districts, a centralized system is superior. In the case of spillovers and 
non-identical districts, the welfare effect depends on the comparison of the 
magnitude of the two effects. They suggest the role of the decision making 
institutions is important. Using a model where a central legislature is composed of 
locally elected representatives and the centralized outcome is a vector of local 
outputs, they argue that the inefficiency effect of a centralized public provision 
depends on how the central legislature functions. As a conclusion, they suggest 
that the relative merits between centralized and decentralized provision depend on 
the trade-off between inefficiencies from resource misallocation associated with a 
centralized system and the losses under a decentralized system when localities 
ignore the spillovers associated with their decision. 
The terminology of the second generation theory was first introduced by 
Qian and Weingast (1997). They offer a new approach which appeals to the 
theory of the firm. The approach is proposed as a critique of the traditional theory 
that ignores incentive problems; why do government officials have incentives to 
behave as prescribed by the theory? In the theory of the firm, managers have their 
own incentives; they do not behave in the interests of shareholders. The incentives 
for managers and the interests of shareholders are then aligned through the 
market. Similar to the theory of the firm, public officials have no reasons to 
advance the interests of citizens. The incentives of government officials and the 
interests of citizens are aligned through appropriate political institutions.
7
 
                                                          
7
This is typically an agency theory. 
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The new literature discusses various issues and their implications within 
different political institutions. Weingast (2009) discusses the second generation 
theory and its implication on taxation and the design of the transfer system. He 
suggests the importance of the fiscal incentive approach. Acknowledging that 
public officials have their own objectives, the fiscal incentive approach 
emphasizes how fiscal institutions create incentives for public officials that affect 
their policy choices to foster local economic performance. Thus, the taxation and 
the transfer system should be designed to induce market preserving 
decentralization.  
Kessing (2010) discusses accountability losses caused by distorted 
elections. He argues that random factors such as weather and economic shocks 
may result in accountable politicians being voted out by mistake, leading to a 
decreased accountability of incumbent politicians. Additionally, he claims that the 
uniformity of service provision in a centralized system is not always considered as 
a factor that reduces efficiency. Whether uniformity of provision reduces 
efficiency or not depends on the origin of how citizens decide their votes. If 
citizens in each region vote on the basis of the level of provision in all regions, 
then uniformity of public service provision is better for reasons of inter-regional 
equity. If citizens vote on the basis of the level of public good provision in their 
own region, the discriminatory regime can reduce accountability. 
Hatfield and Miquel (2008) provide a decentralization framework where 
spillovers and taste heterogeneity are not taken as significant factors. They 
suggest a partial decentralization that depends on a balance between the desire to 
redistribute and the need to avoid highly distortive taxes. Central public goods 
provision becomes redistributive in favour of capital-poor citizens if funded by 
capital taxes as relatively poor citizens prefer to shift the burden of taxation to 
large capital owners. They suggest that centrally provided public goods should be 
funded by capital taxes as a redistributive goal. Koethenbuerger (2008) provides a 
model where the welfare trade-off between decentralization and centralization 
depends on how the policy choices are able to internalize spillovers in public 
consumption. He argues that although spillovers may exist, a decentralized 
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system, if it is welfare enhancing, may promote welfare better than a centralized 
system. 
Hindriks and Lockwood (2009) illustrate the role of political institutions in 
the extent to which voters can control or hold accountable incumbents under 
decentralization and centralization. They show that citizen welfare is lower in a 
centralized system compared to a decentralized system. The reason is that bad 
incumbents can pool with the good ones at a lower cost to themselves under 
centralization. They also show that uniformity under centralization allows voters 
to prevent selective rent diversion, but at the cost of a greater risk of appropriation 
by bad incumbents. In contrast, decentralization provides better circumstances to 
discipline politicians and select good over bad incumbents and hence promote 
better quality of government. 
Other new literature on decentralization discusses the yardstick 
competition mechanism. The competition is induced by inter-jurisdictional 
spillovers in information where citizens are able to benchmark their own local 
jurisdiction using the performance of other jurisdictions. Thus the ability of 
citizens to benchmark is considered as a mechanism to discipline incumbents, 
select good over bad politicians and thus increase accountability (Besley and Case 
1995; Belleflamme and Hindriks 2005; Persson and Tabellini 2000). Khemani 
(2001) provides evidence in the case of India, that local citizens are more vigilant 
in monitoring local government than national government as citizens are more 
able to benchmark, reward, and punish local incumbents. Revelli and Tovmo  
(2007) provide evidence in the case of Norway that comparative performance 
evaluation generates positive spatial auto-correlation in local efficiency indicators. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the difference between the first generation theory 
and the second generation theory of decentralization. The first generation theory 
assumes that government is a benevolent social welfare maximiser. The merits of 
a decentralized system over a centralized system depend on the trade-off between 
taste heterogeneity and spillovers among local governments. The first generation 
theory stands on Tiebout’s (1956) inter-jurisdictional competition where each 
jurisdiction competes with others to provide attractive tax and public service 
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options for people. From the perspective of first generation theory, inter-regional 
transfers function to correct vertical and horizontal imbalances. 
 Extending the traditional theory, the second generation theory stands on 
the assumption that public officials and politicians are rent seekers who always 
attempt to advance their own objectives and that these often diverge from citizens’ 
welfare objectives. The merits of decentralization depend on a set of political 
institutions where political incentives and social welfare are aligned. Competition 
among jurisdictions is induced by informational spillovers across jurisdictions 
where politicians and citizens are able to benchmark the performance of their own 
jurisdiction using information of other jurisdictions’ performance. Hence citizens 
vote on the basis of informational spillovers. 
Table 2.1: Summary of the differences between the first and the second 
generation theories of decentralization 
 First generation theory of 
fiscal decentralization 
Second generation theory 
of fiscal decentralization 
Type of government Benevolent social planner Leviathan 
Goals of government Common objectives- 
maximizing social welfare 
Different objective function 
– rent seeking 
The merit of 
decentralization  
Trade-off between taste 
heterogeneity and spill over 
among localities 
Political institutions, 
political incentive,  








Coping with vertical 
and horizontal 
imbalance 
Intergovernmental transfers  Fiscal incentive approach 
The function of  
intergovernmental 
transfers  






2.3. Empirical Studies on Decentralization and Public Sector 
Efficiency 
The empirical literature on public sector efficiency generally exhibits a typical 
pattern. Efficiency scores are constructed using non-stochastic or stochastic 
approach. Subsequently, an efficiency analysis is employed using descriptive 
statistics, correlation or regression against selected non-discretionary inputs. Some 
are cross-country analyses (Afonso and Aubyn 2005, 2006; Herrera and Pang 
2005; Adam, Delis and Kammas 2008; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007; 
Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi 2005, 2006; Hauner and Kyobe 2008) and some 
are cross-local governments within a country (De Borger et. al 1994, De Borger 
and Kersten 1996; Worthington 2000; Worthington and Dollery 2000; Hauner 
2008; Barankay and Lockwood 2007; Borge,Falch and Tovmo 2008; Balaguer-
Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina 2007; Afonso and Fernandes 2006, 2008; 
Alexander, Haug and Jaforullah 2010). An empirical study carried out by 
Angelopoulos and Philippopoulos (2008) takes the efficiency estimate as an 
explanatory variable for economic growth. 
Among these studies, empirical investigations on the impact of 
decentralization on public sector efficiency are provided by Barankay and 
Lockwood (2007) and Adam, Delis, and Kammas (2008). Barankay and 
Lockwood (2007) investigate the correlation between expenditure decentralization 
and efficiency outcomes. Using a panel regression, they find evidence in the case 
of the Swiss education sector that more decentralized expenditure, measured by 
share of local expenditure to total consolidated expenditure (central + local), is 
associated with higher educational attainment. Adam, Dellis, and Kammas (2008) 
investigate public sector efficiency and fiscal decentralization in the case of 
OECD countries. They find evidence that public sector efficiency is increasing 
with fiscal decentralization. 
Empirical studies on the political economy of decentralization are limited. 
Among this small number of contributors are Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 
(2007), Adam, Delis and Kammas (2008) and Borge, Falch and Tovmo (2008). 
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) investigate whether the outcome of the 
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decentralization depends on the level of political centralization. Using cross-
section and panel data from 75 developing countries over 25 years, they provide 
evidence that the strength of national political parties significantly improves the 
outcomes of decentralization, such as economic growth, quality of government 
and public service provision. They also find evidence that administrative 
subordination does not improve the outcome of decentralization. 
Adam, Dellis and Kammas (2008) investigate public sector efficiency 
against a measure of fiscal decentralization and political variables for 21 OECD 
countries. In the first stage, they use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to obtain a 
public sector efficiency (PSE) score following the method used by Afonso, 
Schucknecht, and Tanzi (2005). In the second stage, they perform an econometric 
analysis to explain the PSE on selected non-discretionary inputs including fiscal 
decentralization measures, coalitions, number of spending ministers, total factor 
productivity growth, dependency ratio, the degree of openness, index of 
government regulation and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. They find evidence 
that fiscal decentralization has a positive and significant effect on public sector 
efficiency. Coalition governments and large government have a negative impact 
on public sector efficiency.
8
 
The Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) and Adam, Delis and Kammas 
(2008) studies are cross-country analyses. Accordingly, these studies are not able 
to capture local political dynamics. In addition, a cross country study suffers from 
different political and fiscal institution bias which is not the case with cross-local 
governments studies (Borge, Falch, and Tovmo 2008). 
Borge, Falch and Tovmo (2008) investigate whether public sector 
efficiency of local government is affected by political and budgetary institutions, 
fiscal capacity and democratic participation. In the first stage, they estimate public 
sector efficiency in Norwegian local governments using several alternative 
measures. Subsequently, using panel data regression with efficiency as the 
                                                          
8
 They use tax revenue decentralization and revenue decentralization as proposed by Stegarescu 
(2005) as an alternative measure to the common measure of fiscal decentralization used in 
Government Financial Statistics. 
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dependant variable, they find evidence that a high degree of party fragmentation 
and high fiscal capacity contribute to low efficiency. They also find evidence that 
greater democratic participation contributes to greater efficiency, and a centralized 
top-down budgetary process contributes to low efficiency. 
 The literature on decentralization in the case of Indonesia is growing. The 
literature mainly discusses the policy implementation and evaluation. More 
specifically it highlights the context, background, institutional arrangements, 
obstacles and its potential impact of such policies in Indonesia (See for example 
Alm, Aten and Bahl 2001). Other literature highlights Indonesia as a case study of 
the policy adoption in comparison with other countries (See Bahl 2006; IMF 
Fiscal Affairs Department 2009). 
 Evaluations of the decentralization policy in relation to particular issues in 
Indonesia are also found in the literature. Corruption is an example. It is one of 
the crucial issues along with power delegation from central to local governments. 
Within weak institutional arrangements in the early stages of the implementation 
of decentralization, corruption was widespread at the local levels (See Rinaldi, 
Purnomo and Damayanti 2007). They reported that in 2006 there were 265 
corruption cases in the local legislatures with almost 1,000 suspects prosecuted by 
Prosecutorial Offices across Indonesia. Not only in the legislatures does the 
corruption occur but also in the executive offices. There were 46 corruption cases 
in 2006 with 61 Governors/Mayors prosecuted. 
 Other literature highlights potential outcomes of decentralization in a 
particular sector following the policy adoption such as in forest management 
(Palmer and Engel 2007; Barr et al. 2006), fisheries management (Satria and 
Matsuda 2004) and education (Arze del Granado et al. 2007; Behrman, Deolalikar 
and Soon 2002; Toyamah and Usman 2004). These studies draw attention to the 
gap between the beliefs that decentralization will result in better outcomes as 





 Given that fiscal decentralization in Indonesia takes place parallel to 
political decentralization and democratization, many scholars draw attention to the 
relationship between decentralization and democratization. They illustrate the 
ambiguity of the relationship between decentralization and democratization in 
Indonesia. Decentralization and democratization in Indonesia have witnessed the 
emergence of new patterns of highly diffuse and decentralized corruption, rule by 
predatory local officials, politik aliran, patron-client affiliation, the rise of money 
politics and the consolidation of old oligarchic powers (See Sulistyo 2002; Hadiz 
2004; Ufen 2006; Tomsa 2008; Chua 2009). In such institutional environment 
decentralization and democratization in Indonesia is characterised as a protracted 
transition rather than a consolidated phase of transition (Malley 2000; Bunte 
2009) and a period of the agony of the decentralization with a gap between 
professional optimism and realistic pessimism (Van Klinken 2007). 
 Despite a growing literature on decentralization in the case of Indonesia, 
there has been little attention to the investigation of the decentralization outcome. 
Any investigation of this matter will be beneficial, not only for its contribution to 
the literature, but also for local government benchmarking. Several publications 
regarding the performance of decentralized local governments have been 
published by the Regional Autonomy Implementation Watch Commission 
(Komisi Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah, KPPOD). The performance 
indicators such as investment climate index, business climate index and 




2.4. Methodological Issues 
2.4.1. Measuring Public Sector Efficiency 
There are four different approaches which are usually used in measuring 
efficiency; deterministic frontier approach (DFA), stochastic frontier approach 
(SFA), data envelopment analysis (DEA) and free disposable hull (FDH). Both 
DFA and SFA are developed on the basis of econometric analysis underlying 
production or cost functions. Once the production or cost function is determined, 
the production frontier can be used as an efficiency benchmark. The difference 
between actual behaviour of an observed unit and the frontier determines the 
degree of the efficiency. The DFA assumes that the difference between actual 
behaviour of an observed unit and the frontier is all due to inefficiency. SFA 
assumes that the difference between actual behaviour and the frontier is due to 
inefficiency and noise. The SFA, first introduced by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 
(1977) has become a standard of econometric based efficiency analysis (Greene 
2008; Coelli et. al 2005; Worthington 2000). 
A comparative efficiency measurement between non-parametric and 
parametric approaches was investigated by De Borger and Kerstens (1996) and 
Worthington (2000). De Borger and Kerstens (1996) provide comparative 
efficiency measurement using DEA, FDH and econometric based techniques in 
the case of Belgian local government. They find large differences in mean 
efficiency scores due to various reference technologies among those techniques. 
They argue that as long as the problem of choosing the best reference technology 
has not been resolved, the ability to accurately measure public sector efficiency is 
still limited. However, they find that despite variability in the efficiency scores, 
the explanatory analysis yields robust results. 
 
Worthington (2000) examines efficiency measurement between a non-
parametric and a parametric approach in the case of Australian local government. 
Given the advantages and the drawbacks of each different technique, he 
emphasizes the need to be aware of different questions, purposes, and 
informational requirements in choosing an appropriate efficiency technique. He 
24 
 
advocates both techniques that should be thought of as complementary in the 
analysis of public sector efficiency. 
In contrast to an econometric based DFA and SFA, the DEA and FDH are 
developed on the basis of mathematical programming. The difference between the 
actual behaviour of an observed unit and the frontier measures relative efficiency 
within a sample. As a non-parametric analysis, DEA and FDH are unable to 
accommodate the probability of the errors due to variable selection and 
measurement. Therefore, efficiency scores obtained through DEA and FDH are 
sensitive to variable selection and measurement. Any inaccuracies in the selection 




Both DEA and FDH are computationally simple and have advantages in 
that they can be implemented without knowing the algebraic form of the 
relationship between outputs and inputs (Coelli et. al 2005). Both DEA and FDH 
are also able to handle multiple outputs which is impossible to do with 
econometric based efficiency techniques. Additionally, DEA is powerful in the 
case where output and input variables are in the form of an index and when price 
data are unavailable or irrelevant as in the case of the public sector (Coelli et. al 
2005). 
Given its advantages, non-parametric techniques have become popular in 
measuring public sector efficiency. Both DEA and FDH have been widely 
adopted in studies measuring efficiency in a specific public sector category such 
as education or health (Afonso and Aubyn 2005, 2006; Herrera and Pang 2005; 
Hauner and Kyobe 2008; Alexander, Haug and Jaforullah 2010) or in 
comprehensive indicator containing several sub-categories in the public sector 
(Afonso, Schucknecht and Tanzi 2005, 2006; Hauner 2008; Adam, Delis and 
Kammas 2008; Afonso and Fernandes 2008). 
                                                          
9
 An important development regarding the statistical issue of DEA efficiency is the work of 
Banker (1993). He provides statistical foundation by identifying conditions under which DEA 




The underlying assumption that the production technology is homogenous 
becomes one of the drawbacks in the efficiency analysis using DEA or FDH. The 
assumption of a homogenous production technology implies that each unit uses 
the same kind of inputs. Consequently, an omission of an important input will 
result in a high efficiency score for a unit that intensively uses the omitted input. It 
also assumes that the quality of the inputs is more or less the same. Hence, the 
efficiency scores will be biased in favour of a unit where the quality is of higher 
grade. Clustering samples with the same characteristics is a common technique 
applied to minimize the input heterogeneity bias as done by Herrera and Pang 







Table 2.2: Summary of studies measuring public sector efficiency 
Author Sample Methodology 
Indicators 
Input Output 
De Borger, et al. (1994) 589 Belgian 
Municipalities 
FDH The number of white and blue collar 
workers 
 
Surface area of buildings owned by 
municipalities 
The surface area of municipal roads 
The number of beneficiaries of minimal 
subsistence grants 
The number of students enrolled in local 
primary schools 
The surface area of public recreational 
facilities 
A proxy variable for the services 
delivered to non-residents: the logarithm 
of the number of non-residents working 
in the municipality divided by the 
logarithm of the total employment in the 
municipality 
     




Total current expenditure 
 
The number of beneficiaries of minimal 
subsistence grants 
The number of students enlisted in local 
primary school 
The surface area of public recreational 
facilities 
Total population 
The fraction of population older than 65 
     
Worthington (2000) 166 Australian 
Municipalities 
DEA, SFA Number of full time equivalent 
employees, 
Other physical expenses 
Financial expenses 
Population, properties receiving DWMS 
Properties receiving sewerage services 
Properties receiving water services 
Length of urban roads 
Length of rural roads (sealed) 
Length of rural roads (unsealed) 
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Afonso, Schucknecht, and Tanzi (2005) 23 Industrialized 
countries 
FDH Total public spending Administrative: Corruption, red tape, 
quality of judiciary, shadow economy 
Education: Secondary school enrolments, 
education achievement 
Health: Infant mortality, life expectancy 
Public infrastructure: Quality of 
communication, transportation 
infrastructure 
Distribution: Income share received by 
40% households of the lowest income 
group 
Stability: Stability of GDP growth, 
inflation 
Economic performance: GDP growth, 
GDP per capita, unemployment 
     
Afonso and Aubyn (2005) OECD countries DEA, FDH Education: The total intended 
instruction time in public institutions 
in hours per year for those 12–14 
year old, and the number of teachers 
per student in public and private 
institutions for secondary education, 
calculation based on full-time 
equivalents. 
Health: In-patient beds, medical 
technology indicators, health 
employment 
Education: The performance of 15 year 
old on PISA reading, mathematics and 
science literacy scale in 2000 
Health: Life expectancy, infant and 
maternal mortality 
 
     
Afonso and Aubyn (2006) Educational System of 
OECD Countries 
DEA Number of teachers per student 
Time spent at school 
 
Student performance, the 2003 results 
from the Programme for International 





Afonso and Fernandes (2006) 51 Municipalities in 
Lisbon Region and 
Vale do Tejo 
(Portugal)  
DEA Total per-capita municipal 
expenditures 
General administration: Total resident 
population, present population divided 
by the total resident population, resident 
population that came from other 
municipalities divided by the total 
resident population 
Education: School buildings per capita, 
education attainment 
Social activity: Local resident > 65 years 
old 
Basic sanitation and environment 
protection: Percentage of the population 
with clean water, percentage of the 
population with draining water system, 
percentage of population with water 
treatment stations, percentage of 
population with solid waste collection, 
percentage of the buildings with solid 
waste collection, recycled materials 
given or sold 
     
Herrera and Pang (2005) 140 developing 
countries 
FDH and DEA Expenditure on education and health. Education: Primary school enrolments 
(gross and net), secondary school 
enrolments (gross and net), literacy of 
youth, average years of school, first level 
complete, second level complete, and 
learning scores 
Health: Life expectancy at birth, 
immunization (DPT9 and measles), and 
the disability-adjusted life expectancy 
(DALE) 
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Afonso, Schucknecht, and Tanzi (2006) New EU member states 
and emerging markets 
DEA Socio-economic Indicators: 
Public consumption as proxy for 
input to produce administrative 
outcomes, 
Health expenditure (for health 
performance/outcome indicators), 




Transfers and subsidies as proxies for 
input to affect the income 
distribution, 
Total spending as proxy for the input 
to affect economic stabilization 
(given that larger public sectors are 
claimed to make economies more 
stable), 
Total spending also as a proxy input 
for economic efficiency and the 
distortive effects of taxation needed 
to finance total expenditure 
Socio-economic indicators: 
Administrative(Corruption, red tape, 
quality of judiciary, shadow economy), 
Education (Quality of math and science), 






Distribution (Gini coefficient), 
Stability (Stability of GDP growth, 
inflation), 
Economic performance (GDP real 
growth, unemployment) 
     
Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina 
(2007) 
Local Governments in 
the Comunitat 
Valenciana (Spain) 
FDH and DEA Wages and Salaries 




Number of lighting points,  
Total population, Tons of waste 
Street infrastructure surface area 
Registered area of public parks 
Quality (categorical variables) 
     
Hauner and Kyobe (2008) Education  and health 
sector of 114 countries 
DEA Health and Education expenditure Education: Primary enrolment rate, 
secondary enrolment rate 
Health: DPT immunisation rate, 
physicians to population ratio, share of 
public spending in total health spending  
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Hauner (2008) 89 regions in Russia  DEA Expenditure in health, education, and 
social protection 
Infectious and parasite diseases per 1000 
population 
Complication during pregnancy or 
postnatal periods, per 1000 population 
Infant mortality rate 
Life expectancy at birth in years 
Pre-schooling coverage of children in 
percentage of applicable age of children  
Primary professional education coverage 
Secondary professional education 
coverage 
General education coverage 
Poverty, Income inequality 
     
Afonso and Fernandes (2008) 308 Municipalities in 
Portugal, clustered in 5 
NUTS-2 regions 
DEA Total municipal expenditure per 
inhabitant 
Social services: Local inhabitants> 65 
years old as a percentage of the total 
resident population 
Basic education: School buildings per 
capita and gross primary enrolment ratio 
Cultural services: Number of library 
users in a percentage of total resident 
population 
Sanitation: water supply 
Territory organisation: The number of 
licenses for building construction 
Roads infrastructure: The length of road 
per population maintained by 
municipalities  
     
Adam, Delis and Kammas (2008) 21 OECD countries DEA Total public spending Economic performance:  GDP per capita, 
unemployment rate, GDP growth rate 
Economic stability: Standard deviation 
of GDP growth rate and inflation rate 
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2.4.2. Explaining Public Sector Efficiency 
Much of the empirical literature on public sector efficiency attempts to explain 
public sector efficiency using a regression analysis. The efficiency score obtained 
through DEA that includes only controllable inputs in the first stage is regressed 
against non-discretionary inputs in the second stage.
10
 In the DEA literature, the 
adoption of the two-stage method to handle non-discretionary inputs is the most 
recommended among other approaches (See Coelli et. al 2005). However, it is 
imperative to note that given the nature of regression analysis, it requires correct 
specification of the functional form of the regression model. Any misspecification 
of the regression model will potentially distort the result (Thanassoulis et. al 
2008). 
In conjunction with the wide adoption of the two-stage method, recent 
critical developments embracing this method include the work of Simar and 
Wilson (2007, 2008), Banker and Natarajan (2008) and McDonald (2009). Simar 
and Wilson (2007, 2008) address several problems which potentially cause the 
results to be invalid. First, the DEA efficiency score as a dependent variable is a 
biased estimator for efficiency. As a consequent, the regression parameters may 
also be biased. Second, the efficiency scores obtained from DEA are serially 
correlated and hence standard approaches to inference are invalid. Third, in some 
cases, if the input-output variables used in assessing DEA efficiency are 
correlated with the independent variables, the error term is also correlated. Thus, 
the result may tell nothing about efficiency. Additionally, it is argued that the 
application of the two-stage method in most studies does not describe the data 
generating process (DGP) for which the second stage would be sensible. Coping 
with these problems, Simar and Wilson suggest a double bootstrap procedure to 
permit valid inference and to improve statistical efficiency.
11
 
As far as can be determined, only a few studies explaining DEA efficiency 
scores through a regression model have taken the issues raised by Simar and 
                                                          
10
Other literature names it as an environmental variable or exogenous variable or non-physical 
input. 
11
Wilson (2003) provides several tests for the independence. Once the independence is hold, the 
bootstrap methods could be simplified, reducing computational burden. 
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Wilson (2007) into consideration. Among these are Afonso and Aubyn (2006) and 
Adam, Delis and Kammas (2008). A recent paper that employs the double 
bootstrap method suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007) can be found in 
Alexander, Haug and Jaforullah (2010). They employ a two-stage double 
bootstrap method in explaining efficiency differences in secondary schools in 
New Zealand. 
Given that the DEA efficiency scores are limited to the interval from 0 to 
1, the Tobit model is typically used in the second stage. In many cases, OLS 
regression is also found. Banker and Natarajan (2008) provide statistical 
foundations and a Monte Carlo Simulation to compare the performance of the 
different approaches used in the second stage. They show that a DEA-based 
efficiency followed by OLS or maximum likelihood yields consistent estimators 
of the impact of non-discretionary variables. Based on a Monte Carlo Simulation 
they show that OLS, maximum likelihood and even Tobit for the second stage 
DEA efficiency analysis are sufficient. Hoff  (2007) also advocates Tobit and 
OLS regression models for the second stage DEA compared to the Papke and 
Wooldridge approach (1996) and the unit-inflated beta model. 
In contrast to the Tobit regression model, McDonald (2009) argues that 
OLS yields unbiased  estimators for the second stage DEA efficiency. He argues 
that the DEA efficiency scores are a particular kind of fractional data or 
proportional data, and thus a fractional OLS model is sufficient. On the contrary, 
a Tobit model for the second stage is not appropriate as the DEA efficiency score 
is not generated by a censoring or corner solution (DGP). A recent study that uses 
fractional regression models for the second stage DEA is provided by Ramalho, 
Ramalho and Henriques (2010). 
In contrast to the parametric application for the second stage DEA, 
Ballaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina  (2007) use a non-parametric smoothing 
approachin the second stage. They argue that though non-parametric regression 
and non-parametric density estimation are less powerful in terms of prediction, 
they are extremely informative for explanatory purposes. 
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Table 2.3: Summary of studies explaining public sector efficiency 
Authors Sample 
Method 
Explanatory variables Main findings 
First Stage Second Stage 
Adam, Delis and Kammas (2008) OECD 
countries 
DEA Tobit with SW single 
and double bootstrap 
procedure. 
Fiscal decentralization measures, dependency 
ratio of population, total factor productivity, 
openness indicator, economic freedom, ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, number of spending 
ministers, coalition.   
Strong positive 




measures) to the PSE 
      
De Borger, et al. (1994) 589 Belgian 
Municipalities 
FDH Standard Tobit Model Population, number of parties in municipal 
coalition, the ruling party, average personal 
income, grants, share of the adult population 
holding a higher education degree. 
 
      
Afonso and Fernandes (2008) 308 
Municipalities 
in Portugese, 
clustered in 5 
NUTS-2 
regions 
DEA Standard Tobit model Purchasing power, educational level, 
geographical distance between the municipality 
and its capital district, population. 
 
      






DEA Standard Tobit model Secondary school enrolment, the competence of 
the civil officials (survey results presented in the 
Global Competitiveness Report), per capita 
GDP, property rights indicator, trade openness 
(exports and imports as a share of GDP), 
transparency in public policy ,other more direct 
indicators of political accountability (such as 
civil liberties, political rights or checks and 
balances) 
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DEA Tobit with SW single 
and double bootstrap 
procedure.  




was strongly related 
to GDP per capita 
and adult educational 
attainment. 
      












Fiscal policy variable (tax revenue, grants,  or 
financial liabilities, own revenue, deficit), 
 
Political variable (the percentage of vote 
attained by ruling party in each municipality) 
 
      
Hauner (2008) 89 regions in 
Russia 
DEA OLS Social and environmental conditions (income 
per capita, fuel industry, consumption of alcohol 
and tobacco, above working age population,  
under-working age population) 
 
Relationship to the federal government (distance 
from Moscow, population, transfer)  
 
Quality of governance (investment risk, share of 
the shadow economy) 
 
Democratic control (academic attainment, 
urbanism, press freedom index, competitiveness 
of election) 
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DEA OLS Economic determinants: Education spending 
and health spending, income per capita, country 
classification as commodity exporter or  
developing country (dummy), inflation, trade 
liberalization, openness. 
 
Institutional determinants: Accountability and 
corruption control, democracy, durable regime, 
social infrastructure, schooling (specific for 
health efficiency). 
 
Demographic and geographic determinants: 
Population >65 and population <14, population 














The discussion in this chapter has considered the literature which is considered 
relevant for constructing a theoretical foundation for an empirical model tested in 
Chapters 4 and 5. First, the discussion reviews the literature on fiscal federalism 
which is well recognized as the traditional theory of decentralization. The 
discussion then reviews the new literature that extends and enriches fiscal 
federalism literature. The new literature is identified as the second generation 
theory of decentralization and has motivated the objectives of this study as the 
literature emphasizes political institutions and politicians’ behaviour in a setting 
of asymmetric information that affects the outcome of decentralization. 
 The discussion also provides some empirical studies in measuring and 
explaining public sector efficiency. In particular, the discussion clarifies 
methodological issues based on previous studies. The issues are then taken as a 
consideration in constructing the empirical model and the estimation technique 
discussed further in Chapter 5. Public sector efficiency is estimated using 
nonparametric data envelopment analysis at the first stage. Subsequently the 
efficiency estimate is regressed against selected explanatory variables in a panel 
data structure. 
 There are two central issues in selecting an appropriate estimation 
technique. First, several explanatory variables are characterised as time-invariant 
variables. As a consequence, a standard fixed effect estimator is not able to yield 
coefficient estimates; and thus, fixed effect vector decomposition is chosen. 
Second, the dependent variable is limited to an interval from 0 to 1. However, it is 
considered as a fractional data, not as a censored data generating process. 





Issues and Progress in Selected 





The literature survey discussed in the preceding chapter reveals that Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is popular as a method used to generate public 
sector efficiency scores. DEA is appropriate to measure efficiency in the case of 
the public sector where price information is unavailable or even irrelevant. It is 
also suitable to measure efficiency where output and input variables are in the 
form of an index. In addition, it is applicable in the case of a production process 
that involves multiple outputs which is a situation where econometric based 
efficiency analysis is impossible. 
However, as a non-parametric method, the efficiency score obtained 
through DEA is sensitive due to errors in the input-output selection and 
measurement. Hence, the selection and measurement of the input-output variables 
is critical. One should be aware of the intention and condition to which DEA is 
adopted. More input and output variables involved in the computation may not 
achieve better results. The substance of the selection stands on the relevance of 
the input-output to a particular circumstance. A calculation with different types of 
input-output variables as well as different techniques will generate different 
efficiency scores. However, this does not have an effect on the robustness of the 
explanatory analysis (See De Borger and Kerstens 1996). 
In order to motivate the significance of the input-output variables used in 
the efficiency calculation in this study, this chapter discusses issues and progress 
in selected public categories and associated indicators. The public sector 
categories selected in this study involve education, health, water supply (basic 
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infrastructure), and poverty mitigation. The substance of the discussion generally 
reveals a variation in public sector performance across decentralized local 
governments in Indonesia. 
 
3.2. Education: Targeting “Basic Education for All”  
Like most of Indonesia’s public sectors, the education sector was centralized. This 
occurred under the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of 
Indonesia. Educational policy was set at the national level and financed through 
the national budget, including spending on educational staff salaries for all levels 
of government. The delegation to sub-national governments was conducted under 
a so-called “deconcentration” system where the central government delegated 
particular management responsibilities to branch offices at provincial or district 
levels. In this sort of delegation system, local government officials conducted the 
administration on behalf of central offices.  
Based on Law 22/1999dealing with Regional Government, the education 
sector is among the sectors delegated to local governments as an obligatory 
function.
12
 How the decentralized education sector is applied is defined in 
Education Law 20/2003. The Law mandates Kabupaten/Kota district governments 
to deliver basic and secondary education.
13
 Provincial governments are 
responsible for conducting inter-local government coordination concerning 
educational attainment, teacher skill development, and inter-local service 
provision in the education sector. The central government determines national 
education standards and policy (Article 50 Law 20/2003). However, the 
implementation of a decentralized education sector has encountered several 
problems as a result of unclear, incomplete, and inappropriate assignment of 
governance and management functions, as well as a shortage of management and 
technical skills needed to operate such a decentralized education system (See Arze 
del Granado et. al 2007; The World Bank 2004a). 
 
                                                          
12
The law was enacted as the legal basis for decentralization policy. It is now amended by Law 
32/2004. 
13
 The law defines basic education (9 years grade compulsory) comprising the first 6 grades of 
primary school and 3 years of junior secondary school. 
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Indonesia has a commitment to achieve education for all. The 9 years 
compulsory basic education program was launched in 1994 to achieve the 
“education for all” goal. The program targets 7-15 year old children to achieve 
basic education to the junior secondary level. The program aimed to reach 100% 
participation rate at the primary level and 96% participation rate at the junior 
secondary level by 2009. By the end of 2015, the program aims to achieve 100% 
realization of 9 years compulsory basic education (Indonesia Millennium 
Development Goals Progress Report  2010).  
Figure 3.1 illustrates progress in the school participation rate. As a result 
of a consistent drive to build schools across the country since before 
decentralization, the participation rate shows a consistent increase at every level 
of education.
14
 The gross participation rate at primary level education has 
achieved full coverage. However, the participation rates in junior and senior 
secondary levels remain low which presents a challenge to the goal of education 
for all and 9 years compulsory schooling. 
In 2005, the central government launched a “Bantuan Operasional Sekolah 
(BOS)” subsidy program. The program is intended to finance school operations so 
that tuition fees that burden parents/carers could be eliminated. In conjunction 
with BOS, the central government also launched a “Bantuan Siswa Miskin 
(BSM)” scholarship for the poor that aims to minimize the school drop-out rate. 
The BOS subsidy program has been adopted by several local governments, 
financed through their local budgets. As a result, a number of local governments 
have been able to operate 9 years compulsory basic education with free tuition. 
  
                                                          
14
The budget allocation aimed to build primary school buildings across country was administered 
specifically in a so called “Instruksi Presiden (INPRES)” policy. 
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Figure 3.1: Progress in school participation rates in Indonesia 
 
 
 : primary level net participation rate 
 : primary level gross participation rate 
 : junior secondary level net participation rate 
 : junior secondary level gross participation rate 
 
Source: BPS (Centre Bureau of Statistics), Susenas (National Socio-Economic 
Survey), and Ministry of Education the Republic of Indonesia. 
 
 As a country with a large population and wide geographic dispersion, 
inequality across income groups and regional gaps remain as a fundamental issue. 
In 2008, with Papua as an exception, all provinces had achieved net participation 
above 90% in the primary level education. Net participation of primary level 
education in Papua was 82.9%. While the difference between the primary level 
participation rates across provinces is small, the difference in the secondary level 
participation rates is still high. The regional participation rate ranged from 48.6% 
to 76.7% at junior secondary level and 33.5% to 62.1% at senior secondary level. 
Indonesia’s MDG claims that socio-economic factors have been a cause of 
participation rates remaining low. Many children from poor families drop out of 
school as they have to work. Lack of educational infrastructure, irrelevant 
curriculum, underqualified teachers, as well as an unbalanced teacher distribution 
across regions, have also been sources of the low participation rate (Indonesia 
Millennium Development Goals Progress Report  2010). Therefore, under the 
decentralized system, the education sector is targeted, mainly to achieving 
9 years compulsory 
Basic education  
Economic crisis Decentralization 
“Big Bang” 




universal participation of 9 years compulsory basic education, eliminating 
regional and income group gaps, improving the quality and relevance of 
schooling, and improving the education management system (See Behrman, 
Deolalikar and Soon 2002; Toyamah and Usman 2004; The World Bank 2004). 
Figure 3.2: School participation rate, provincial level 
 
Source: BPS (Centre Bureau of Statistics). 
 The commitment to improve education performance results in a significant 
increase in the budget allocation for education. Moreover, the budget allocation 
for the education sector is explicitly specified in the 2002 amended constitution. 
The constitution mandates all levels of government to devote at least 20% of the 
budget (central + provincial + local) to the education sector. Starting from 2003, 
teacher salaries are excluded from the 20% allocation leading to pressure on every 
level of government to increase discretionary spending in the education sector. 
Nevertheless, although spending in the education sector tends to be consistently 
increased, it never achieves the 20% minimum requirement. This had led to a 
national debate on the budget legitimacy. The debate was carried to the 
constitutional court to review the budget spending as to whether it is in line with 
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all levels of government to fully complete the 20% minimum requirement starting 
from 2009. Otherwise, the budget will be considered as unconstitutional.
15
 Table 
3.1 shows an upward trend in spending on the education sector that reached 
16.8% of total spending in 2007. The upward trend is continuing as a consequence 
of the 20% minimum requirement on spending for education. 
Table 3.1: National public spending on education in trillions Rupiah  
(central + provinces + districts) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006* 2007** 
Nominal National Education Expenditures 42.3 53.1 64.8 63.1 78.6 114.7 131.0 
National Education Expenditures (2001 constant price)  42.3 47.4 54.3 49.8 56.2 72.7 78.1 
Growth real national education expenditure 40.3 8.5 18.4 -8.4 12.8 29.4 7.5 
Education Expenditures (% to total national expenditures) 12.0 15.7 16.0 14.2 14.7 15.7 16.8 
Education Expenditures (% to GDP) 2.5 2.8 3.2 2.8 2.9 3.5 3.9 
Total Nominal national expenditures 352.8 336.5 405.4 445.3 535.8 728.2 778.2 
Total real national expenditures (2001 price) 352.8 300.8 339.9 351.6 382.9 461.3 464.0 
Government Size (total exp. As % of GDP) 21.0 18.1 19.8 19.6 19.6 22.0 22.0 
Source: World Bank staff calculation based on Ministry of Finance and SIKD 
(Regional Finance Information system). 
Note: * = budget, ** = estimated 
 
3.3. Health: Improving the Level of Health Status 
A number of indicators are available to portray the level of health status. A 
proportion of indicators depict performance measures in the process of health 
service delivery. These indicators usually deal with the quantity and the quality of 
health infrastructures such as the ratio of available doctors, nurses, hospitals and 
other health providers per resident in a particular region. Other indicators deal 
with particular health services in a specific area. Examples are coverage of a 
particular immunization or contraception. Other indicators can take the form of 
health outcome performance measures such as a life expectancy index, an infant 
mortality index, a maternal mortality index or even a prevalence indicator of the 
incidence of specific diseases such as HIV or tuberculosis. 
This study takes the infant mortality Rate (IMR) and the annual 
tuberculosis index (ATI) as outcome indicators to portray health sector 
performance. Both indicators are pertinent with regard to the objectives of the 
study. The selected indicators should reflect the flow of services that arise from 
                                                          
15
Constitutional Court No: 013/PUU-VI/2007,date 13 Agustus 2008. 
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public spending. In addition, both indicators are selected as numerous programs as 
well as MDG takes them as targets and hence they are commonly used as 
indicators to portray the level of Indonesia’s health status (See Profil Kesehatan 
Indonesia  2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). Indonesia’s MDG documented goals to 
achieve by 2015 including a decrease the infant mortality rate (IMR) and 
combating HIV/Aids, tuberculosis, malaria and other contagious diseases 
(Indonesia Millennium Development Goals Progress Report  2010). 
Indonesia is among South East Asian countries that have a high incidence 
of tuberculosis (TB). Therefore, Indonesia’s MDG specifically targets to reduce 
by half the incidence of tuberculosis by 2015. It also targets to achieve at least 
70% of TB sufferers are detected and treated by the direct observed treatment 
short cure chemotherapy (DOTS) program or the direct monitoring medication 
program (PMO), and achieve at least 85% success rate (Profil Kesehatan 
Indonesia  2008). Figure 6.3 shows progress in the case detection rate (CDR) and 
the success rate (SR) in tuberculosis medication. 
A consistent drive to increase health status since before decentralization 
has been able to improve several important health indicators. The infant mortality 
rate decreased from 46 to 35 per 1000 birth lives from 1997 to 2003. Life 
expectancy increased from 65.8 years in 1999 to 66.2 years in 2003. Underweight 
prevalence of children fell from 37.5% in 1989 to 25.8% in 2002 (Mid-Term 
Development Planning 2004-2009).  Nevertheless, several problems still remain 
and become significant issues to deal with in the decentralization. The first 
problem is the disparity of health status across socio-economic groups, regional, 
and rural-urban. The infant and child mortality rate of the lowest income 
household group was 61 per 1000 live births, four times higher than the highest 
income group which was 17. The maternal mortality rate (MMR) and IMR in 
rural areas are higher than those in urban areas. In addition, the IMR and MMR in 
the Eastern Indonesia are higher than in Western Indonesia and higher for the less 
educated group than the higher educated group. The prevalence of underweight 
children in rural areas is higher than that in urban areas. Birth assistance services 
in high income groups are twice that in low income groups. That is 82.3% 
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compared to 39.1%. Immunization coverage in low income groups is lower than 
that of high income groups. 
Figure 3.3: Success rate (SR) and case detection rate (CDR) of tuberculosis 
medication (percentage) 
 
Source:  (Indonesia Millennium Development Goals Progress Report  2010). 
A low level of health service performance also emerges as a crucial issue. 
The coverage of birth assistance service was just 67.7% in 2001 varying from 
only 41.39 % in Maluku to 100% in Bali. Measles immunization for 12-13 month 
old babies covered only 71.6% in 2002 varying from 44.1% in Banten to 91.1% in 
DIY Province. In 2002 there were only 3.5 puskesmas (sub-district based health 
services) for every 100,000 people, with low service quality. Meanwhile the ratios 
of doctors, dentists, specialists and nurses per 100,000 pupils were 7.7, 2.7, 3.0, 
and 8.0 respectively. More than two-thirds of medical specialists were located in 
Java and Bali. Eighteen provinces had the doctors per person ratio lower than the 
national average. The survey on Indonesia’s demographic and health (SDKI) 
illustrates that financial problems, distance and transportation were among the 
causes of the unbalanced health services. Meanwhile, health insurance coverage 
that guarantees health services was only 18.74% in 2001, dominated by those on 




Lack of quantity and low quality as well as inequality of health services 
are crucial issues in the health sector development under the decentralization 
system. In the mid-term development planning (RPJM) 2004-2009, health 
development is intended to increase community access to health services. It 
targets an increase in life expectancy from 66.2 to 67.9 year, a decrease in the 
infant mortality rate from 35 to 25 per 1000 live births, a decrease in the maternal 
mortality rate from 307 to 226 per 100,000 live births, and a decrease in child-
underweight prevalence from 25.8% to 20%. Figure 3.4 shows that more than half 
of all provinces are still resisting with the infant mortality rate higher than 25 in 
2008. 
Figure 3.4: Infant mortality rate (IMR), 2008 
 
 
Source: (Profil Kesehatan Indonesia  2008). 
3.4. Basic Infrastructure: Widening Water Supply Coverage 
Water consumption as a basic need will always be a crucial issue in a large 
population country like Indonesia. In fact, according to Susenas (National Socio-
economic Survey) in 1993 only 37.73% of households in Indonesia had access to 
a government provide, safe reticulated water supply; and only 24.81% of 
households had access to basic sanitation. These conditions have contributed to 
































































































































































































































































































































Departing from the reality of low access to water, Indonesia Millennium 
Development Goal has documented a target to decrease by a half the number of 
households that do not have access to water and basic sanitation by 2015. The 
target is very crucial for local jurisdictions to achieve since fiscal decentralization 
delegates water supply responsibility to the local jurisdictions. How decentralized 
water supply responsibility applies has been confirmed in Government Regulation 
PP. No. 16/2005 on the developing water supply system. The responsibility to 
provide water is critical for local government since the capacity of local 
government to manage water supply and basic sanitation is lacking. At the same 
time, the performance of PDAM as the local government-owned water enterprises 
is poor (Indonesia Millennium Development Goals Progress Report  2010). 
 
Figure 3.5: Percentage of households that have access to a safe water supply 
 
 
Source: BPS (Centre Bureau of Statistics), and Susenas (national socio-economic 
survey) (Indonesia Millennium Development Goals Progress Report  2010). 
By 2009, households who are able to access water increased to 47.71% 
and basic sanitation increased to 51.19%. Although the access has increased, there 
are several challenges to overcome. The first challenge is the access disparity 
across rural and urban areas. Households in rural areas have less access than those 
in urban areas. The regional water access disparity is also high with high access as 
in DIY, Bali and North Sulawesi provinces and low access as in Banten, Aceh and 
Bengkulu Provinces. Second, the expansion of water supply infrastructure is less 
than the population growth, especially in urban areas. Meanwhile, the built-in 
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infrastructure is poorly maintained that will potentially hinder the continuity of 
the supply (Indonesia Millennium Development Goals Progress Report  2010). 
Figure 3.6: Percentage of households that have access to a safe water supply, 
provincial level 
 
Source: BPS (Centre Bureau of Statistics), and Susenas (national socio-economic 
survey) (Indonesia Millennium Development Goals Progress Report  2010). 
 
3.5. Poverty Eradication 
Poverty is a major issue in Indonesia’s development. It arises from inequalities 
between income groups, regions and sectors. Much focus on economic growth in 
the early stages of development has put a priority on the industrial sector ahead of 
agriculture, urban areas ahead of rural areas, and Java-oriented development 
ahead of outer Java Island. As a consequence, despite success in speeding up 
economic growth, income inequalities emerges as a serious problem.  
A number of programs to reduce poverty had been systematically 
introduced in 1975-1976. The trilogy of Indonesia development since the second 
“Repelita” (mid-term development planning) targeted equity as the first priority 
ahead of growth and stability. In 1993, the IDT program (assistance program for 
backward villages) was launched on the basis of community-based development. 
This consistent drive to combat poverty has succeeded in reducing the proportion 




Figure 3.7: Population below poverty line, persons (millions) and percentage 
 
 Population below the poverty line (millions) 
 Percentage of population below the poverty line 
Source: BPS (Centre Bureau of Statistics), and Susenas (national socio-economic 
survey) (Indonesia Millennium Development Goals Progress Report  2010). 
 
The poverty line measure was adjusted in 1998 particularly in non-food 
expenditure. It now takes into account: expenditure on education until junior 
secondary high school, expenditure on health adjusted from “puskesmas” services 
to general practitioner services and expenditure on transportation adjusted from 
within-district to inter-district transportation expenditure. These adjustments 
resulted from an unexpected monetary crisis that hit Indonesia mid-1997 plunged 
Indonesia into a deep economic crisis followed by political turmoil. The economy 
contracted and the industrial sector collapsed. As a result, the unemployment rate 
increased leading to a significant increase in the number of poor people. The 
number of poor people below the poverty line more than doubled to 24.2% in 
1998 and 23.4% in 1999, just in the year when decentralization system was firstly 
introduced. Therefore, poverty is one of the crucial issues to deal with in the 
decentralized system. The failure in the safety-net program in response to the 
crisis was believed not to be the result of the scarcity of natural resources, but the 
result of the central-planned program across localities. Therefore, decentralization 
is supposed to result in poverty eradication programs which better match the local 
conditions and better reach the poor people. Thus, assuming that local 
governments have better understanding of local issues, decentralization is 
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expected to have a bigger impact on poverty eradication. As shown in the Figure 
3.7, the number of poor people after decentralization tends to decrease with a 
slight increase in 2006 as a result of a significant cut in subsidies.  
However, the disparity across provinces remains a serious problem. The 
poverty level in 17 provinces is larger than the national average. This indicates a 
large variation in the poverty issue across regions. Papua, Papua Barat and 
Maluku are among provinces that have poverty levels twice the national average. 
Figure 3.8: Percentage of population below poverty line, by Province, 2010 
Source: BPS (Centre Bureau of Statistics), and Susenas (national socio-economic 
survey) (Indonesia Millennium Development Goals Progress Report  2010). 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
The discussion in this Chapter provided issues and progress in selected public 
sector categories with associated indicators. These indicators are considered 
pertinent for decentralized local governments in Indonesia and accordingly taken 
in the measurement of public sector performance index which will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. Different indicators used in the measurement will obviously result in 
different index. However, as it was already argued that this has no effect on the 
robustness of the explanatory analysis. More indicators used in the calculation 
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may also not achieve better results. By showing the background of selected 
indicators, the discussion in this chapter has driven the significance of the public 
performance index used as a measure of the flow of services that arise from local 
spending. 








This chapter presents some of the theoretical foundations for the empirical model 
developed in Chapter 5. It does this by setting out by way of background the 
benefits and costs of decentralized versus centralized provision of public goods.  
The arguments presented in this discussion are standard and can be found in the 
fiscal federalism literature. Following this the Chapter sets out an optimizing 
model of a region that chooses a single local public good to maximize the welfare 
of its citizens while adopting least cost behaviour. The point of developing the 
model is to show that the degree of decentralization of revenue raising powers 
directly affects the optimizing choices of sub-national governments and hence the 
flow of services per unit of jurisdictional expenditure which is the measure of 
local efficiency used in the empirical model of Chapter 5. Finally, the Chapter 
presents a discussion of other variables that might be expected to influence this 
ratio (e.g. democratization and local accountability). These variables are also 
included as explanatory variables in the empirical model.   
4.2. Decentralization versus Centralization 
Suppose an economy with two regions i=1,2. Figure 4.1illustrates the provision of 
a pure local public good under centralization versus decentralization. The vertical 
axis in the figure depicts marginal benefit (MB) and marginal cost (MC); and the 
horizontal axis depicts the quantity of pure public goods    . Suppose i denotes 




. Each region 
determines the level of public service provision that maximizes the net benefit. 
Thus, region 1 characterised with low aggregate demand determines the optimum 
level of public service provision at   
 where      
  
       ; and region 2 
characterised with low aggregate demand determines the optimum level of public 
service provision at   
  where          
  
   . Here, it is shown that under 
52 
 
decentralization, each region has authority to determine the optimum level of each 
public service provision where the sum of marginal benefit of the population 
equals marginal cost. In other words, public service provision in both regions is 
consistent with the Samuelson condition. 










 Assume instead that public good provision is undertaken by a central 
government that determines a single level of public service provision, say  . Here, 
we assume the uniformity of public service provision by a central government for 
both regions because this is a feature of federalism that is observed in practice.
16
 
Under central government provision, we see that region 1 gets “too much” public 
good provision, while region 2 gets “too little” public good provision. Thus, 
assuming uniformity of centralized provision, each region gets the level of 
provision away from its optimum level, which in turn causes inefficiency. The 
inefficiency under centralized provision is illustrated by the dead weight loss abc 
for region 1 and cef for region 2. We can conclude that decentralized public 
service provision is superior on efficiency grounds. Here, we assume that there are 
                                                          
16
If a central government wishes local governments to provide a particular local public good to a 
standard, a central government can mandate local governments to provide uniform provision. For 
example the provision of basic education is decentralized to local governments in Indonesia. 
However, the central government sets a national standard curriculum to pursue and 9 years 
compulsory basic education to accomplish. The mandate is stated in the constitution of which each 
level of government must at least allocate 20% of its’ total budget to the education sector. 
     
  
   
 
     
  
   
          
 
   
 
    
    
    
  
    
    
b 
e 




no externalities among regions and the central government is not able to diversify 
its provision to match each region’s preferences. 
 Figure 4.2 illustrates local public good provision with the presence of 
externalities. Thus, the sum of marginal benefits in each region is now inclusive 
of externalities. If each region ignores these externalities (pursues self-interest), 
each will under-provide local public goods, for example     and     . At these 
levels, local public good provision creates an additional social cost illustrated in 
figure 4.2 by the deadweight loss abc for region 1, and the dead weight loss def 
for region 2. 









The problem of inter-jurisdictional externalities in local public good 
provision becomes a central issue confronting decentralized public service 
provision. The presence of externalities, if ignored by regions, can undermine 
efficiency.
17
 For example, emission from factories in region 1 contributes to acid 
pollution in region 2; or public expenditures on education in region 1 can benefit 
employers in region 2. The case of water management can be mentioned as a real 
case example of externalities in Indonesia. Decentralization delegates the 
responsibility to provide a safe water supply to kabupaten/kota governments. 
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 Under-provision of a local public good is often characterized as a prisoners’ dilemma game in 
which states free ride on each other’s provision. 
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Several local governments source their safe water supply from streams that flow 
through other local jurisdictions. The fact that the stream flows across local 
jurisdictions often causes inter-jurisdictional externalities problems especially 
poor water condition and stream conservation. Government regulation PP. No. 
16/2005 on the developing water supply system has delegated provincial 
governments to harmonize this issue. However, it does not work well as in 
Indonesia’s multi-level government system, provincial governments do not have 
the political power to control local governments. 
Another example of externalities in Indonesia is found in marine fisheries 
management. Prior to decentralization, marine fisheries management was 
centralized and accordingly the marine environment was open access for all local 
fishermen. Decentralization delegates marine fisheries management to local 
governments allowing local governments to set up fisheries management systems 
at the local level. This often causes externalities problems across local 
jurisdictions. Conflicts between fishermen often happen with fish-stock depletion 
as a central issue (See Satria and Matsuda 2004). 
The introduction of transfers from higher levels of governments to lower 
levels of governments can eliminate inefficiency arising from inter-jurisdictional 
externalities. This kind of transfer is often called a matching grant. The rationale 
of this transfer is different from transfers aiming to correct a fiscal gap.
18
  
Figure 4.3 illustrates the introduction of transfers to correct for 
externalities. Here,      
  
    is the sum of marginal benefit inclusive of 
externalities. Assuming that regions are free riders, the level of public good 
provision is at     which is less than provision at   
 . The introduction of a transfer 
    reduces    to       . Thus, it can be seen that although the regions are 
still free riders, the provision of local public goods increases to     which is now 
equal to   
 ; and eliminates the deadweight loss abc. 
                                                          
18
 Fiscal gaps often arise as a consequence of the assignment of tax and spending powers. It is 
believed that taxation cost at the lower level of government is higher than that at the higher level 
of government. Accordingly decentralization applies only to spending power, while taxing power 
is still centralized, resulting in substantial fiscal gaps. As a result, fiscal gap transfers should be 
made for lower level governments. 
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The optimal transfer rate should be determined by the size of externalities. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates that external benefits will not be taken into account by any 
particular local government in deciding how much public good should be 
provided. Thus, too little externality-generating activity will be undertaken unless 
the local government receives a fixed unit of subsidy just to equal the value of 
marginal benefit inclusive of externalities. In Figure 4.3 it is assumed that all local 
governments have the same price elasticity of demand for local services 
(assuming no cross-price elasticity effects). Therefore, all local governments 
receive the same fixed unit of transfer. In the case where price elasticity of 
demand for local services varies across local governments, the correct transfer rate 
differs inversely to the price elasticity of demand for local services. 
As an alternative to a central grant it might be argued that if the regions 
cooperate voluntarily, they can both be made better off. However, there is always 
a coordination problem as a result of the prisoners’ dilemma where cheating on 
the cooperative solution to the game is rewarded. The prisoners’ dilemma problem 
can be illustrated by Figure 4.4 that depicts the utility possibility frontier of 
regions 1 and 2. 
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 Suppose the decentralized outcome with under provision is at point A, 
such that per capita utility in each regions are   
  and  
 . If each region commits 
to cooperate and not to cheat, each region can raise their per capita utility. The 
potential increase in per capita utility of each region is illustrated at any point 
between B and C. The agreement may be self-enforcing or centrally coordinated, 
but the underlying prisoners’ dilemma problem remains. Alternatively, central 
government may enforce an agreement with contracts to make the agreement 
works. However, though inter-jurisdictional agreement is legally enforceable, in 
practice, the enforcement mechanism is often very costly. 
We have seen that inter-jurisdictional externalities become a central issue 
undermining efficiency with decentralized public good provision. In addition, 
economies of scale as an advantage of centralized public service provision have to 
be considered as an opportunity cost of decentralized provision. Thus, 
decentralized public provision promotes efficiency only if regions are able to 
internalize externalities in the local public good provision and preferences across 
regions are diverse. Clearly, there is a trade-off between decentralized and 
centralized public service provision. Figure 4.5 illustrates this.  
The losses from local provision by free riding regions is the deadweight 
loss abc + def = Lf. The losses from “one size fits all” central provision are the 
   












deadweight losseschg + hif = Lc. Thus, the merits of decentralized over 
centralized public service provision depend on the degree of preferences 
heterogeneity and the extent of externalities. With no externalities and non-
identical preferences, decentralized public service provision is superior. With 
externalities and identical preferences, centralized provision is preferred. With 
externalities and non-identical preferences, decentralized public service provision 
is preferred if Lf<Lc and vice versa if Lf>Lc. Given this trade off, the public 
economics literature advocates partial decentralization where central government 
is assigned responsibility for public service provision with significant 
externalities, while local government is assigned for those activities for which 
such externalities are limited or absent, and preferences are diverse. This is known 
as “subsidiarity”. 










If the centre is well informed and concerned about preferences diversity 
and hence able to differentiate public service provision to match each region’s 
preferences, an efficient outcome could be attained through centralized public 
service provision without any fiscal and power delegation to local government. 
This is the case of that Oates (1999) declares as “decentralization in spirit”. In 
reality, especially in a country with high geographical, cultural and ethnical 
diversity like Indonesia, central government is unlikely to have better information 
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than local governments. Moreover, political pressures and intuitional obstacles 
might limit the capacity of central government to provide higher level of public 
services in some jurisdictions than others. 
 
4.3. Optimizing Model 
Using Section 4.2 as a background this section develops a simple optimization 
model for decentralized local governments in a setting where decentralization 
policy mainly delegates expenditure or the provision of local goods to local 
jurisdictions. 
 Suppose that the economy has i=1,...,N sub-national jurisdictions each 
with iL citizens who are identical in terms of income and preferences. It is 
assumed that there is no factor mobility across jurisdictions. Local governments 
are assumed to be benevolent and choose the provision of a single pure public 
good to maximize citizen welfare.  Since all citizens in a particular jurisdiction are 
assumed to be identical, this is equivalent to choosing the provision of the public 
good to maximize per capita welfare and the analysis can be conducted from the 
perspective of a representative citizen.  
 Now consider jurisdiction i where for convenience the remainder of the 
discussion dispenses with the subscript.  The utility function of a representative 
citizen in the jurisdiction is           where x is per capita consumption of a 
private good and   is consumption of a pure local public good.19 The flow of 
services from provision of the local public good is defined by the function 
     where       . Note that citizens are interested in the flow of services 
rather than the production of the public good per se. The jurisdiction is also 
assumed to have the production technology         where  is a fixed vector 
of inputs such as capital and materials. Notice that it is assumed that the public 
good is a variable input to jurisdictional output. The price of the numeraire 
output  is assumed to be one for convenience so         also defines the 
value of jurisdictional output. With this set up the government of the jurisdiction 
solves the following optimization problem: 
                                                          
19
Assuming no spillovers between jurisdictions. 
59 
 
    
 
         (4.1) 
Subject to: 
(i)                 
(ii)          (4.2) 
where      is a least cost function for the public good and    is a given transfer 
from the central government. The budget constraint tells us that total expenditure 
on private consumption and the public good          must be equal to the 
value of output in the jurisdiction          plus the central government 
transfer  .  Hence           is a numeraire that is transformed into the public 
and private good via the equation described by the budget constraint.  The set up 
implies that per capita consumption is 
 
            




Notice that per capita consumption is a function of   conditional on the values of 
the parameters of the model,  ,    and L.  The local jurisdiction’s optimization 
problem now becomes  
 
   
 
   
              
 
       
(4.4) 
The first order necessary condition is  
 
 
             
 
                           
(4.5) 
With rearrangement this yields 
              
     
    
               
(4.6) 
   
                      
The optimal level of public good provision is the value of  , from now on denoted 
as   , that solves the first order necessary condition (4.6), conditional on the 
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values of the parameters for local population, the central government transfer and 
the vector of fixed inputs.  One can show that (4.6) is a Samuelson condition for 
the optimal provision of a public good where the public good is provided to the 
point where marginal benefit             is equal to marginal cost  
      in equilibrium.  Notice that while the marginal benefit is a function of the 
parameters, the marginal cost is not. Since the solution is conditional on the 
parameters of the problem one can define optimal public good provision as a 
function of these parameter, namely, 
            (4.7) 
Thus, conditional on (i) the jurisdiction being benevolent and choosing public 
good provision consistent with the Samuelson condition and (ii) producing the 
public good at least cost, the choice of public good is a function of the 
jurisdiction’s population L, the transfer    from the central government and the 
vector   of fixed inputs employed.  
 The flow of services and spending on the public good in equilibrium can 
be defined as 
               
            
and 
               
           (4.8) 
respectively. The flow of services per unit of public good expenditure in 
equilibrium, denoted as PSE
*
, is  
 
             
          
          
 
(4.9) 
 Thus the equilibrium PSE is a function of population, the central transfer 
and the vector fixed inputs. Since the jurisdiction adopts cost minimizing 
behaviour and is benevolent, in equilibrium the value of the PSE is at its highest 
feasible value and is consistent with a Pareto optimum. If however the jurisdiction 
did not engage in least cost behaviour and/or chose public good provision 
inconsistent with the Samuelson condition (4.6), then any equilibrium    will not 
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be Pareto optimal and the resulting PSE value will no longer be at its maximum 
value for given parameter values. This is more likely to be the case in practice 
where jurisdictional choices will be influenced by non-benevolent behaviour and 
the production of the public good is likely to be other than least cost.  That said 
we know from the above that an efficient and benevolent jurisdiction can achieve 
the maximum feasible PSE ratio which serves in the empirical work of Chapter 5 
as a standard or benchmark against which to compare the actual performance of 
Indonesia’s sub-national jurisdictions.    
 The transfer parameter Tr is a proxy for the degree of decentralization in 
the system of public finance being modelled. One would expect a highly 
decentralized system to have a relatively low Tr and a centralized system to have a 
relatively high Tr with jurisdictions heavily dependent on the centre for funding.  
It should also be noted that theory alone is inconclusive as to the precise 
functional relationship between PSE
*
 and Tr implied by (4.9). On the one hand the 
ability of a local jurisdiction to pay for its public good from own revenues with 
less reliance on central transfers may play a crucial role in improving the flow of 
local services per unit of local spending or jurisdictional efficiency (See Weingast 
2009). This might be because greater local financing is associated with more 
accountability as citizens are vigilant and concerned about local government 
performance. Relying on central financing may also mean that local jurisdictions 
are more likely to increase spending without any efforts to generate their own 
revenue and hence there will be less incentive to improve the efficiency of local 
government and more limited innovation in delivering public services. As a result 
of increased accountability and transparency local own tax revenue may also be 
less costly in terms of its distorting effects on economic activity. Against these 
arguments one must weigh the potential for economies of scale associated with 
central revenue raising; indeed, such economies of scale are often raised as a 
factor in favour of central income and consumption taxes. Having said this we 
will find the relationship between central financing and jurisdictional efficiency 
from the empirical model developed in Chapter 5. There it will be shown that the 
greater the reliance on central transfers the lower is the level of local efficiency as 
measured by the PSE score.  
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 One must also recognize that there are other variables that might be 
considered to be important in explaining the PSE ratio for any particular 
jurisdiction including democratization. These variables, partly non-economic in 
nature, are extremely difficult to derive from an underlying theoretical model.  
Yet one would like to test using empirical methods whether they have had an 
impact on the PSE measure for local jurisdictions in Indonesia, given that 
country’s recent experience with apparent political change.  Therefore to complete 
the discussion of the variables that are used in Chapter 5 to explain the PSE 
variable in Indonesia we now discuss issues such as the potential influence of 
democracy and political accountability on the PSE value for a particular 
jurisdiction.   
 
4.4. Democracy 
Shifting public service provision closer to citizens requires local political 
accountability. Hence, decentralization typically involves political power 
delegation that allows citizens to shape their own local jurisdiction through local 
electoral contest. The executive and legislature that constitute governments are 
elected through competitive electoral contest. Through an election, citizens 
express and delegate their preferences among alternative policies to political 
representatives. Therefore, decentralization involves democratisation and 
empowerment processes. It does not simply stand as an opposed to centralization. 
Decentralization comes as an alliance to democratization. Bahl (2006) explicitly 
defines decentralization as a process of local citizens’ empowerment with regard 
to democratization. 
In the political economic model of an electoral democracy system, how 
votes are transformed into public policies to some extent is nonfigurative. It copes 
with inter-related driving forces where correlation between citizens and politicians 
are shaped in a particular political institution and regime. Persson and Tabellini 
(2000) categorize an electoral contest model into a probabilistic voting and 
legislature bargaining. Both assume some form of representative democracy 
where policy choices are delegated to political representatives. In the probabilistic 
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voting model, competing candidates or parties commit to specific and detailed 
policy promises before the elections. Citizens vote for preferred policy. Thus the 
winning politician or party has complete control over the decision making 
process. This is the most case found in the literature of political analysis of 
decentralization (See Seabright 1996; Besley and Coate 1999; Besley, Persson 
and Sturm 2005, Besley and Smart 2007; Hatfield and Miquel 2008). 
On the other hand, legislature bargaining model assumes that competing 
candidates or parties cannot commit to policies in the advances of the elections. In 
this model, citizens do not vote among alternative policies, but rather among 
alternative agents to be appointed and play policy formation games. This model 
has brought attention to the much of post-election bargaining over economic 
policy that goes on in actual political system, particularly if there is no single 
party holds a majority in the parliament. In this case, the legislature bargaining 
takes place in the government formation, as well as in the budgetary process. The 
legislature bargaining model also opens the eyes to Indonesia’s political 
institution where multi-party takes part in the electoral competitions without any 
clear differentiated platforms and policies among them. In addition, the model 
corresponds to a situation where citizens do not have enough rational information 
as a basis to vote rather than a patron-client affiliation relationship. 
In both models, an election plays its role as a market-like mechanism. A 
political equilibrium is obtained as a result of an interaction between 
politicians/parties offering policies and voters demanding preferred policy. It 
assumes as it is found in the public choice literature that the motive of the rent 
seeker politicians is only to hold office. Thus politicians do not care the policy to 
be implemented as they do not have partisan preferences. They offer policy 
choices, in order to maximize the probability of victory. On the other hand, voters 
select policies that best match their preferences.
20
 
The efficiency of political equilibrium depends on available information 
for voters to decide their vote. The more information voters have dealing with 
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detailed platform of competing parties and politicians’ track record, the more 
influential is the voices to drive politicians in and out of a “political market” 
resulting in a greater political efficiency.
21
 Thus, an electoral contest is considered 
as a way to select good over bad politicians. In addition, an electoral cycle is an 
effective driving force to discipline politicians resulting in improved quality of 
politicians and greater economic performance (Besley and Coate 2000; Besley, 
Persson and Sturm 2005) and less corruption (Fisman and Gatti 2002). 
However, the dramatic increase in the number of countries adopting 
electoral democracy has elevated a fundamental question concerning the variation 
of the impact of democratization on economic performance. Why do some other 
democracies show less performance than others? Keefer and Vlaicu (2005) show 
that 40% of countries that have competitive elections scored no better on a 
common measure of corruption than 50% of countries that do not have 
competitive election. In the World Development Report 2004, The World Bank 
claims that over the last century, the percentage of people living in democracies 
with competitive multi-party elections has increased dramatically. In 1974 only 39 
countries (one in four) were electoral democracies. By the end of 2002, this had 
grown dramatically to 121 governments (three in five). However the rapid 
democratization with representation and liberties does not bring rapid 
improvements in services for poor people.
22
 Electoral democracy in developing 
countries might even create pathology of democracy and decentralization. In a 
situation where required norms and series of institutions that complement 
elections are absent, electoral democracy may serve as a mechanism of social 
control rather than citizens’ choices (Weingast 2009). 
 
 
                                                          
21
 The principle of assessable information voters can attain and the ability of voices to drive in and 
out politicians as political sanction are known as “answerability” and “enforceability” principles 
(See The World Bank 2004b). 
22
 Democracy is defined as political system whose leaders are elected in competitive multi-party 
and multi-candidate processes in which opposition parties have a legitimate chance of attaining 
power or participating in power (Freedom House Annual Report 2002). 
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Source: World Development Report, 2004. 
 Dealing with political decentralization and corruption, Fan, Lin and 
Treisman (2009) argue that there is no simple and general explanation dealing 
with the relationship between decentralization and corruption that holds in 
different contexts and geographical settings. Whether countries have elections or 
not seems not to matter for public perceptions about corruption. 
 
4.5. Accountability 
The accountability relationship between citizens and politicians to some extent is 
complex. Both are linked by voice. Through voice citizens express their 
preferences and influence politicians. Voice as an accountability relationship is 
complicated as it links many citizens with many politicians with different 
interests. Therefore, it potentially creates unbalanced political pressures. A small 
group of elite citizens or even a single elite might be able to put sturdy political 
pressures to influence public service provision to better match their preferences. 
On the other hand, a large group of citizens may be voicelessness and vulnerable. 
They have problems in the political mechanism to voicing their preferences, 
though they are largest voters. They are generally poor people. 
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The complexity of voice for the accountability relationship between 
citizens and politicians causes problems in the political and institutional 
mechanism. Voice takes place at the first point of departure on the flow of 
accountability. Its impact on the outcome is conditional to a process through 
which voice is realized into public goods and services provision. Whether the 
provision of public goods and services matches to the citizens’ preferences 
depends on the quality of governance. A sceptic expression to the political 
mechanism underpinning the efficiency outcome of decentralization is seen in the 
statement of Prud’homme (1994): 
“Preferences are complex and manifold. They relate to the 
importance of the local public sector output (that is, the total 
amount of local tax paid), and to the structure of this output, to 
the set of regulations that will be locally imposed, to the supply 
efficiency is expected, to the distributional implications of the tax-
expenditure package that will be decided. How could all that be 
expressed in a single vote? Local elections, when they exist, are 
usually decided on the basis of personal loyalties or of political 
party loyalties.” 
 
Whereas traditional literature on fiscal decentralization focuses on 
improved efficiency as a result of inter-jurisdictional competition, recent literature 
emphasizes more explicitly on the electoral mechanism, political accountability 
and the relationship between decentralization and democratization. There is an 
emerging theoretical literature emphasizing on the outcome of a political contest 
in relation with public sector policy determination. Hatfield and Miquel argue that 
the outcome of a political contest in a decentralized system determines the 
outcome of decentralization. Neither the governments are benevolent or rent-
seeking agents they implement policies determined through a political contest. 
Seabright (1996) suggests that the political contest plays an important role for 
efficient public service provision as election increases control and government 
accountability. He argues that political decentralization may also be valuable in 
improving government accountability even without preferences diversity between 
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localities. Thus, political decentralization promotes an efficient public service 
provision. Belleflamme and Hindriks (2005) claim that election is a way for 
sorting good over bad incumbents though elections may not work well in 
controlling and sorting politicians as a result of an agency problem. 
Weak institutional governance may hinder potential outcomes of the local 
political contests. Besley and Smart (2007) claim that the quality of government 
plays a crucial role for voters to deal with principal agent problems they face vis a 
vis public officials. In a political agency model, Besley and Smart (2007) explore 
moral hazards and adverse selection as a source of incredible politicians. They 
argue that political contest is a way to discipline incumbents who may act against 
public interests. Their explanation is based on the tradition of the public choice 
literature assuming that government is populated by rationally self-interested 
actors who may use the state to advance their private interests.
23
 Keefer and 
Vlaicu (2005) argue that democratization in developing countries results in a 
variation of public goods provision performance. They argue that the variation is 
caused by low credibility of political competitors’ promises in immature 
democratized countries. In line with Keefer and Vlaicu (2005), Hofman and 
Kaiser (2004) states: 
“The potential benefits of decentralization depend crucially on 
governance. By all accounts, the jury on the link between 
decentralization and prospects for improve governance at local 
level is still out, and there are several concerns about the 
prospects of decentralization/devolution in developing countries. 
On the one hand government closer to the people reduces 
monitoring costs of the electorate, and competition among 
governments could drive out corruption. On the other hand, local 
governments seem to be more prone to elite capture.” 
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The rent seeking-motivated government is a normative tradition of the Public Choice theory 
assuming that government is a rent seeker actor.  
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4.6. Political Agency Considerations 
A political accountability relationship is typically an agency relationship 
involving agents and clients/principals.
24
 Citizens as clients delegate their interests 
over the use of their own resources to agents who receive compensation for their 
efforts to carry out political preferences on behalf of the clients. There is an 
accountability problem between agents and clients in the contractual transactions. 
The problems emerge as a result of the key assumptions underlying the agency 
theory. First, there are always at least partially conflicts of interests between 
actors. Second, there is always asymmetric information between agents and 
clients.
25
 Subsequently, the asymmetric information causes latent opportunistic 
behaviours. Agents tend to exploit information they have over clients in order to 
advance their interest even at the expense of the clients. 
 The opportunistic behaviours as a result of asymmetric information 
include adverse selection and moral hazard. Both are recognized as a general 
problem which is inherent in the contractual relationship. The adverse selection 
takes place when there is unobservable information, belief and value of which 
principals select incapable agents to carry out their preferences. This is a type of 
pre-contractual opportunistic behaviour where asymmetric information is 
exploited by opportunistic politicians so that they are selected. Moral hazard 
opportunistic behaviour takes place when selected agents deviate from a 
contractual concord. This is a type of post-contractual opportunistic behaviour of 




Since clients are not sure that agents really act on behalf of their interests, 
clients arrange incentives to align agents’ interests with their own, and undertake 
activities to monitor agents’ behaviour. The activities carried out by principals in 
                                                          
24
Agency theory was first introduced in the economic literature by Ross (1973) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Mitnick (1975) in political science.  
25
Thesetwo assumptions are well known as preference divergence or incentive incompatibility 
principles (Eckardt 2008). 
26
In the democratic politics, these two types of opportunistic behaviours are expected to be 
eliminated by two principles of answerability and enforceability. In relation to decentralization and 
political accountability, yardstick competition is considered as a way to discipline politicians. 
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monitoring agents’ behaviour result in agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
define the agency costs as the sum of monitoring expenditures by principals, the 
bonding expenditures by agents, and the residual loss due to a welfare reduction. 
The political agency framework seems to be the same as that in the classic 
version.
27
 In this case, the agency relationship contains contracts, incentives, 
monitoring devices, bonding, and other forms of social control undertaken to 
minimize agency costs constitute the element of the contract (Shapiro 2005). 
Nevertheless, the principal-agent relationships in the political framework 
emerge in a more complex relationship within and across political organizations. 
A major problem that causes complexity in the political agency relationship is a 
collective action problem. Through votes, different citizens express different 
preferences to many politicians/parties in the election. At this arena, different 
clients delegate their preferences to the competing agents. Politicians/parties 
compete with others to triumph an electoral competition. The winning 
politicians/parties that hold office act on behalf of citizens and carry out policies 
which are considered in a compliance of the interests of citizens. Collective action 
problem arises as a result of difficulties on how every single principal is sure that 
his preferences are well represented by agent’s action. Another source of the 
problem is difficulties on how agents do understand and bring together the duties 
delegated to them when they are receiving mixed delegations, conflicting orders 
and incentives from multiple principals. Shapiro (2005) in his review on the 
agency theory states: 
“...Political scientists assume multiple agents and principals; 
heterogeneous preferences or goal conflict and competition 
among principals and among agents as well as between them; 
problems of collective actions; a more complicated palate of 
interests and therefore different incentives mobilized to control 
them; varying sources of and mechanism to mitigate 
informational asymmetries; an active role for third parties 
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Shapiro (2005) claims that the conception of agency theory in the political science adopts from 
the economics paradigm rather than the more sociological conception offered by Mitnick (1975). 
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(interest groups, regulated parties, etc.); and a dynamic 
playing filed on which relationships unfold and are 
transformed”.  
In the provision of public goods, the complexity of the political agency 
relationship involves multiple relationship between citizens, politicians, 
bureaucrats, and frontline actors such as doctors, nurses, and teachers, etc., who 
directly provide public goods and services to the citizens. At the point of 
departure, citizens are the principals who delegate their mandate to politicians. 
Politicians as agents then set policies. Afterward, politicians delegate the authority 
to bureaucrats to implement the policy and provide public goods and services. At 
this stage, politicians are the principal, and bureaucrats are the agent. Bureaucrats 
then delegate the authority within the organization to their branch offices, or 
departments who manage frontline providers delivering services directly to the 
citizens as ultimate principals. This multiple principle-agent relationship is 
expressed by Moe (1984) as follows: 
“Democratic politics is easily viewed in principal-agent terms. 
Citizens are principals, politicians are their agents. Politicians 
are principals, bureaucrats are their agent. Bureaucratic 
superiors are principals, bureaucratic subordinates are their 
agents. The whole politics is therefore structured by chain of 
principal-agent relationships, from citizens to politician to 
bureaucratic superior to bureaucratic subordinates and down 
the hierarchy of government to the lowest-level bureaucrats 
who actually deliver services directly to the citizens” 
Figure 4.7 illustrates the flow of accountability relationship in the 
provision of public goods and services. The figure provides a micro-foundation of 
contractual transactions in order to pursue collective objectives and public 
resources mobilization to meet the objectives of citizens. The accountability 
relationship between citizens and politicians is linked through voice. Voice is a 
point of departure on the flow accountability relationship. Through voice citizens 
delegate their preferences to politicians. Within a particular political institution, 
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how the voice containing preferences is realized into services is conditional to the 
politicians-bureaucrats and bureaucrats-frontline providers accountability 
relationships. 











Source: Adapted from The World Bank(2004) 
Taking an agency relationship into a political economy analysis was 
introduced by Niskanen (1975). He discusses the agency relationship between 
vote maximising politicians and budget maximising bureaucrats. Instigated by 
Niskanen (1975), the agency relationship has been adopted in the public choice 
analysis (See Moe 1984; Breton 1998; Bendor, Taylor and Gaalen 1987; Alesina 
and Tabellini 2008) and public administrative and management (See Guy Peters 
and Pierre 2001; Guy Peters 2002). 
Seabright (1996) and Besley and Coate (1999) introduce a decentralization 
model with voters-politicians agency relationship as a framework. The merit of 
decentralization thus depends on the behaviour of political agents with their 
diverged interests. The analysis assumes that there is no political market 
imperfection in the local level. Local citizens are completely able to express their 
preferences through their votes in the electoral contest. On the other hand, elected 
politicians in the executive and legislative act to ideally represent and satisfy 
citizen’s preferences. Hence, the political mechanism is completely accountable 
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for a contractual transaction between citizens and politicians. Thus, local 
governments are always able to provide optimum level of public goods.  The 
Seabright (1996) and Besley and Coate (1999) frameworks have embarked the 
rise of the second generation theory of fiscal federalism with an agency 
relationship as a framework (Oates 2005).  
Political imperfection is prevalent in the real world because of asymmetric 
information, social polarization and lack credibility of politicians. Accordingly, 
political incentives fail to provide optimal public goods and services, even under a 
decentralized system (See Keefer and Khemani  2005). With the political agency 
relationship as a framework, the second generation theory emphasizes the role of 
sufficient political incentives for politicians that affect policy choices and 
economic performances that will satisfy citizens’ welfare (Weingast 2009). 
 
4.7. Clientelism 
Clientelism or patron-client relationship is generally viewed as a factor 
undermining political accountability. It causes political competition fail to induce 
optimal provision of public goods and services (Keefer and Valicu 2005; The 
World Bank 2004). It is defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties 
involving a largely instrumental friendship where an individual of higher socio-
economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide 
protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his 
part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal 
services to the patron (Scott 1972). Clientelism is typically prevalent in 
developing nations as it is considered rational for redistributive coalitions and 
effective as strategies for achieving the goals of powerful constituencies within 
the coalitions. Hence, democratization in developing nations cannot eliminate 
patron-client politic. 
However, clientelism may increase accountability in the short run. In the 
absence of credibility, politicians’ reliance on patrons may improve outcomes 
relative to a situation where politicians can do nothing to make them credible. 
Hence, patron-client can function as an intermediary between politicians and 
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citizens. It may improve accountability in a circumstance where populations are 
polarized around non-service issue such as religious, ethnic, caste or tribal 
background (Keefer and Vlaicu 2005).  
 
4.8. Conclusion 
The discussion in this Chapter has provided the theoretical foundation for the 
empirical work to be undertaken in Chapter 5. It has done this by first providing 
an overview of some of the theoretical benefits and costs of centralized versus 
decentralized provision of public goods.  Using this as background the discussion 
then developed a simple optimizing model of a local jurisdiction and suggested 
that PSE, the flow of local services per unit of expenditure, is determined by the 
level of output of local public services and the degree of decentralization in the 
system of public finance being studied. The precise relationship between PSE and 
decentralization was left unspecified as this will be determined, at least for 
Indonesia, in the empirical work of the next Chapter.   
 The discussion also provided some rationale as to why other mainly non-
economic variables might be important determinants of the PSE for any particular 
jurisdiction. These factors included the influence of democracy and accountability 
of local politicians. They too will be measured in the empirical work of the next 
Chapter and used to attempt to explain variations in the PSE variable across the 
jurisdictions of Indonesia and hence come to some conclusions about their 








Chapter 4 set out the theoretical foundation for the empirical work. The discussion 
there showed that fiscal decentralization, through its potential impact on the cost 
of providing government services, is expected to influence the PSE variable for a 
particular local jurisdiction, though from a theoretical perspective alone the exact 
nature of this relationship is difficult to determine. We also know from the 
discussion in Chapter 4 that other non-economic variables may have an influence 
on PSE, including democratization and accountability. 
 This Chapter develops the empirical model to test these relationships for 
Indonesian local jurisdictions. Following on from the discussion of alternative 
empirical methodologies in the Literature Survey a two stage data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) is selected on the basis that this is the most-accepted method to 
handle non-discretionary inputs that affect efficiency in the public sector.
28
 In the 
first stage a non-parametric method using DEA is employed to construct a PSE 
score for each local jurisdiction in Indonesia. Only discretionary inputs are 
considered in this stage, that is, inputs over which local jurisdictions have control. 
Since the variables used in constructing the PSE score are in the form of an index 
the Chapter explains the process by which the index is created. In the second stage 
a regression analysis is used to analyse the importance of fiscal decentralization 
and the non-economic political variables in explaining jurisdictional PSE scores. 
The results form the basis for the conclusions reached in later Chapters. 
 A major advantage of the two-stage method is that the difference between 
the efficiency score from the first stage and the estimated value from the second 
stage can be used as an index to measure pure technical efficiency which could be 
attributable to management (De Borger and Kerstens 1996). In other words, the 
                                                          
28
Non-discretionary inputs are those which are exogenously determined and could not be 
influenced by management.Ruggiero (1996) suggests to take non-discretionary variables as 
uncontrolled variables into a single stage DEA procedure following Banker and Morey (1986). 
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second stage can be used to correct the efficiency scores for environmental 
variables by using the estimated regression coefficients to adjust all efficiency 
scores to correspond to a common level of the environment. However, if the 
variable used in the first stage is highly correlated with the second stage variables, 
then the results are likely to be biased (Coelli et. al 2005).                                         
5.2. Constructing PSE Scores 
It is well known that public sector output is extremely difficult to measure.  
Nevertheless one can construct a public sector outcome index which we define 
from now on as the Public Sector Performance (PSP) index. Following Afonso, 
Schucknecht and Tanzi (2005, 2006) the PSP index is measured as follows: 
           
 
   
 (5.1) 
where i = 1,...., N regions and j=1,.....,J, public sector categories. One can think of 
PSP as being a proxy for the function      developed from the theoretical model 
of Chapter 4. As a composite indicator the value of PSPij depends on the values of 
certain socio-economic indicators used in public sector category j(Skj).Hence, an 
improvement in public sector performance depends on an improvement in the 
values of those socio-economic indicators: 
              
        
  
    
 
   
     (5.2) 
where k= 1,....,K socio economic indicators. The PSP index is calibrated by 
various socio economic indicators for selected public sector categories involving 
education, health, infrastructure, poverty mitigation as well as macro-economic 
goals. Those categories are selected based on Indonesia-specific public sector 
issues (discussed in Chapter 3). Thus the PSP can be interpreted as the flow of 
services arising from public spending and should reflect the objectives (or 
alternatively the tasks) of the government. Table 5.1 shows selected public sector 
categories and associated indicators. 
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Table 5.1: Outcome indicators used to generate public sector performance 
       in region i. 
Public Services ( j ) Selected Socio-Economic Indicators(Sk) 
  
Education - Net primary enrolment rate (NPE) 
- Net secondary enrolment rate (SPE) 
  
Health - Infant mortality rate (IMR) 
- Annual new tuberculosis incident (ATI) 
  










 - Economic growth (GRT) 
- Unemployment rate (UER) 
a) PDAM is a local government-owned enterprise that is in charge to provide tap water to 
residents. The coverage of the water supply by the PDAM signifies the capacity of local 
government to conform the duty stand on Law 23/2004 and the achievement of the 
millennium development goal target. 
b) Macroeconomic goal is incorporated as an indicator of economic performance. 
 
The indicators in each category are compiled into a single public sector 
performance index (PSP) by giving equal weight to each following the method 
used by Afonso, Schucknecht, and Tanzi (2005). Public Sector Efficiency for 
local government i(PSEi) is then defined as: 
     
    
    
 (5.3) 
where             
 
   and      = expenditure which is a proxy for      
developed in Chapter 4. Thus PSEij defined above in (5.3) is a proxy for the PSE 
variable derived from the theoretical model: see equation (4.9) in Chapter 4. 
Positive but declining marginal productivity of public spending would imply: 
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   (5.4) 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is now employed to estimate the efficiency 
score in Equation (5.3). In this case the application of DEA is essential with 
regard to the situation where there is more than one output: econometrically-based 
efficiency analysis would not suffice in this case. In addition, DEA is suitable in 
cases where the output variables are in the form of outcome indicators and the 
price data are either not available or irrelevant, as in the case of the public sector 
(Coelli et. al 2005). 
 The DEA model is employed with constant returns to scale to generate the 
efficiency score defined in Equation (5.3). Let us use x to represent input costs 
PEX, and y to represent output PSP. Let the subscripts r and j represent particular 
inputs and outputs respectively. Hence, xr represents the rth input and yj represents 
jth output of an observed unit. Let the total number of inputs and outputs be 
represented by R and J where R, J > 0. 
 Multiple inputs and outputs are linearly aggregated using weights. Define 
vras the weight assigned to input xr and uj as the weight assigned to output yj 
where vr, uj > 0. Given these weighted inputs and outputs the efficiency of the 
public sector in region i is obtained as a ratio of the linearly weighted outputs to 
the linearly weighted inputs as follows: 
         
       
 
   
       
 
   
 
(5.5) 
The assessment of weights as defined in Equation (5.5) becomes the central issue. 
DEA tackles this by assigning a unique set of weights for each region. The 
weights for a region are determined using mathematical programming, as those 
weights that maximize its efficiency subject to the condition that the efficiencies 
of other regions (calculated using the same set of weights) is restricted to values 
between 0 and 1. Here there are 33 regions whose efficiencies to be compared so 
N=33. Let a region being measured for its’ efficiency using Formula (5.5) be the 
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mth, where mth = 1th,...,Nth. The mth region is the reference region. The 
mathematical program for an observed unit m is defined as follows:
29
 
   
     
    
       
 
   
       
 





       
 
   
       
 
   






          ; j=1,2...,J;  r=1,2....,R 
where 
   is the efficiency of the mth region, 
    is jth output of the mth region, 
    is the weight of that output, 
    is rth input of the mth region, 
   is the weight of that input, and 
    and     are jth output and rth input, respectively of the ith region, i=1,2...., N. 
Here, i includes m. The mathematical model illustrated above is used to calculate 
output oriented efficiency based on the Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). In 
order to calculate the input oriented efficiency model, the formula is defined in a 
reciprocal version.  
   
    
    
       
 
   
       
 
   
 
Subject to: 
       
 
   
       
 
   










                                                          
29
The fundamentals of the mathematical aspects of this frontier analysis are provided by Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978). 
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5.3. Estimation Model 
The discussion in Chapter 4 indicated that key factors determining a jurisdiction’s 
PSE include the degree of decentralization and political variables which capture 
for example the degree of democratization and accountability. On the basis that 
the political and institutional variables are characterised as time-invariant the 
following empirical model in a panel data structure is therefore postulated:  
                                        (5.7) 
where 
    = PSEit 
     
  
   
   




   
   and               . 
where i denotes an individual cross-section unit, and t denotes time. 
Zit is a vector of time-variant explanatory variables including a fiscal 
decentralization measure (FD) and total factor productivity growth (TFP). Xi is a 
vector of time-invariant political variables including democratic participation 
(DP), political fragmentation (PF), formation of new government (NG) as well as 
institutional variables (IST). The formation of new government is represented by 
the Golkar (GOL) and politik aliran which is characterised by political Islam 
(ISL). Institutional variables (IST) are represented by a corruption perception 
index (COR) and a physical infrastructure index (INF) which are expected to 
capture the impact of the quality of governance on public sector efficiency. 
 The following discussion provides details on how each of the explanatory 
variables on the right hand side of Equation (5.7) is constructed. 
 
5.3.1. Decentralization measure (FD) 
Due to the complexities of a vertical government structure, a measure to best 
approximate the degree of decentralization is one of the critical issues in the 
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empirical studies. An example is in studies concerning the relationship between 
decentralization and economic growth. The ambiguity of the relationship is 
claimed to be due to the problems of the degree of decentralization approximation 
(Martinez-Vazquez 2003; Thornton 2007). Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) also highlight 
that the substantially different results of the empirical studies concerning the 
determinant and impact of the decentralization depends on the measure of 
decentralization used. Moreover, Stegarescu (2005) argues that the measurement 
errors concerning decentralization as an independent variable are more 
problematic in the regression analysis than that as a dependent variable.  
 The conventional measure of the degree of decentralization that has been 
widely used in the empirical studies is ratio of the total budgetary revenue or 
expenditure of sub-national governments to the consolidated government revenue 
or expenditure. Both measures are generally used in the cross-country analysis of 
the decentralization. A drawback of these conventional measures is that they do 
not appropriately capture the decision-making structure and the extent of sub-
central government autonomy over the allocation of their expenditure and revenue 
(See Stegarescu 2005).
30
 Additionally, Boex and Simatupang (2008) argue that 
the conventional measures  are not able to capture the empowerment gain from the 
power delegation. 
 The degree of fiscal decentralization is measured as a ratio of local-own 
revenue to total spending. This ratio measures the degree of a local jurisdiction’s 
ability to manage resources, given tax autonomy and other pure revenue-
generating activities of local governments. This shows the ability of a local 
jurisdiction to internalize the benefits from the delegation of power. 
 Table 5.2 illustrates the structure of local government revenue in 
Indonesia. Regional taxation in the decentralized Indonesia is levied under law 
34/2000 which is now amended by Law 28/2009. Based on the law, the local tax 
bases and tax rates are determined by the central government. As a consequence, 
there is no variation in the tax rates and tax bases between local governments. In 
                                                          
30
More details on the conception and measurement of fiscal decentralization could be seen in Ebel 
and Yilmaz (2002) and Stegarescu (2005). 
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the case where local governments have no authority to determine the tax base and 
tax rates, tax competition among local government becomes irrelevant and hence 
a fiscal decentralization measure may not be able to capture the variation in local 
decision making concerning local taxation. However, even with centrally imposed 
common tax rates, the measure may reflect the de facto institutional capacity 
variation across local governments in administering their tax revenue. 
Table 5.2: The structure of Indonesia’s local government revenue 
  
1. Local government own-revenues (LOR) 
 a. Local Tax a) 
 b. Local retribution b) 
 c.  Income from regional government owned 
companies, managing split off regional assets 
 d. Others c) 
2. Transfers 
 e. Shared tax and non-tax (STX) d) 
 f. General allocation fund (GAF) e) 
 g. Special allocation fund (SAF) g) 
 
a)  Provincial tax 
- vehicle tax 
- vehicle transfer fee 
- fuel tax 
- exploration tax of surface 
and underground water  
 
Local government tax: 
- hotel tax 
- restaurant tax 
- entertainment tax 
- advertisement tax 
- street lighting tax 
- exploration tax of mine (type C-
non-metal and rock) 
- parking tax 
b)  - general service levy 
- business service levy 
- levy on permit 
 
     
c)  - demand deposit account 
fee  
- interest income 
- income from exchange 
rate discrepancy 
- commission, discount and 
other income from trading 
 d)  Regional share of the income from land 
and building tax, land and building right 
acquisition duties, and from natural 
resources 
 
     
e)  Determined on the basis of 
fiscal gap and basic allocation   
 f) Technically specific purpose such as 
reforestation 
Note: The structure of local tax and retributions are based on law 34/2000 which 
is now replaced by law 28/2009. 
Given the definition, the degree of decentralization (FD)is measured as follows: 
    
    
   
 
where LOR is local government own-revenue and TE is total expenditure. 
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5.3.2. Total Factor Productivity growth (TFP)  
The discussion in Chapter 4 indicated that a jurisdiction’s population, a fixed 
vector of inputs (capital and materials) and government transfers are key factors 
determining a jurisdiction’s PSE. This implies that beside transfers which 
represent the degree of decentralization, the productivity of resources is also 
crucial for the PSE. In the empirical model, the growth rate of total factor 
productivity is used as a proxy of local government’s resources productivity. In 
the empirical model, The TFP is also considered as a control variable for the 
efficiency impact. Local governments with high TFP are expected to present high 
productivity in the public sector as well regardless of the level of fiscal 
decentralization, democratization and accountability (See Barankay and 
Lockwood 2007; Adam, Delis and Kammas 2008). 
 The TFP growth is measured using the Solow residual which is estimated 
as the residual of the regression of growth rate of per capita output on the growth 
rate of per capita capital (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). 
 
5.3.3. Political and Institutional Determinants  
The political reform after the downfall of the new order regime has transformed 
Indonesia into a new democratic nation. A number of parties arose with various 
platforms to compete in the election. The political and institutional variables used 
in this study are generated from the 2004 electoral contest, the first election in the 
decentralized Indonesia. Twenty-four parties competed in the contest, of which 
twenty-one of them were new parties.  
 The structure of the political institutions across all jurisdictions is the 
same. Therefore, the variation in the political variables will de facto reflect voters’ 
political preferences. An illustration is the variation in the number of votes or 
seats held by a particular party. The variation reflects the de facto variation in 
local voter’s preferences to differentiated parties. When this variation is linked to 
public sector efficiency, it is expected to exhibit a true association between 
political preferences and public sector efficiency. On the contrary, cross-country 
political studies may not be able to capture any valid association between political 
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variables and public sector efficiency since the association may contain bias in the 
political structure variation across countries. 
 
5.3.3.1. Democratic Participation (DP) 
Democratic participation generally refers to any political activities done by 
citizens to influence government or take part in the government system. It could 
take forms from the most formal one with the intention of voting, to informal ones 
such as protesting, campaigning, petitions, and even community activity. 
Democratic participation is defined specifically as a number of votes in the 
election. Thus, democratic participation (DPi) is defined as the ratio of actual 
voters (AVi) to eligible voters in the election (EVi). 
    
   
   
 
Democratic participation is associated with elements of democratic government 
such as rationality, checks and balances, responsiveness, flexibility, legitimacy, 
and conflict resolution (Kaase and Marsh 1979). Accordingly, higher democratic 
participation is generally associated with citizen’s participation in shaping the 
profile of government with high accountability (Besley and Coate 2000). 
However, robust generalization and systematic evidence on how exactly they 
interrelate are lacking (See Rodrik 2000).  
 To what extent the democratic participation has an impact on the quality of 
the democratic process and economy continues to invite discussion among 
observers. It is generally hypothesized and empirically supported that the upper 
classes tend to have higher participation rates than the lower classes. Accordingly, 
low participation in elections may lead to inequality in representation. In addition, 
the “influence” as a result of low participation in the election is not randomly 
distributed but systematically biased in favour of those with higher incomes, 
wealth and better education (See Lijphart 1997).
31
 On the other hand, the class-
                                                          
31
 Institutional mechanisms are generally taken in order to increase democratic participation in the 
election, such as simple registration rules, weekend voting, infrequent elections, and compulsory 
voting. In Indonesia, the effort to increase democratic participation is institutionalized in the 
Islamic legal opinion of “Majelis Ulama Indonesia”saying that “not to vote” is forbidden.  
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bias in political participation may lead to a better economic performance as the 
participation of the uneducated and poor would worsen the quality of the inputs in 
the political process and thus policies coming out of it (Mueller and Stratman 
2003). Li, et al. (1993) provide evidence that in countries with weak democratic 
institutions, the more privileged classes are able to capture the government and 
bend its policies to advance their benefit at the expense of the large poor voters. 
Poor people are generally characterized with powerlessness and voicelessness. 
Their voices are politically less influential though they represent more votes. 
 Democratic participation in the decentralized democratized Indonesia has 
been a subject of some interest among observers since 1999. Baswedan (2007) 
investigates decentralization and patterns of democracy in Indonesia. He finds 
evidence that the regional autonomy does not directly increase local participation 
though regional autonomy has shifted the focus from national to regional political 
issues. Mujani (2003) more specifically investigates political participation in 
relation to the Islamic tradition in Indonesia.
32
 Ufen (2006) investigates “politik 
aliran” in relation to democratic participation in the decentralized democratized 
Indonesia. 
 The political reality in Indonesia with the features of “politik aliran” and 
“money politic” may distort the significance of democratic participation.“Politik 
aliran” (stream) refers to political parties with strong roots in ethnicity, religion, 
and socio-ideological institutions.
33
“Money politic” refers to a money-driven vote 
condition where citizens vote in exchange for instant money or jobs offered by 
particular candidates. In a situation where “politik aliran” and “money politic” is 
dominant, the relationship between voters and politicians deviates from a political 
agency relationship. People do not vote politicians/parties on the basis of rational 
considerations as principal who delegate their interests to political agents. They 
vote rather on the basis of ethnic and socio-ideological likeness or in exchange for 
money. 
                                                          
32
 An emergence of political parties which socially-rooted to the Islamic tradition and identity is 
investigated to empirically provide evidence on the relation between democratization and the 
Islamic political tradition. 
33
 Further discussion on “politik aliran”, see Ufen (2006). 
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5.3.3.2. Political Fragmentation (PF) 
The emergence of many political parties in the decentralized democratized 
Indonesia result in increased political fragmentation. This section briefly discusses 
concepts and measurement of this political fragmentation as well as its expected 
impact on public sector efficiency. 
 In the public choice literature, political fragmentation has evolved into a 
broader definition, rather than just an ideological aspect. Ricciuti (2004) classifies 
political fragmentation into four aspects. The first is ideological fragmentation 
that refers to the importance of ideological differences among political actors. The 
second is size-fragmentation that refers the number of parties or politicians who 
are actually involved in the decision making process. The third is institutional 
fragmentation that concerns a number of issues from the political system in 
selecting chief executives (presidential or parliamentarian). The fourth concept 
refers to changes in size and ideological composition of a political landscape 
overtime, which is known as over-time fragmentation. 
 This study uses a size-fragmentation concept that measures effective 
number of political parties involved in the decision making process. However, it is 
important to distinguish two cases dealing with the deployment of the size-
fragmentation concept: (i) the size-fragmentation concept from the perspective of 
voters and (ii) the size-fragmentation that indicates the level of dispersed political 
power (Geys 2004). The number of competing parties/politicians indicates the 
degree of political fragmentation. From the perspective of voters, the more parties 
or politicians that compete in the election, the higher the degree of choice. Voters 
decide which of the competing politicians or parties to support. In this case, voters 
have extensive alternatives among parties or politicians to support that will best 
represent their preferences. Therefore, the higher the political fragmentation, the 
better is the political outcome on the ground of citizens’ interests, and 
subsequently, the better is the public sector efficiency. 
 On the other hand, higher political fragmentation indicates the more 
dispersed the political power. A number of parties or politicians have to cooperate 
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and come to a common decision regarding policy issues. Thus, the more 
politically fragmented the decision making the lower is the likelihood that public 
sector policy reform will occur (Mierau, Jong-Apin and de Haan 2007) and the 
lower is the public sector efficiency (Borge, Falch and Tovmo 2008). 
 Highly dispersed political power in the decentralized democratized 
Indonesia as a result of political liberalization should have developed a good 
system of checks and balances and accordingly help improving accountability and 
public sector efficiency. However, politicians’ behaviour in a young democracy 
such as in Indonesia tends to bend the system of checks and balances. Moreover, 
the party partnership in the local political structure also exhibits sophisticated 
patterns as a result of pragmatic party coalitions dealing with local leader 
elections (Pratikno 2009). In this situation the legislature bargaining in an 
environment of highly dispersed political power is distorted in respect to 
improved efficiency. Therefore higher levels of political fragmentation tend to 
reduce public sector efficiency. 
  Several measures of political fragmentation have been proposed by many 
scholars in the literature. Laakso and Taagepera (1979) introduce a measure of the 
effective number of parties (ENP) that refers to the number of hypothetical equal-
size parties that would have the same effect on fractionalization as have the actual 
parties of unequal-size. Perotti and Kantopolous (2002) use the ENP index to 
investigate the effect of the degree of government fractionalization on policy 
outcomes. The ENP index is defined as follows: 
    
 
     
 
   
 
where SHp is share of the seats in the government (assembly) held by party p, and 
P is the total number of parties. 
 Another measure of political fragmentation using a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HH) currently appears in the public choice literature.The HH index is an 
inverse of the ENP. This measure is adapted from a market concentration measure 
in the industrial economics literature. Borge, Falch and Tovmo (2008) use the HH 
index to measure political fragmentation in relation to public sector efficiency. 
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Another measure of political fragmentation found in the public choice literature is 
a political fractionalization index (PF). Elgie and McMenamin (2008) use a PF 
index to measure political fragmentation in relation to a tendency to fiscal deficits 
and political institutionalisation. The fractionalization index is defined as follows: 
         
 
 
   
 
This study uses the size-fragmentation to measure political fragmentation in the 
legislative body. The political fragmentation is measured using a Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HH) defined as follows: 
          
 
 
   
 
where SHp is share of seats in the local assembly held by party p, and P is the total 
number of parties in the local assembly. The higher the HH index, the lower is the 
political fragmentation in a local parliament. The HH index captures the number 
of seats and parties in the local assembly which can be interpreted as the 
probability of two randomly drawn members of the parliament belong to the same 
party (Borge, Falch and Tovmo 2008). 
 
5.3.3.3. The formation of New Government (NG) 
The new order era in Indonesia (1968-1998) is characterized as a period of 
political repression under the President Suharto administration. A number of 
parties were amalgamated and emasculated, opposition was tightly restrained and 
administration was centralized and strongly controlled.
34
 It was almost impossible 
to set up new political parties (See Ufen 2006).
35
 In this period, Golkar as the 
                                                          
34
In 1973, President Suharto simplified the number of parties into three:Golkar as the government 
political vehicle, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development Unification Party), a merge of 
Islamic-rooted parties and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesia Democracy Party), a fusion of 
non-Islamic rooted parties.  
35
Several “parties” were set up by democracy activists, standing in a real opposition against 
hegemonic new-order government. People Opposition Party (Partai Oposisi Rakyat) led by Dita 
Indah Sari and Democratic People Party(Partai Rakyat Demokratik) led by Budiman Sujatmiko 




political vehicle for the regime to sustain its political power was always able to 
maintain the single majority in the parliament, while Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan Indonesia (PPP) and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) as rivals 
were restricted and strongly regulated and hence could not take action as real 
oppositions (See Tomsa 2008). 
 
Table 5.3: Votes and seats of parties in the elections during Indonesia’s new 
order era 
 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 
vote seat Vote Seat Vote Seat vote seat vote seat 
           
Golongan Karya 62.11 232 64.34 242 73.16 299 68.10 282 74.51 325 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 29.29 29 27.78 94 15.97 61 17.01 62 22.43 89 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 8.6 29 7.88 24 10.87 40 14.89 56 3.06 11 
Note: vote as a percentage. 
Source:http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/narasi/2004/03/19/nrs,20040319-
01,id.html, accessed 12 July 2010. 
 
 The political repression was generally justified by the reason to 
maintaining national stability as a necessary condition needed for economic 
development. However, social conflicts were by no means eliminated. Social 
conflicts caused by separatist movements were reinforced in resource-rich regions 
such as Aceh, Riau and East Kalimantan and in historically potential separatism 
such as East Timor, Aceh, Maluku and Papua. Dissatisfactions to the political 
repression of the long-standing regime amplified several political disputes leading 
to national instability.
36
 Internal conflicts in the PDI reached a peak and led to a 
riot on 27 July 1996.
37
 Subsequently, President Suharto resigned in May 1998 in 
response to mass protests of uncontrolled political and economic instability.
38
 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
36
 East Timor is separated from the Republic of Indonesia as a result of a referendum conducted in 
1999 under the administration of President B.J. Habibie, the predecessor of President Suharto. 
37
 In the 1993 PDI national convention, Megawati Sukarnoputri was elected as the chairperson 
defeating the regime-backed candidate. In response to the congress’s result, the regime brought 
about an extraordinary convention to select an alternative chairperson. However Megawati still 
won the battle. Another convention was engineered in June 1996 supported by the regime where 
Suryadi was designated as the Chairperson. From that moment on there were two leaderships in 
the PDI that caused a serious political clash. The clash reached its climax on 27 July 1996 when 
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 Political reform emerged as the most urgent agenda soon after the transfer 
of power from President Suharto to the interim President Habibie in May 1998. 
As the President in the transition period, Habibie was responsible for preparing an 
election in 1999 in which he promised to be fair, free and open for new political 
parties to participate and compete.
39
 This period is noted as the era of political 
liberalization. Golkar lost the domination in the parliamentary house. The 1999 
election changed the political composition in the parliament with the presence of a 
mixture of new participating parties. Apart from the changing composition, the 
new government as an outcome from the successful, free and fair 2009 election 
might have little to do with the main reform issues such as corruption, the 








                                                                                                                                                               
PDI under Suryadi fought PDI Megawati with violence to take over the PDI’s headquarters in 
Jakarta. The riot is well known as a kudatuli case (kasus dua puluh tujuh juli). 
In the 1997 election, PDI Megawati gave their votes to PPP leading to a significant decrease with 
only 3% votes obtained by regime-backed PDI. 
Following the downfall of the regime, Megawati declared Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle 
(PDI-P) to differentiate from the government-backed PDI. 
38
 See Sulistyo (2002). 
39
Many parties were registered with various platforms ranging from professional groups, backed-
Islamic organization groups, ethnic groups, women, old people, and religious minorities groups, 








Seats (%) Seats (%) 
Partai Golongan Karya 118 (25.76) 128 (23.27) 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan 151 (32.97) 109 (19.82) 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 58 (12.66) 58 (10.55) 
Partai Demokrat  55 (10.00) 
Partai Amanat Nasional 34 (7.42) 53 (9.64) 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 51 (11.14) 52 (9.45) 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (1999 : Partai Keadilan) 7 (1.53) 45 (8.18) 
Partai Bintang Reformasi  14 (2.55) 
Partai Damai Sejahtera  13 (2.36) 
Partai Bulan Bintang 13 (2.84) 11 (2.00) 
Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan  4 (0.73) 
Partai Persatuan Nahdhatul Ummah 5 (1.09)  
Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia 4 (0.87) 1 (0.18) 
Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa  2 (0.36) 
Partai Pelopor  3 (0.55) 
Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme  1 (0.18) 
Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia 2 (0.44) 1 (0.18) 
Partai Sarikat Indonesia 3 (0.66)  
Others 12 (2.62)  
Total 458 550 
Source:http://ditpolkom.bappenas.go.id/basedir/Politik%20Dalam%20Negeri/1)%
20Pemilu/3)%20Pemilu%20tahun%202004/Perbandingan%20Kursi%20Parpol%
20Pemilu%202004%20vs%201999.pdf,accessed 12 July 2010. 
 Although Golkar does not hold a dominant majority, its influence is still 
significant in post-Suharto Indonesia. Golkar’s political infrastructure has long 
been developed compared to that of the new parties. Given its strong party 
institutionalization, it was not surprising when Golkar was able to win back the 
highest number of votes in the 2004 election. Close connection between Golkar 
and businessmen that have long been established have also contributed to the 
success of Golkar in continuing its role in the decentralized democratized 
Indonesia though the multiparty system has created new incentives for the 
business community to sponsor various parties other than Golkar and hence 
businessmen may diversify their financial support to other political actors (Chua 
2009). Golkar is still believed to remain one of the major recipients of money 
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from the business community (Tomsa 2008).
40
 Thus, it is hardly surprising that 
Golkar is still influential in directing the formulation of crucial laws. Moreover, 
the party was able to win many gubernatorial and mayoral elections in provinces 
and local Kabupaten/Kota Governments. 
 Given the power delegation from central to sub-national government, the 
changing formation of new government stretched out into sub-national 
governments. However, lack of institutional infrastructures might mean the result 
of the 1999 election did not result in improved public sector outcome. The 
euphoria of political liberalization in the sub-national governments caused a 
serious corruption pandemic where legislative bodies and leaders of sub-national 
governments were almost uncontrolled (Sulistyo 2002).
41
Besides, the 
decentralization policy had not been effectively implemented throughout the years 
up to 2001. Hence, the formation of new government as a result of 1999 election 
had nothing to do with better public sector performance expected from 
decentralization. 
 The early period in the democratic transition of the post-Suharto Indonesia 
was frequently acknowledged as  a protracted transition rather than consolidated 
phase of transition (Malley 2000). This period was dubbed with the period of 
decentralization anomaly that causes pessimism the decentralization. Nordholt 
and Van Klinken (2007) describes it as a period of the agony of the 
decentralization with a disparity between professional optimism and realistic 
pessimism. Bunte (2009) also illustrates this phase as a protracted 
decentralization. 
 In 2004, the second election was held in post-Suharto Indonesia. It was the 
first election in the decentralized Indonesia. Several institutional infrastructures 
                                                          
40
 Since 2004, Golkar has been chaired by prominent Indonesian businessmen. Yusuf Kalla, well- 
known as a success businessman with Kalla group and Bukaka group, chaired Golkar from 2004-
2009. Yusuf Kalla then won the 2004 presidential election as vice president of the Republic of 
Indonesia. Golkar is now chaired by Aburizal Bakrie, one of the most prominent Indonesian 
conglomerates with Bakrie business group. 
41
 The “little kings” terminology became popular to reflect uncontrolled sub-national government 
authorities in the executive and legislative bodies. A “little Suharto” terminology was introduced 
by Aspinal and Fealy, (2003) to address a wide spread patronage. 
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had been established to support better local budgetary processes. Law 22/1999 on 
the sub-national government had been amended by Law 32/2004 underpinning 
better local accountability. An introduction to the direct gubernatorial and mayor 
election and an abolition of non-elected representatives in the parliament were 
among the most outstanding achievements of the new law. The performance-
based budgeting for local budget management was introduced in government 
regulation PP 105/2000 which was then updated in PP 58/2005.The legislation of 
Law 17/2003 on the public finance and Law 1/2004 on the national asset supports 
better local budget management and corruption prevention. Within these 
circumstances, one might expect that the outcome of the 2004 electoral contest 
will yield good elected politicians with good policy outcomes. 
 The changing political configuration in the parliament is used as a proxy to 
represent the formation of new government in the decentralized democratized 
Indonesia. However, the changing political configuration may not be able to really 
indicate distinctive political behaviour from the previous government. This has 
been confirmed by several political studies in the post-Suharto Indonesia. The 
new government in the decentralized democratized Indonesia is more likely to be 
captured by elites in less differentiated political parties than being held 
accountable by the general public. Malley (2003) illustrates this situation as a 
circumstance of new rules, old structures and the limits of democratic 
decentralization. Robinson and Hadiz (2004) show that the mutual relationship 
between oligarchic power and business interests are still intact as they have 
successfully adapted to the new political environment without changing their 
predatory mentality. 
 In the public choice literature, the presence of new government in relation 
to public policy outcomes has been a subject of some interest. Mierau, Jong-Apin 
and de Haan (2007) investigate the presence of new government using dummy 
variables in a discrete choice model using panel data from 20 OECD countries. 
They argue that the presence of new government increases the likelihood that 




- Golkar (GOL) 
Golkar in the democratized Indonesia is still influential though it has lost its 
domination in the multiparty electoral system. Its existence encounters challenges 
from parties holding seats in the parliament. Among those are three reform 
pioneers, Partai Demokrai Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P), Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa (PKB) and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), and two new emerging 
parties, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and Partai Demokrat, as well as Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). Assuming that Golkar politicians represent the 
status quo that will always maintain and protect political rent, they have benefited 
from the previous regime. One might expect that the larger the number of seats 
held by Golkar in the assembly, the lower the propensity for public service reform 
to occur and the smaller is the improvement in the public sector efficiency. 
 However, given the strong party institutionalization of Golkar, presumably 
as an incumbent government, one might also expect that the continuing 
domination of Golkar will result in better policy outcomes. This is based on 
Riker’s (1964) proposition. According to Riker (1964) only strong national 
political parties achieve the necessary balance between national and local 
interests. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) support this proposition. They find 
evidence from a panel study of 75 developing and transition nations that a strong 
political party significantly improves the outcomes of decentralization such as 
economic growth, quality of government, and public good provision. 
 The formation of new government is defined as the ratio of seats held by 
Golkar to the total seats in the local assembly. 
     
   
   
 
where 
GS is seats held by Golkar 






- Politik Aliran (ISL)  
Another major feature ofthe political institution in the democratized Indonesia is 
the rebirth of politik aliran.
42
 New parties which rooted in the ethnic or religious 
groups flourish as a result of political liberalization, and it has resulted in the 
rebirth of politik aliran (ideological stream)(Ufen 2006). Six of the ten largest 
parties in the 2004 national parliament are Islamic rooted parties and four of them 
are secular nationalists (Table 5.4).
43
Mujani (2003) claims that the Islamic 
tradition, in the case of Indonesia is not inimical to political participation and 
democracy. His finding rejects the hypothesis that Islamic tradition is 
unfavourable to the democracy. It also rejects the hypothesis that the nation-state 
is alien to the Islamic tradition in the case of Indonesia. 
 Political institutions rooted in Islamic institutions may have increased 
electoral participation in a populated country with Islam as a major religion. 
However, whether the Islamic political institutions result in improved public 
services is not yet determined. It is interesting to empirically investigate this 
Indonesia-specific political institution in relation to the public service outcome. 
This Indonesia-specific political institution is a kind of particular patron-client 
relationship of a political agency. How this Indonesia-specific political institution 
is supposed to have an impact on public service outcomes is of interest in the 
empirical investigation. 
 In the empirical literatures, an investigation on a particular political 
institution in relation to the public policy can be found in Mierau, Jong-Apin and 
de Haan (2007). They investigate the tendency of a political fragmentation under 
left-wing and right-wing in the 20 OECD countries. They claim that the likelihood 
                                                          
42
Politik aliran was historically rooted to political parties in 1950s and 1960s where political 
parties allied with social-religious groups. Partai Nasionalis Indonesia represented those who 
were still set apart by an aristocratic Javanese culture and earned their living mainly as state 
employees and civil servants or were clients of them. Partai Komunis Indonesia was a communist 
platform party with loyal followers among abangan workers in urban and rural areas. The 
modernists were represented in Masyumi including urban intellectuals, traders and artisans on the 
Outer Islands. NU represented traditionalist santri including ulama and their followers. Partai 
Katolik represented catholic people. The Christian group were represented in the Parkindo. See the 
details in the Ufen (2006). 
43
PAN and PKB do not explicitly mention Islam as their platform; however both are backed by 
two largest Islam Organizations in Indonesia. 
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of the public sector adjustment is lower under left-wing government than under 
right government. Elgie and McMenamin (2008) investigate ideological 
fragmentation in relation to fiscal deficits. They find evidence that the more 




 Politik aliran is defined as the ratio of seats held by Islamic-rooted parties 
to the total seats in the local assembly: 
     
     
   
 
where 
SISL is seats held by Islamic-rooted parties 
TS is total seats 
 
5.3.3.4. Institutional Variables 
Increased accountability is crucial for improved efficiency outcomes in a 
decentralized system of public service provision. However institutional obstacles 
in most developing countries potentially cause corruption becoming wide-spread 
along with power and fiscal decentralization. Additionally, less political 
accountability and fewer obstacles to corruption in the lower levels of  
government compared to the national level emerge as factors undermining public 
sector efficiency (Prud’homme 1994). In the case of Indonesia’s decentralization a 
wave of corruption swept across newly decentralized local governments. It takes 
place in various forms, in almost every level of government and institutions of 
legislatures and executives (See Rinaldi 2007). Fisman and Gatti (2002) argue that 
political decentralization focusing on coordination of rent seeking appears to 
influence the spread of corruption alongside decentralization. In a situation where 
corruption is widespread along with power and fiscal decentralization the outcome 
of decentralization is supposed to be an anomaly. This study uses a corruption 
                                                          
44
Both studies are based on OECD countries, where the result is sensitive to the sample selected 
and the degree of democratic institutionalisation (Elgie 2008). The extent of democratic 
institutionalisation is expected to be eliminated in this study as it is a local government cross 
analysis within a country where the democratic institutionalisation is at the same level. 
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perception index and an infrastructure perception index to capture the impact of 
the quality of governance on public sector efficiency. 









The higher the ability of a decentralized local 
government to benefit the decentralization, the greater is 




The greater the democratic participation the greater is the 




The greater the political fragmentation (measured using 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index), the lower is the public 
sector efficiency. The higher the HH index, the lower is 
the fragmentation. 
+ 
4. The formation 
of “new 
government” 
The new government as an outcome of the 2004 
electoral democracy is expected to result in improved 
public sector efficiency. However in the setting of 
Indonesia’s political institutions, whether the new 
government results in improved public sector efficiency 
is uncertain. 
undetermined 
5. “Politik aliran” Patron-client affiliation is generally seen as a factor 
undermining political accountability. Thus it reduces 
public sector efficiency. However, in young democracies 
where politicians/parties are not credible, patron-client 
affiliation can function as a political intermediary. Thus 
patron-client affiliation can help in improving 
accountability between politicians/parties and voters. 
undetermined 
6. Total factor 
Productivity 
growth 





The better the institutional quality of local government, 
the greater is the public sector efficiency. 
+ 
5.4. Data 
Local government budget data from 33 provincial governments and more than 
400Kabupaten/Kota governments are observed.
45
 The data are aggregated up to 
the provincial level as the outcome data in the first stage as well as explanatory 
                                                          
45
Since the implementation regional autonomy, the number of Indonesian local governments is 
increasing as a result of regional splitting. Based on internal affair department data base, there 
were 32 provincial governments and 440 Kabupaten/kota governments in 2005 and 2006, 33 
provincial governments and 456 Kabupaten/kota governments in 2007, and 33 provincial 
governments and 497 Kabupaten/kota governments in 2008. 
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variables in the second stage are available at the cross-provincial level. This gives 
the advantage that the spillover problems across local Kabupaten/Kota 
governments within the same province, and spillover effect from provincial 
government are contained altogether at the cost of informational loss across 
Kabupaten/Kota governments. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 summarize the data used in this 
study. 
 The local budget data is taken from the regional finance information 
system (SIKD). Over the observation period, there were several changes in the 
budgeting system. A performance-based budgeting system was introduced 
following the Ministry of Internal Affair (MoIF) decree no. 29/2002 replacing the 
old regional finance administration manual (MAKUDA) system. In the SIKD 
2005 data several local jurisdictions had adopted the new system, while some 
stuck to the old system. In the SIKD 2006, all local jurisdictions had already 
adopted the new budgeting system. In the SIKD 2007 and 2008, there were two 
types of budgeting system based on SAP and MoIF-13/2006 as a consequence of 
the introduction of Public Accounting Standard (SAP) and MoIF-29/2002 
amended by MoIF decree no. 13/2006. 
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Table 5.6: Description of data used in the first stage of the method 
Variable Measure Category Indicator Description Source 
PSP 
           
 
   
 





Net secondary enrolment rate (NSE) 
The number of children of official primary school age who are enrolled 
in primary education as a percentage of the total children of the official 
school age population (The Official United Nations Sites for MDG 
Indicators) 
 
The number of children of official secondary school age who are 
enrolled in secondary education as a percentage of the total children of 
the official school age population (The Official United Nations Sites 
for MDG Indicators) 





BPS Statistics Indonesia 
 
    
Health Infant mortality rate (IMR) 
 
 
Annual new tuberculosis incident (ATI) 
The number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 
live births (The Official United Nations Sites for MDG Indicators) 
 
Tuberculosis incidence is the estimated number of new tuberculosis 
(TB) cases arising in one year per 100,000 populations. All forms of 
TB are included, as are cases in people with HIV (The Official United 
Nations Sites for MDG Indicators) 
BPS Statistics Indonesia 
 
 
BPS Statistics Indonesia 
 
    
Infrastructure Percentage of households who have a 
safe water supply (HPW) 
 
 
BPS Statistics Indonesia 
 
    
Poverty Percentage of population below poverty 
line (PPL) 
Head count index of population below the poverty line. The poverty 
line is calculated using basic need approach comprising of two 
components; food poverty line of 2,100 calorie per day per capita and 
non-food poverty line. The poverty line varies among provinces. 
BPS Statistics Indonesia 
 
    
Macroeconomic Goal Economic growth (GRT) 
 
Unemployment rate (UER) 
 BPS Statistics Indonesia 
 
BPS Statistics Indonesia 
      
PSE     
    
  
     
    
 
   
 
 PEX represents per capita public 
expenditure, aggregated from total local 
governments budget in a province plus 
provincial government budget. 
Ratio of PSPs as outcomes to total public expenditure per capita as an 
input. 
 
Directorate General of 





Table 5.7: Description of data used in the second stage of the method 
 Abbreviation Measure Source Note: 
Dependent variable:  
Public Sector Efficiency 
PSE Stage one calculation 
 
Own calculation DEA calculation 
Independent Variables:     
Decentralization measure FD 
 
    
    
   
 
 




Local governments’ budget data 
are taken from Directorate General 
of Fiscal Balance, Ministry of 
Finance. 
     
Democratic participation DP 
    
   
   
 
Own calculation based on data base 
KPU 
seats in local government assembly 
and votes data are taken from  
     
Political fragmentation PF 
            
 
 
   
 
Own calculation based on database 
pemilu 2004: peta daerah 
pemilihan, perolehan suara dan 
kursi untuk DPR RI, DPRD 
propinsi, dan DPRD 
kabupaten/kota se-Indonesia. 
seats in local government assembly 
and votes data are taken from 
     
The formation of “new government” 
- The struggle of Golkar 
 
 







     
   
   
 
 
     
     
   
 
Own calculation based on database 
pemilu 2004: peta daerah 
pemilihan, perolehan suara dan 
kursi untuk DPR RI, DPRD 
propinsi, dan DPRD 
kabupaten/kota se-Indonesia. 
seats in local government assembly 
and votes data are taken from 
     
Total factor productivity growth TFP Solow residual Own calculation Solow residual 
     




Corruption perception index 
 
 
Physical infrastructure index 
Transparency International, 









5.5. Econometric Method 
This section discusses issues in the econometrics used to estimate the empirical 
model specified in Equation (5.7). The empirical model is structured in a panel 
data with 33 cross-section units over 4 years period of observation from 2005 – 
2008. The discussion starts with the deficiencies of the common approaches in 
estimating panel data given idiosyncratic variables. First, political and 
institutional variables are constant over time. It generates a complication in the 
estimation technique. Second, the DEA efficiency score as dependent variable is 
limited from 0 to 1. It raises a question whether it is a kind of censoring data or it 
is a particular kind of fractional or proportional data. 
 The discussion continues with fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD) 
as a chosen estimation technique. However, in order to provide detail clarification 
to the chosen technique, the discussion departs from fixed effect (FE) and random 
effect (RE) as common methods in estimating panel data. The Hausman-Taylor 
estimator (HT) as a popular technique dealing with time-invariant explanatory 
variables is also discussed. Afterward, the discussion explores why both FE and 
RE as well as HT are not sufficient to estimate the model. 
 
5.5.1. Panel Data 
In political science, it is common to investigate political variables as well as 
institutional variables that show much variation across units but rarely changing 
or constant over a particular period (See Plumper 2007). As a result, it causes 
complications in the panel data estimation technique. 
Consider the following empirical model in a panel data structure: 
         
            (5.8) 
   is the dependent variable,     is a vector of explanatory variables,    is the 
common intercept,    is unobserved individual effect and     is error term which 
is assumed to be independent and identically distributed           for i = 1, 
2,...N units for period t= 1, 2,...T.   are the coefficient estimates that have 
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restrictions upon them. They may represent common (cross section and period), 
cross section specific, or period specific parameters. 
 There are two common approaches to estimate Model (5.8): fixed effect 
(FE) and random effect (RE). The point of interest that distinguishes these two 
approaches is how to treat the unobserved individual effect,  . In FE,    is 
allowed to be correlated with explanatory variables,            . In RE,    is 
treated as random like     and independent to a set of explanatory 
variables,            . 
 A dichotomy between FE and RE has been an interest in the panel data 
literature. A decrease of the degrees of freedom is usually considered as the 
drawback of FE. If there is a large number of cross-section units, estimating    as 
N individual effect consumes a lot of the degrees of freedom. Another drawback is 
when the model being estimated involves time-invariant explanatory variable for 
example years of schooling, family background, political and institutional 
variables. In this case, FE is not able to estimate the model as it will eliminate the 
time-invariant coefficients (Baltagi 2008; Hsiao 2003). 
 Since the political and institutional variables in this study are characterised 
as time-invariant variables, Equation 5.8 is rewritten as follows: 
         
      
           (5.9) 
whereXi is a vector of time-invariant variables. The chosen model under 
consideration to estimate Equation (5.9) should be an RE since FE is impotent.  
 Another alternative method to estimate Equation (5.9) is pooled OLS 
(Knack 1993; Acemoglu et. al 2002; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). In this case, 
Acemoglu et. al (2002) argues that with attention to the determined set of 
institutions (which are clearly exogenous), not on the variation of institutions from 
year to year, the regression does not control a full set of individual dummies. 
 However, both RE and pooled OLS are considered inconsistent and biased 
when the individual effects are correlated with explanatory variables (Baltagi 
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2008). The unobserved individual effect is presumably correlated with 
explanatory variables. Economic growth for example, is positively correlated with 
fiscal decentralization, total factor productivity, political and institutional quality 
of local jurisdiction which is associated with higher public sector efficiency. 
Therefore, in a situation where unobserved individual effect is modelled as a 
linear function of    , FE yields best, linear, unbiased estimator. On the other 
hand, RE will result in biased estimators. In addition, the ability of FE to deal with 
unobserved heterogeneity across units has become one of the advantages of FE. 
Researchers often pool data just for the purpose of controlling for the potentially 
large number of unmeasured explanatory variables by estimating FE (Plumper 
2007). 
 An estimation method to deal with time-invariant explanatory variables 
was introduced into the literature by Hausman and Taylor (1981). Another method 
labelled as Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD) is suggested by Plumper 
and Troeger (2007) which is similar to the procedure suggested by Hsiao (2003). 
These methods are helpful in the political science when numerous political and 
institutional variables which are time-invariant or rarely changing over time are 
used. The following section discusses these methods. 
 
5.5.1.1. Fixed Effect Estimator (FE) 
Consider Equation (5.8) as a common mean corrected model. In this model, the 
intercept varies across individuals with a common slope, 
         
            
The coefficient estimates are defined as  
       
      
          
     
              




         
 
   
            
 
   
 
   
           
         
 
   
            
 
   
 
   
           
         
 
   
            
 
 
   
 
   
 
The residual sum of square               
    
      
 
5.5.1.2. Random Effect Estimator (RE) 
The unobserved individual effect    in RE exists, but the effect is random. 
Therefore, Equation (5.8) can be written as follows: 
         
            (5.10) 
 
where            The composite error term     has two 
components,           .
46
 RE assumes that all error components are uncorrelated 
with all explanatory variables    , 
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An efficient estimator can be obtained by Generalized Least Square (GLS). 
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Since the error components are uncorrelated with    , the composite error term   
is also uncorrelated with    . 
            . 
           
  
    
 
  
    
     
       
Where   is positive definite. 
D is a non-singular matrix such that         and       .  
The model is then transformed as 
          
          
                             
The RE estimator is then defined as 
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5.5.1.3. Hausman-Taylor Estimator (HT) 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) proposes a method using instrumental variables that 
could be applied to deal with time-invariant explanatory variables. With a set of 
instrumental variables, the coefficient estimate of time-invariant variables can be 
obtained using two stage least square (2SLS).  
Recall Equation (5.9) 
         
      
                                            
The method then finds instruments for those time-variant     and time-invariant    
which are potentially correlated with unobserved individual random effect    by 
pre-multiplying Equation (5.9) by 
 
  . The instrument variables proposed by HT 
are generated from within the model with no need to seek external instrumental 
variables.  
 To illustrate the application of the HT method in this study, consider 
Equation5.9 rewritten as: 
          
        
        
       
            5.11 
Where      is a vector of exogenous time-variant variables that are not correlated 
with    and     ,      is a vector of endogenous time-variant variables that are 
expected to be correlated with    and     .     is a vector of exogenous time-
invariant variables that are not correlated with    and    , and     is a vector of 
endogenous time-invariant variables that may be correlated with    and    .  
 The first step of the HT method is to estimate Equation (5.9) using fixed 
effect and get consistent and unbiased estimate of   .47 The procedure then takes 
the residual and regresses it on time invariant variables    using a set of 
instruments (deviation from individual mean of the variable      , deviation of 
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     from associated individual means, means of the variable     , and also 
variables    are used as instruments. This regression is intended to obtain the 
consistent estimates of  .  
 The matrix of instruments takes the following form: 
                 
Where Q is the matrix of projection transforming a vector      into a vector of 
deviations from group means            and P transforms a vector      into a 
vector group means     . Then both overall and within residuals are obtained. 
These residuals are used to estimate the components of variance of the dependent 
variable. The estimated variance components are used to undertake GLS 
transform on each of the variables in the second stage (See Also Baltagi 2008). 
 
5.5.1.4. Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD)  
The key feature of the FEVD method is an individual effect of the time-invariant 
variables decomposition into an explained and unexplained part. Then, the 
unexplained part is augmented as explanatory variable in the full model. The 
FEVD procedure involves three steps. First, the procedure estimates the 
unobserved individual FE using a baseline model. Second, the procedure splits the 
individual effect into explained and unexplained parts by regressing the unit effect 
on the time-invariant explanatory variables of the original model. Third, the 
procedure performs a pooled-OLS estimation of the baseline model by including 
all explanatory time-variant, time-invariant and unexplained part of the FE vector. 
This procedure corrects standard errors for the coefficient of the invariant 
variables, and at the same time adjusts for serial correlation errors (Plumper and 
Troeger 2007). 
 Recall the data generating process (DGP) of FE in Equation (5.9) as 
follows: 
               
 
   
       
 
   
        (5.12) 
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The first stage of FEVD estimates a baseline FE model. The baseline FE model is 
obtained by first averaging Equation (5.12) over T: 
               
 
   
       
 
   
        (5.13) 
Where   
     
 
 
    
 
   
 
     
 
 
    
 
   
 
     
 
 
    
 
   
 
Subtracting Equation (5.13) from Equation (5.12) will eliminate the individual 
effect    and the time invariant variable  ; 
                  
 
   
             
 
   
                        
             
 
   
      (5.14) 
Equation (5.14) stands for the demeaned transformation of Equation (5.12). The 
procedure, then estimates Equation (5.14) using FE with intention to obtain 
individual effect   :
48
 
             
 
   
          (5.15) 
                                                          
48
 Note that this individual effect differs from the individual effect   in the original model. The 
estimated unit effects in this equation include all time-invariant variables, the overall constant 
terms, and the mean effect of time varying variables Z. 
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The individual effect     obtained from the FE estimate of Equation (5.15) differs 
from unobserved individual effect    in the original model as     includes the 
unobserved unit-specific effects as well as observed unit specific effects X, the 
unit means of the residual    , and the time varying variables     . 
 
Stage two of the FEVD is intended to obtain the unexplained part of the individual 
specific effect. This stage regress the individual effect     on the observed time-
invariant variables Xi.  
           
 
   
    (5.16) 
The unexplained part of the individual effect is captured in the residual of the 
regression Equation (5.16) as: 
             
 
   
 (5.17) 
The decomposition of the individual effect of the time-invariant variable into 
explained and unexplained parts is the key feature of the FEVD. In stage three, the 
procedure performs a regression of the full model but includes the unexplained 
part hi using pooled OLS.  
               
 
   
       
 
   
         
 
(5.18) 
By design, hi is not correlated with Z and X and hence the OLS estimator produces 
an unbiased estimate. 
5.5.2. Model Selection 
The choice between FE and RE depends on how the unobserved variable    is 
treated. RE is chosen when    is treated to be independent of    . Otherwise, FE 
should be chosen to avoid unobserved heterogeneity bias (Dougherty 2007).  A 
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standard test that is usually used to select between FE and RE is provided by 
Hausman (1978). Figure 5.1 summarises the estimation technique in panel data. 














Source: Summary based on Dougherty (2007), Baltagi (2003, 2008) and Plumper 
and Troeger (2007). 
However, the choice between FE and RE should depend on the objectives and 
inferences a researcher wants to pursue. FE might be chosen if the researcher 
wants to make inferences about only this set of cross-section units. Additionally, 
FE might be used to control potentially large number of unobserved heterogeneity 
across units. In this case,    is treated as fixed. In contrast, RE might be chosen if 
the researcher wants to make inferences about populations from which these 
population data came with    treated as random (Maddala 1987). On special 
occasions where there are time-invariant explanatory variables, FE is not 





Can the observations be described as being a random 
sample from a given population? 
Perform both FE and RE Select FE 
Does Hausman test indicate significant 
differences in the coefficient? 
Provisionally select RE. Does a test 
indicate the presence of randomeffect? 
Select FE if there is no time 
invariant regressor.  
Select RE Use pooled OLS 
Select HTE if there is time invariant regressor and the 
equation is identified that need prior knowledge of 
exogenous and endogenous regressor. 
Select FEVD if there is time invariant regressor with 




5.5.2.1. Hausman Test 
The assumption that    is independent of     is critical in the RE. Under the null 
hypothesis that            , Hausman (1978) suggests to test the difference 
between FE and RE estimators. If the difference is statistically equals to zero, the 
null hypothesis is not rejected indicating that RE specification is correct. If the 
difference is statistically significant, the null hypothesis is rejected indicating that 
FE is correct. Technically, the test is as following (Baltagi 2008):  
                
Given that           
               and           
          , the 
difference of both estimator is expected to be statistically zero,  
         and 
                                           
                                           
                         
Given that               , and so                               since 
               .  
                                 
                     
The Hausman test statistic is given by 
     
          
     
H0 is asymptotically distributed as   
  and K denotes the dimension of the slope 







5.5.2.2. FE, RE, HT or FEVD? 
Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte (2003) provide a pre-test estimator based on the 
Hausman-Taylor estimator. The first Hausman test is employed to select RE or 
FE. If the test rejects the null hypothesis, FE is chosen. Then the second Hausman 
test is employed to test the difference between the FE and HT estimators. If the 
null hypothesis in not rejected, the HT estimator is selected. It indicates that the 
unobserved individual effect may be correlated with some explanatory variables, 
but not all. The HT estimator is basically a 2SLS using a set of instruments 
(Baltagi 2008). 
(1) If the number of exogenous time-variant variables is less than the number of 
endogenous time-invariant variables, the equation is under-identified. In this 
case the HT is not efficient. 
(2) If the number of exogenous time-variant variables is equal to the number of 
endogenous time-invariant variables, the equation is just-identified. In this 
case the HT is as efficient as FE. 
(3) If the number of exogenous time-variant variables is greater than the number 
of endogenous time-invariant variables, the equation is over-identified. In this 
case the HT is more efficient. 
 
Hausman-Taylor estimator has become a popular method among economists. It 
can be found in most recent econometrics textbooks (Baltagi 2008; Hsiao 2003). 
The partition of both time-variant and time-invariant variables into exogenous and 
endogenous requires careful a priori non-correlation assumptions (Hausman 
1981). Though such a correlation can be tested as provided by Hausman and 
Taylor (1981), the test is difficult as individual effects are unobserved and mostly 
even unobservable (See Plumper and Troeger 2007). 
 In fact, both fiscal decentralization (FD) and total factor productivity 
(TFP) in this study are assumed to be endogenous which are expected to be 
correlated with the unobserved individual effect    but not correlated with the 
error term     . The expected impact of the decentralization measure and total 
factor productivity on public sector efficiency occurs as a result of an efficiency-
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enhancement effect of the local jurisdictions’ ability to generate local own-tax 
revenue and expand local economic resources. Consequently, there is no 
exogenous time-variant variable to serve for instrumentation and hence the model 
is under-identified. In this case HT is not efficient. 
Given the above considerations, FEVD comes as the chosen model. It is basically 
a fixed effect, but decomposes the individual effect into unexplained and 
explained parts. It then takes the unexplained parts as an explanatory variable 
together with time-variant and time-invariant variables. Pooled OLS is then 
employed to estimate the full model. 
 
5.5.3. Tobit vs OLS 
The preceding discussion emphasizes the estimation technique to deal with the 
presence of time-invariant explanatory variables on the right-hand side of the 
panel data model. The discussion disregards the DEA efficiency score as a 
dependent variable. 
 The characteristics of the DEA efficiency score as a dependent variable 
attract a deal of attention in the second stage DEA literature. The feature of the 
DEA efficiency score limited to the interval from 0 to 1 has been considered as a 
form of censored data. Accordingly, the Tobit model is selected. Nevertheless, 
OLS regression is also found in the second stage DEA efficiency analysis. There 
are at least four different estimation techniques for the second stage DEA estimate 
that are seen in the literature. First, the Tobit regression with or without Simar and 
Wilson (2007) bootstrap correction method. Second, conventional OLS regression 
advocated by Banker and Natarajan (2008) and McDonald (2009). Third, the 
Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimator (QMLE) using the Papke and Wooldridge 
(1996) approach, and fourth, the unit-inflated beta model. Hoff (2007) provides a 
comparison between these approaches for the second stage DEA estimate. He 
concludes that Tobit and OLS estimator are sufficient in many cases, whilst the 





5.5.3.1. Second Stage DEA Efficiency with Tobit  
The Tobit regression is found in many efficiency studies. The DEA efficiency 
scores which are limited to an interval of 0 to 1 are considered as a kind of 
censored data. However, as it is argued by Simar and Wilson (2007, 2008) a 
conventional Tobit procedure in the two stage DEA efficiency estimate 
encounters several problems. Such problems emerge as a consequence of an 
unclear data-generating process (DGP) where a DEA is applied to estimate an 
unobserved true frontier, conditional on observed discretionary input variables. 
Furthermore, they argue that DEA efficiency estimates are serially correlated, 
bringing a consequence that the standard approaches to inference are invalid. For 
that reason, they propose a single and double bootstrap method to correct 
estimation bias and to improve statistical inference at the same time. The 
following argument is adapted from Simar and Wilson (2008). 
 The underlying idea to employ the two stage method is the fact that there 
are two types of inputs: discretionary under control inputs, X; and non-
discretionary beyond control inputs, Z, which may be continuous or discrete. With 
a production set  which is unknown, both inputs influence output Y.  A sample 
                  
 which assumed is to be independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d) is observed with probability density function f(x, y, z). 
Therefore,              
      , where      
  is the discretionary inputs 
vector,      
  is the non-discretionary inputs vector, and      
  is the output 
vector. 
 In the first stage, within an unknown production set ,only discretionary 
inputs xi are taken to measure efficiency. The input requirement set is defined for 
all      
  by 
            
             (5.19) 
The efficiency boundary       is defined for a given      
  by 
                                    (5.20) 
The efficiency for a given point (x, y) is given by 
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                        (5.21) 
Given an output level y and an input mix (a direction) given by a vector x, the 
efficient level of input is determined by 
                (5.22) 
which is the projection of (x, y) onto the efficient boundary     along the ray x 
and orthogonal to vector y. Hence  (x, y) is the proportionate reduction of inputs a 
unit located at (x, y) could undertake to become technically efficient by 
construction, for all (x, y)   ,  (x, y)  1, and (x, y) is efficient if and only if  (x, 
y) = 1. 
 In the second stage, the input oriented efficiency  (x, y) is explained by a 
vector of non-discretionary inputs      
 .  Hence the condition on f (       is 
defined through the following mechanism: 
                         (5.23) 
where β is a vector of parameters, and εi is a continuous i.i.d. random variable 
independent of zi. 
 
5.5.3.2. Second Stage DEA Efficiency with OLS 
In contrast to the Tobit adoption, McDonald (2009) advocates the use of OLS for 
the second stage DEA. The reason is that the DEA efficiency score is a kind of 
fractional data or a percentage data if it is multiplied by 100. DEA efficiency 
score is not generated by a censoring process. Therefore a suitable data generating 
process (DGP) for the efficiency score would be the linear unit interval,  
            (5.24) 
where    and    are i.i.d with zero means, and       , with the limit point 
      possessing positive probability. Equation 5.24 implies that when     , 
         with probability = 1 – probability that      
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 OLS is a consistent estimate for Equation (5.24). Statistical inference is 
also valid under heteroskedasticity conditions. Accordingly, the white 
heteroskedasticity method can be carried out to yield consistent standard errors 
and covariance. The problem using OLS to estimate Equation (5.24) is the 
possibility that     lies outside the unit interval. Therefore, the marginal effect for 
a single explanatory variable is bounded in a unit interval of the dependent 
variable. McDonald (2009) proposes alternative solutions dealing with this 
problems. However, it is still unclear whether the solution would be advantageous 
(See McDonald 2009). 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
The discussion in this Chapter has explained the process for estimating the PSE 
score for each local jurisdiction in Indonesia, and then developed an empirical 
panel model with the PSE scores as the dependent variable. The Chapter also 
explained how the independent variables have been constructed, discusses data 
sources and raised a number of econometric issues that needed to be resolved.  
The discussion has formed the basis for the results, to be presented and discussed 








This chapter discusses the estimation results from the two-stage method described 
in the preceding chapter. In the first stage, a public sector efficiency (PSE) 
indicator for local jurisdictions is constructed using Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA). Subsequently, the efficiency score is regressed against selected political 
and institutional variables using the Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD) 
technique. 
 The efficiency estimate obtained through DEA generally shows an 
efficiency variation across local jurisdictions. It shows a substantial gap in the 
public sector efficiency that corresponds to the general pattern of the regional 
disparity in Indonesia’s economic development. The results from the second stage 
reveal how political and institutional variables as well the degree of fiscal 
decentralization impact on the PSE.  
 
6.2. Public Sector Efficiency Score 
As previously argued, outcome indicators of education, health, infrastructure and 
poverty mitigation as well as macroeconomic performance determine the overall 
public sector performance (PSP) in each local jurisdiction. The PSP index was 
calculated using a formula defined in Equation (5.1). Public sector efficiency 
(PSE) was then calculated using an input oriented DEA as defined in Equation 
(5.6). The score implies that inefficiency in the public sector is due to the failure 
of each local jurisdiction relative to others to optimally internalize the benefit 
from spending and taxing delegation to maximize their outcome. 
 The PSP index and PSE score are presented in Table 6.1 and 6.2 
respectively. A PSE score of 100indicates the local jurisdictions under 
observation are located on the frontier with maximum feasible efficiency. These 
jurisdictions provide a benchmark for other local jurisdictions. On the other hand 
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a score below 100 indicates that the local jurisdictions under observation are 
inefficient relative to the frontier. The smaller the score the higher is the 
inefficiency. 
 In general, local jurisdictions that consistently locate on the frontier are 
local jurisdictions on the Java Island. Yogyakarta which is not at the frontier in 
2005 increased its efficiency in 2006, 2007 and 2008. Local jurisdictions out of 
Java that show a high PSE score are Sumatera Utara and Bali. Even Sumatera 
Utara achieves the maximum efficiency score in 2005 and 2006 and Bali achieves 
the maximum efficiency score in 2005 and 2007. On the contrary, local 
jurisdictions in Papua and Papua Barat remain in the lowest position over the 
observation period with a large distance from the frontier. The average score of 
Papua’s efficiency is only 9.42. 
 The median efficiency score is only 55.89. It indicates a large gap in the 
public sector efficiency across local jurisdictions in Indonesia. The efficiency gap 
seems to be larger over the observation period as the median and the average 
efficiency score decrease. Several local jurisdictions even show consistent 





Table 6.1: Public sector performance (PSP) index 
No. Province 
Education Health Infrastructure Poverty Macroeconomy 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 2.34 2.23 2.23  2.23  1.70  1.77  1.87  1.74  0.58  0.54 0.69 0.69 0.47  0.52 0.51  0.53  0.06  1.07 0.34  0.13  
2 Sumatera Utara 2.18  2.14 2.16  2.16  1.82  1.70  1.67  1.61  1.19  1.28 1.21 1.21 0.92  0.98 0.98  0.99  1.89  1.84 1.94  1.89  
3 Sumatera Barat 2.10  2.06 2.07  2.06  1.90  1.95  1.76  1.72  1.07  1.14 1.28 1.28 1.24  1.17 1.14  1.17  1.88  1.87 1.82  1.92  
4 R i a u 2.20  2.14 2.12  2.11  2.41  2.54  2.52  2.69  0.19  0.13 0.15 0.15 1.08  1.24 1.21  1.17  1.78  1.78 1.35  1.80  
5 Jambi 2.05  2.02 2.04  2.03  1.91  1.75  1.83  1.68  0.83  0.83 0.94 0.94 1.13  1.29 1.32  1.34   2.05  2.33 2.36  2.52  
6 Sumatera Selatan 2.00  2.05 2.02  2.01  2.02  2.02  1.90  1.82  0.87  0.94 1.01 1.01 0.64  0.70 0.71  0.70   1.81  1.80 1.79  1.74  
7 Bengkulu 1.99  2.04 2.09  2.08  1.72  1.84  1.64  1.69  0.72  0.64 0.63 0.63 0.61  0.64 0.61  0.60   2.36  2.47 2.60  2.42  
8 Lampung 2.04  2.04 2.08  2.08  2.38  2.29  2.02  1.98  0.29  0.24 0.23 0.23 0.63  0.64 0.61  0.59   1.97  1.87 2.00  1.96  
9 Kep Bangka Belitung 1.99  1.84 1.80  1.79  2.14  2.01  1.82  1.65  0.19  0.20 0.12 0.12 1.38  1.34 1.43  1.45   1.86  1.92 1.89  1.95  
10 Kepulauan Riau 2.03  2.12 2.12  2.14  2.92  1.46  2.39  2.74  1.99  1.87 1.44 1.44 1.23  1.20 1.32  1.36   2.20  2.05 2.08  2.03  
11 DKI Jakarta 2.21  2.08 2.12  2.12  2.53  3.08  3.51  3.50  2.37  1.96 1.93 1.93 3.73  3.20 2.95  2.91   1.80  1.81 1.72  1.70  
12 Jawa Barat 1.94  1.97 2.06  2.06  1.81  1.95  1.80  1.75  0.65  0.63 0.64 0.64 1.03  1.01 1.00  0.96   1.72  1.75 1.69  1.61  
13 Jawa Tengah 2.12  2.05 2.10  2.10  2.58  2.69  2.46  2.50  0.75  0.83 0.83 0.83 0.66  0.66 0.67  0.65   2.07  2.09 1.94  1.93  
14 Dista Yogyakarta 2.37  2.13 2.17  2.17  3.55  4.33  4.77  4.69  0.45  0.70 0.58 0.58 0.71  0.76 0.72  0.68   2.36  2.08 2.00  2.10  
15 Jawa Timur 2.09  2.10 2.10  2.09  2.17  2.30  2.04  2.02  0.85  0.88 0.92 0.92 0.67  0.69 0.68  0.67   2.24  2.19 2.13  2.14  
16 Banten 1.99  2.04 1.92  1.91  1.91  1.72  1.57  1.57  0.70  0.64 0.52 0.52 1.52  1.50 1.50  1.53   1.77  1.56 1.53  1.52  
17 B a l i 2.14  2.08 2.06  2.06  3.14  3.43  3.59  3.42  2.03  1.89 1.97 1.97 2.00  2.07 2.05  2.02   3.02  2.53 2.78  2.80  
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 2.07  2.09 2.12  2.11  1.32  1.50  1.53  1.46  0.74  0.82 0.83 0.83 0.52  0.54 0.54  0.52   1.27  1.50 1.94  1.67  
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur 1.61  1.71 1.76  1.76  2.00  1.78  1.68  1.73  0.99  1.00 0.80 0.80 0.48  0.50 0.49  0.49   2.43  2.97 2.87  2.69  
20 Kalimantan Barat 1.83  1.95 1.86  1.86  1.76  1.58  1.57  1.60  0.45  0.46 0.42 0.42 0.94  0.96 1.05  1.13   2.01  2.11 2.17  2.12  
21 Kalimantan Tengah 2.12  2.07 1.97  1.96  2.23  1.98  2.23  2.24  0.89  0.84 0.89 0.89 1.25  1.33 1.45  1.43   3.01  2.58 2.56  2.56  
22 Kalimantan Selatan 1.94  1.96 1.94  1.94  1.53  1.48  1.41  1.40  1.70  1.71 1.99 1.99 1.86  1.76 1.94  1.92   2.34  1.93 2.07  2.17  
23 Kalimantan Timur 2.10  1.98 2.12  2.11  2.41  2.44  2.27  2.23  2.18  2.38 2.69 2.69 1.27  1.28 1.23  1.31   1.52  1.22 0.94  1.48  
24 Sulawesi Utara 2.01  1.99 2.01  2.01  1.97  2.24  2.31  2.32  1.19  1.42 1.11 1.11 1.44  1.27 1.19  1.23   1.62  1.70 1.73  1.96  
25 Sulawesi Tengah 1.94  1.97 1.92  1.92  1.48  1.50  1.51  1.43  1.13  0.89 0.84 0.84 0.62  0.62 0.61  0.60   2.69  2.40 2.38  2.47  
26 Sulawesi Selatan 1.89  1.91 1.94  1.93  1.43  1.60  1.67  1.67  1.22  1.26 1.31 1.31 0.90  1.00 0.96  0.93   1.83  1.97 1.76  2.11  
27 Sulawesi Tenggara 2.02  2.11 2.04  2.04  1.41  1.42  1.41  1.38  1.40  1.38 1.15 1.15 0.63  0.63 0.64  0.64   2.38  2.48 2.53  2.47  
28 Gorontalo 1.65  1.78 1.79  1.79  1.10  1.37  1.31  1.29  0.80  0.79 1.01 1.01 0.46  0.50 0.50  0.50   2.20  2.39 2.37  2.47  
29 Sulawesi Barat 1.89  1.84 1.81  1.80  1.51  1.57  1.69  1.47  0.65  0.63 0.58 0.58 0.90  0.71 0.71  0.75   3.09  2.79 2.89  2.87  
30 Maluku 2.10  2.17 2.10  2.10  1.72  1.44  1.54  1.67  1.30  1.17 1.00 1.00 0.42  0.44 0.44  0.42   1.68  1.65 1.56  1.39  
31 Maluku Utara 2.00  2.01 2.00  2.00  1.89  2.10  1.76  2.14  1.11  1.11 0.95 0.95 1.02  1.15 1.14  1.11   1.84  2.17 2.10  2.09  
32 Papua Barat 1.53  1.78 1.74  1.83  1.89  1.65  1.46  1.79  0.85  1.14 1.53 1.53 0.33  0.35 0.35  0.35   2.25  1.68 1.99  2.13  
33 Papua 1.53  1.57 1.63  1.65  1.73  1.51  1.50  1.41  0.70  0.68 0.81 0.81 0.33  0.35 0.33  0.34   1.01  1.46 2.20  1.19  
        
    
  
  




    
 
  
Source: Author’s calculation based on Equation5.1
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Table 6.2: DEA estimate for public sector efficiency (PSE) 
No. Province 
PSE Score 
2005 2006 2007 2008 Average 
1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 33.59 31.26 28.30 22.16 28.83 
2 Sumatera Utara 100.00 100.00 90.42 93.75 96.04 
3 Sumatera Barat 61.54 63.69 65.43 59.50 62.54 
4 R i a u 28.25 30.77 26.28 32.61 29.48 
5 Jambi 43.63 47.47 49.23 48.71 47.26 
6 Sumatera Selatan 53.61 55.44 54.88 58.24 55.54 
7 Bengkulu 51.23 54.94 43.49 37.67 46.83 
8 Lampung 72.78 71.50 74.48 84.13 75.72 
9 Kep Bangka Belitung 38.66 39.42 34.61 30.87 35.89 
10 Kepulauan Riau 55.73 50.70 34.02 41.02 45.37 
11 DKI Jakarta 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
12 Jawa Barat 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
13 Jawa Tengah 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
14 Dista Yogyakarta 87.51 100.00 100.00 100.00 96.88 
15 Jawa Timur 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
16 Banten 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
17 B a l i 100.00 97.76 100.00 99.58 99.34 
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 67.83 70.42 68.41 70.03 69.17 
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur 62.55 75.54 73.34 67.39 69.71 
20 Kalimantan Barat 46.46 48.62 52.68 49.63 49.35 
21 Kalimantan Tengah 35.22 31.22 33.33 29.96 32.43 
22 Kalimantan Selatan 84.51 86.97 91.83 80.53 85.96 
23 Kalimantan Timur 29.63 31.45 36.68 34.18 32.99 
24 Sulawesi Utara 59.48 67.43 50.03 46.62 55.89 
25 Sulawesi Tengah 53.03 45.10 43.87 47.30 47.33 
26 Sulawesi Selatan 75.38 74.34 78.26 73.18 75.29 
27 Sulawesi Tenggara 70.90 67.72 45.68 45.53 57.46 
28 Gorontalo 39.63 44.18 41.93 42.60 42.09 
29 Sulawesi Barat 65.30 60.38 48.58 55.57 57.46 
30 Maluku 44.13 38.24 36.73 29.97 37.27 
31 Maluku Utara 30.11 31.53 27.32 24.90 28.47 
32 Papua Barat 11.90 14.28 18.42 14.35 14.74 
33 Papua 9.18 9.04 10.33 9.14 9.42 
 
Minimum 9.18 9.04 10.33 9.14 9.42 
 
Average 60.96 61.80 59.35 58.46 60.14 
 
Median 59.48 60.38 50.03 49.63 55.89 
 






6.3. FEVD Estimate and Interpretation 
The estimation starts with the choice between Fixed Effect (FE) and Random 
Effect (RE) to estimate Equation (5.8) specified in Chapter 5. Since the equation 
involves time-invariant variables, FE is unable to estimate the equation. Therefore 
RE is chosen. Nevertheless the Hausman test indicates that the unobserved 
individual effect is correlated with explanatory variables. The test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the difference between FE and RE estimates is equal to zero (See 
appendix 1). In this case RE generates biased estimates. On the other hand 
Hausman-Taylor estimator (HTE) as a popular method to handle time-invariant 
variables in panel data fails to serve as an efficient technique as the model is under 
identified (see the discussion in Section 5.5.2.2). The empirical model specified in 
Equation (5.8) is now estimated using Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition 
(FEVD) described in Section 5.5.1.4. Table 6.3 shows the FEVD estimates. 
 Political variables are represented by democratic participation and political 
fragmentation. How both variables have impacts on public sector efficiency is 
discussed in Chapter 4 and 5. Greater democratic participation is generally 
associated with better economic development. Higher political fragmentation as a 
consequence of the multiparty systems may improve public sector efficiency as it 
offers alternatives for citizens to select political agents to best represent their 
interests. However if the size-fragmentation measures the degree of dispersed 
political power in the parliament, higher political fragmentation may have a 
negative impact on public sector efficiency. In a young democracy with low 
accountability and low political credibility like Indonesia, higher political 
fragmentation in parliament implies a higher political cost in achieving policy 
decisions. 
 The formation of new government variables are represented by the ratio of 
seats held by the Golkar party to the total seats in the local parliament (GOL), and 
the ratio of seats held by Islamic-based political parties to the total seats in the 
local parliament (ISL). ISL1 stands for political parties that formally set Islam as 
their political platform. ISL2 stands for ISL1 plus Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa/Nation Awakening Party (PKB) and Partai Amanat Nasional/National 
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Mandate Party (PAN). Both PKB and PAN do not formally put Islam as their 
political platform, but they affiliate to the largest of Indonesian socio-religious 
organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Both ISL1 and ISL2 
can either represent a feature of politik aliran (ideological-stream politics) or 
patron-client political relationship. Chapter 5 discusses the features of Indonesia’s 
political realm along with decentralization characterised by an increase in political 
fragmentation, the support for Golkar, and the rebirth of politik aliran. 
Institutional determinants are represented by a corruption perception index and an 
infrastructure perception index. Both variables are selected to stand for the quality 
of institutional governance. This chapter concludes with a discussion of empirical 
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R2 0.575573 0.631270 0.598023 0.665322 0.591369 0.658455 
R2 Adjusted 0.551614 0.610455 0.575331 0.646429 0.568301 0.639175 
Number in parenthesis indicates t statistics. ***, ** and *indicate 99%, 95% and 90% level of confidence respectively.  
Estimate 1 and 2 stand for the PSE in the setting of new government formation characterised by the lost grip of Golkar domination. Estimate 3, 4, 5, & 6 stand for the PSE in the setting of new government 
formation characterised by the rebirth of politik aliran. In the model 5 & 6, the variable ISL2 includes seats held by PKB and PAN in the calculation.
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 The FEVD estimate is basically a fixed effect that assumes individual 
effects and explanatory variables are correlated. The model then decomposes the 
individual effect into explained and unexplained parts and takes the unexplained 
part as an explanatory variable together with time-variant and time-invariant 
variables. Finally, pooled OLS is performed as an estimation technique to the full 
FEVD model. The key feature of the FEVD estimate is the unexplained part of the 
individual effect. The estimation of the model shows that the coefficient estimate 
of all the unexplained part is significant. The estimate also shows a relatively high 
degree of the coefficient of determination ranging from 0.575 to 0.658. It 
indicates that the FEVD model selected as a procedure for empirical investigation 
is robust.  
 The estimate shows that public sector efficiency of decentralized local 
governments in Indonesia is significantly influenced by the degree of 
decentralization (FD) and the growth of total factor productivity (TFP). All 
models estimate a positive impact for both determinants of public sector 
efficiency with a high level of confidence. This shows that the higher the degree 
of decentralization, the higher is efficiency in the public sector. The estimate 
confirms the theoretical claims in which the ability of local jurisdictions to 
generate local own revenue is crucial for improved efficiency. 
 The growth rate of total factor productivity shows significant and positive 
impact on the public sector efficiency. As a control variable, this may be an 
indication that the efficiency variation in the public sector is due to the variation 
in the total factor productivity growth. Local jurisdictions that present high 
productivity have high productivity in the public sector as well. 
 The discussion dealing with political variables begins with the formation 
of new government that is represented by the changing composition in the local 
parliament. The first variable investigated is the ratio of seats held by Golkar to 
the total seats in the local parliament. Golkar as a political vehicle for the previous 
autarchy regime is assumed to represent the status quo in the democratized 
Indonesia. Therefore, the higher the ratio of seats held by Golkar that oppose 
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other parties representing reforms is expected to have a negative impact on public 
sector efficiency. On the contrary Golkar might represent strong and well 
experienced legislatures compared to other relatively new legislatures. Hence the 
higher the ratio of seats held by Golkar can also have a positive impact on public 
sector efficiency. 
 The estimate fails to provide evidence for either hypothesis. The 
coefficient estimates are not significant and have ambiguous sign. This implies 
that the new government formation with Golkar in the assembly has no significant 
impact on public sector efficiency. This empirical evidence supports political 
studies in the democratized Indonesia. The new government may not represent a 
real new structure of government but a continuation of old structures with new 
rules within the limits of democratization and decentralization. In this 
circumstance changing the composition of parliament as a consequence of a 
multiparty system does not really differentiate political parties when the political 
structure is likely to be captured by elites unaccountable to citizens. Golkar along 
the Suharto regime profited as a vehicle for business interests to set up mutually 
advantageous relations with oligarchic power. Thus the lost grip of Golkar 
domination in the parliament does not automatically imply that this integral 
relationship is eased as business interests and elites have successfully adapted to 
the new political environment without changing their predatory mentality (See 
Robinson and Hadiz 2004; Chua 2009; Tomsa 2008; Malley 2003).  
 Another feature of new government in Indonesia is political Islam 
measured as the ratio of seats held by political Islam to total seats in the local 
parliament. Islam-based political parties remark the rebirth of politik aliran in 
Indonesia. Interestingly, the empirical results show evidence that the ratio of seats 
held by Islamic parties to the total seats in the local parliament (ISL1) is 
statistically significant with a negative impact on public sector efficiency even 
when seats held by PKB and PAN are included (ISL2). Again this result supports 
the view that there is no real new government in the decentralized and 
democratized Indonesia.  
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 As previously described, the feature of political Islam may also represent a 
patron-client political relationship. In young democratic countries such as 
Indonesia, patron-client politics is prevalent. Democratization cannot eliminate 
patron-client politics as it is considered as rational for redistributive coalitions and 
effective as a strategy to achieve the goal of powerful constituencies within these 
coalitions. However patron-client politics undermines accountability (Khan 2005). 
On the other hand patron-client politics may also help improve accountability in 
the short run. In the absence of credibility, politicians’ reliance on patrons may 
improve outcomes in the short run relative to the situation where politicians can 
do nothing to make them credible. Patron can function as an intermediary between 
citizens and parties/politicians to improve accountability when populations are 
polarized around non-service issue such as religion, ethnic, caste or tribal 
background (Keefer and Vlaicu Keefer 2005). The estimation results show that 
ISL2 is statistically significant with negative impact on public sector efficiency. 
This indicates that patron-client politics fail to function as intermediaries between 
parties/politicians and their constituents. 
 Subsequent political variables to be empirically examined are democratic 
participation (DP) and political fragmentation (PF). Democratic participation and 
its effect on economic performance has been an interest among scholars in politics 
as well as economics. Higher democratic participation is generally associated with 
better economic performance though there is no robust explanation on how 
democratic participation affects economic performance (Rodrik 2000). Therefore, 
the effect of democratic participation on economic performance is usually left for 
an empirical investigation (See Blair 2000; Borge 2008).  
 High democratic participation in the decentralized system indicates high 
legitimacy and accountability in the provision of public services resulting in 
increased public sector efficiency. However the results show an inverse 
association between democratic participation and public sector efficiency that 
contradicts the traditional claim. In the context of electoral democracy in 
Indonesia this result may not be surprising because of money politics and a class 
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bias politic. Electoral contests in almost all levels of government are characterised 
by money politics where voters do not vote on the basis of accountability 
considerations but pragmatically as an exchange for money (See Ufen 2006). 
Therefore money politics distort the significance of electoral participation.  
 A class bias politic as acknowledged by Lijphart (1997) may also cause 
democratic participation to have nothing to do with better public service 
performance. In a young democracy such as Indonesia large participation of less 
educated and poor people can worsen the quality of the inputs into the political 
process and policies coming out of it (See Mueller 2003). Concurrently, elites are 
able to capture government and bend policies to advance their interests at the 
expense of larger uneducated poor voters. 
 Patron-client politics also appears as a problem concurrent with money 
politics and a class bias politic that diminishes the significance of democratic 
participation. In the setting of a new government characterised by political Islam, 
the model produces a negative sign for the effect of democratic participation on 
public sector efficiency. This indicates that while politik aliran may have 
increased political participation, especially in relation with Islam as the major 
religion in Indonesia (Mujani 2003), it is evident that the participation has nothing 
to do with better public sector efficiency and even diminishes public sector 
efficiency. 
 Dealing with political fragmentation (PF) the model shows inconsistent 
results with ambiguous signs. It fails to provide strong evidence of the impact of 
political fragmentation on public sector efficiency. However a significant impact 
of political fragmentation on public sector efficiency is shown in the model 1 and 
5 with a positive sign. As a higher index (measured using Herfindahl-Hirschman) 
denotes lower fragmentation hence a higher political fragmentation is associated 
with lower efficiency. This is parallel with the result found in Borge, Falch and 
Tovmo (2008) claiming that in the absence of accountability and political 




 The coefficient estimate of the corruption perception index and 
infrastructure perception index is expected to suggest how the quality of 
governance affects public sector efficiency. The results show that public sector 
efficiency is not associated with the corruption perception index. In the early 
decentralized Indonesia corruption is widespread along with fiscal and power 
delegation to local governments. Thus improved efficiency might not correlate 
with the perception about corruption as corruption occurs in almost all levels of 
government and institutions. Unlike the corruption perception index, the 
infrastructure perception index shows a significant and positive impact on public 
sector efficiency. This appears to agree with Fisman and Gatti (2000) claiming 
that if decentralization shows a gain in efficiency this is not due to an improved 
quality of governance but rather other factors such as a variation in initial 
infrastructure levels across jurisdictions.  
6.4. Discussion 
This chapter has illustrated the use of data envelopment analysis (DEA) to 
construct a descriptive measure of the efficiency score in the public sector. It has 
been previously mentioned that non parametric-DEA is employed in respect to a 
situation where price data is not relevant or even unavailable as in the case of the 
public sector. DEA is also suitable where inputs and outputs are in the form of 
indicator measures. 
 As is the nature of a non-parametric analysis there is no foundation for a 
formal statistical inference to the DEA efficiency score. With no statistical 
inference, the consistency of DEA for the efficiency estimate is critical. In regard 
to this matter, Banker (1993) provides a formal statistical foundation for DEA by 
identifying conditions under which DEA estimators are statistically consistent and 
maximize likelihood. In addition, whether statistical inference is critical in the 
DEA analysis also depends on the intention and the condition of which the 
efficiency scores are generated. This study employs DEA to generate descriptive 
measures of the efficiency of local jurisdictions in the first stage. Subsequently, 
the efficiency scores are taken into the second stage to be regressed against 
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institutional and political variables as well as other control variables. Therefore, as 
a descriptive measure, the DEA efficiency score can be treated in the same way as 
other variables and when the econometric properties apply in the second stage the 
efficiency score will be taken into account (See McDonald 2009). 
 This chapter has also discussed the estimation of the empirical model 
using fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD). Unlike most studies that use 
Tobit to serve as the regression analysis in the second stage, this study uses 
ordinary least square (OLS). The estimation technique of the FEVD is basically a 
fixed effect that decomposes the individual effect into explained and unexplained 
parts. The model then regresses public sector efficiency against the unexplained 
part together with time variant and time-invariant variables using pooled OLS. 
The adoption of FEVD is vital to deal with the time-invariant explanatory 
variables with correlation between individual effect and explanatory variables. In 
this case a standard FE is impotent. 
 The underlying data generating process of the DEA efficiency score can be 
best described as a particular kind of fractional or proportional data. Though the 
efficiency score is limited between 0 and 1there is no censoring process. Thus, the 
adoption of Tobit for the second stage is questionable. On the contrary, OLS 
results in a consistent estimator (See McDonald 2009). Banker and Natarajan 
(2008) provide statistical foundations for the analysis of the impact of 
environmental variables on efficiency. They prove that standard DEA in the first 
stage followed by OLS or MLE in the second stage yields consistent estimators. 
 Given that input and output indicators in the DEA calculation are observed 
variables the DEA efficiency scores can also be interpreted as an “observed” 
value of efficiency relative to an “observed” frontier regardless of how 
sophisticated the mathematical technique used in the calculation. Thus the DEA 
efficiency score can be interpreted as a descriptive measure of relative efficiency 
for production units in the sample, which can be treated in the same way as other 
variables in the regression analysis. As an “observed” measure of efficiency, when 
properties in the regression analysis are evaluated, the scores should also be taken 
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into account. For those reasons, this study did not perform a complex bootstrap 









Decentralization policy in Indonesia delegates power to local jurisdictions mainly 
in relation to expenditure. The delegation of expenditure power gives local 
jurisdictions the ability to achieve the maximum flow of services from local 
spending. Improved public service provision is expected to occur as a result of a 
process where public goods and services are provided by empowered local 
jurisdictions with more compact political processes. Decentralization may also 
promote competition among jurisdictions to provide combinations of taxation, 
expenditures, public service provision and regulatory policies that better match 
local preferences. Concurrently, political decentralization along with fiscal 
decentralization may promote political legitimacy and accountability for public 
service provision. 
 A public sector efficiency (PSE) score is constructed in a comprehensive 
way using several indicators in education, health, poverty mitigation, 
infrastructure, as well as macroeconomic performance as outcome indicators. 
Local expenditure per capita is taken as an input indicator. Then an input oriented 
DEA is employed to assess the efficiency score from 2005 to 2008. Changes in 
the political structure as a result of the 2004 electoral contest are taken as 
environmental variables explaining the PSE of decentralized local governments.  
 A regression analysis is employed where PSE is explained against a fiscal 
decentralization measure, political and institutional variables, as well as total 
factor productivity growth. The data generating process (DGP) for the DEA 
efficiency score which is limited to the interval from 0 to 100 is considered as a 
particular kind of fractional or proportional data. Fixed effect vector 
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decomposition (FEVD) is selected as a panel model to deal with time-invariant 
explanatory variables. 
  
7.2. Major findings 
Stage one of the method measures public sector efficiency using input oriented 
DEA with constant returns to scale assumption. Findings from the efficiency 
calculation are as follows: First the distribution of the efficiency score shows large 
variation across local jurisdictions. Second local jurisdictions on Java Island 
consistently achieve the maximum efficiency score over the observation period. 
This implies that local jurisdictions on Java Island benchmark public sector 
efficiency in Indonesia. Third Papua and Papua Barat emerge with the lowest 
efficiency score over the observation period with a large divergence from the 
maximum score. Fourth the distance between the median efficiency score and the 
maximum score is large. This indicates a significant disparity across local 
jurisdictions in efficiency. In general the results correspond with the regional 
disparity pattern in Indonesia’s economic development. That is, poorly developed 
regions have relatively inefficient local governments. 
 In the second stage, the estimation of all models shows a consistent result 
in which decentralization correlates positively with PSE. It suggests that the 
higher the degree of decentralization the more efficient is public service provision 
by local jurisdictions. It implies that the greater the ability of a local jurisdiction to 
finance its expenditure with local own revenue the greater is the efficiency. 
 However evidence that decentralization has a positive impact on efficiency 
should be interpreted with caution because the growth rate of total factor 
productivity as a control variable has a significant and positive impact on the PSE. 
The growth rate of total factor productivity is measured using a Solow residual 
which is generally interpreted as the entire productivity growth of total resources 
in a particular economy (Barro 2004). Accordingly, the positive impact of the 
degree of decentralization on the PSE may due to the existing total productivity 
performance. A local jurisdiction with higher productivity is more able to generate 
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local own revenue and hence have higher efficiency in the public sector as well. 
Therefore, it is not surprising if local jurisdictions on Java Island generally 
achieve higher efficiency score compared to the jurisdictions in the outer Java. 
 A new government in the democratized and decentralized Indonesia is 
represented by two major political structures: First Golkar does not hold a 
dominant majority in the parliament though its power is still significant. Second 
many political parties rooted in a particular socio-religious group flourish in the 
Indonesian democracy, known as politik aliran. Interestingly, the estimation of 
the empirical model finds evidence that the new government structure has had 
nothing to do with the improved public sector efficiency. While Golkar fails to be 
attributed to the improved efficiency, politik aliran emerges with an adverse 
impact on efficiency. The adverse relationship between politik aliran and 
efficiency outcome also indicates that patron-client politic undermines the 
outcome of decentralization and democratization.  
 Another interesting finding from this study is an adverse impact of 
democratic participation on public sector efficiency. This contradicts the general 
claim that associates democratic participation with better economic performance. 
However, in the case of Indonesia this finding is not surprising as electoral 
democracy is characterised by endemic money politics, a class bias politic and a 
patron-client politic. These political features distort the significance of democratic 
participation, reduce accountability, and subsequently undermine public sector 
efficiency. 
 Dealing with political fragmentation, the estimation of all models finds 
inconsistent results. This indicates that a higher political fragmentation as a 
consequence of a multi-party system does not have a consistent effect on 
efficiency. However, the estimation shows that model 1 and 5 produce a 
significant estimate with a positive sign. This implies that the more dispersed 
political parties in the parliament the lower is the efficiency.
49
 The more dispersed 
                                                          
49
 Political fragmentation is measured using Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The lower the index the 
higher is the fragmentation. 
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political power is generally associated with higher cost in achieving policy 
decisions.  
The political liberalization in the decentralized democratized Indonesia has 
increased the number of political parties to participate in the election, shaping the 
structure of government with highly dispersed political power both in the 
executive and legislature. The highly dispersed political power to some extent 
should have been constructive for the development of a system of checks and 
balances. Therefore it should have helped improve political accountability. 
However, the structure of government with highly dispersed political power as the 
result of the 2004 and 2009 elections in Indonesia exhibits sophisticated political 
patterns across local jurisdictions. The coalition patterns tend to be pragmatic, 
dealing with local leader election and therefore are highly diverse across local 
jurisdictions. Even at the national level, there is no clear division between 
coalition and opposition. In this situation the system of checks and balances as an 
important mechanism in the democracy does not work well. Therefore improved 
accountability within highly dispersed political power is uncertain. Thus the high 
political fragmentation in the decentralized Indonesia is indistinct in respect to 
improved efficiency in the public sector and even tends to reduce the efficiency. 
 A corruption perception index and an infrastructure perception index are 
taken as a general representation of the quality of institutional governance. The 
estimate shows that public sector efficiency is positively associated with the 
infrastructure perception index, but fails to find evidence of an effect for the 
corruption perception index. This indicates that the outcome of the 
decentralization is not contingent with the perception about corruption which is 
prevalent in the decentralized Indonesia. Corruption occurs almost in all levels of 
government and institutions. Thus in the case of Indonesia, the outcome of 
decentralization is independent to the perception about corruption but dependent 
on the perception about the level of infrastructure. This finding may support 
conflicting conclusions about corruption and decentralization that hold in different 
settings (See Fisman and Gatti 2002, Fan, Lin and Treisman 2009). 
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 In general, findings in this study have confirmed political studies in the 
post-Suharto Indonesia. Many political studies have portrayed post-Suharto 
Indonesia as a protracted phase of decentralization and democratization. There is 
no real new political structure as an outcome from the electoral democracy, but a 
continuation of the old structure with new rules in a limited democracy. A new 
political structure may exist as an outcome of the electoral democracy, but it has 
nothing to do with improved public sector efficiency. This shows that the local 
political dynamic has failed to deliver improved public sector efficiency in the 
decentralized Indonesia. 
 
7.3. Policy Implications 
Decentralization will be efficiency-enhancing if it leads to a condition where there 
is some sort of accountability for policy choices, expenditure decisions, and 
service delivery. Therefore, any strategies to improve public service efficiency 
should be targeted not only at fiscal and organizational capacity improvement, but 
also at the incentive and disincentives governing local government behaviour. The 
key institutional feature that needs to be addressed is a strengthening of 
participation at the local level to allow citizens to voice their preferences, 
effectively monitor and benchmark the performance of local governments and 
react appropriately to that performance. This will mean that politicians and local 
officials have an incentive to be responsive. 
 It has been shown that there is a large disparity in the public sector 
efficiency across local jurisdictions in Indonesia. The variation is associated with 
the variation in the degree of fiscal decentralization and total factor productivity 
growth. This implies that despite limited tax power delegation, the ability of local 
jurisdictions to generate local tax revenue is crucial for the improved efficiency. 
This result has to be seen as a motivation for local governments to enhance fiscal 
and organizational capacity in conjunction with economic productivity. The 
ability of local jurisdictions to generate their own revenue is crucial for the 
improved efficiency. This is because local jurisdictions that raise a substantial 
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portion of their own revenue tend to be more accountable to citizens, more 
efficiency enhancing, and to be less corrupt. 
7.4. Limitations and Further Focus for Future Research 
There are limitations that have to be taken as a consideration in interpreting the 
results and inferring the conclusions as well as policy implications. Future studies 
are expected to overcome these limitations. 
 The first limitation deals with gaps in the data used in assessing public 
sector efficiency in the first stage of the method. The outcome indicators are 
available at the level of provincial government that apply for all Kabupaten/Kota 
district governments in a province. The input data is available at the level of 
Kabupaten/Kota district government. Accordingly, the input data is aggregated up 
to the provincial level. Thus, the efficiency score obtained is supposed to be 
interpreted as an average efficiency score of local jurisdictions within the same 
province. The score varies across provincial governments. Future studies are 
expected to overcome this gap, so that public sector efficiency can be assessed at 
the level of Kabupaten/Kota district government. 
 Second the political variables are generated from the outcome of one 
election period. The 2004 political contest was the first election following the 
implementation of the decentralization. It was the first direct election in Indonesia 
where voters directly chose leaders at every level of governments. Thus the result 
can only be interpreted as a result of a single period of election cycle. When the 
data is available for the time period after the 2009 election, future studies are 
expected to expand the observation period that cover the outcome of the 2009 
electoral contest. An investigation into the outcome of more than one election 
periods has advantages in that it will gain extensive information due to changes in 
political dynamic across election periods.  
 Third, the political agency relationship framework is taken from the 
perspective of the relationship between voters as principals and politicians as 
agents. Voters delegate their preferences to politicians through a ballot. Politicians 
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as agents play a policy formation game and set policies on behalf of citizens. The 
flow of the political agency relationship in relation to public service provision is 
complex in that it involves many agency relationships other than a voter-politician 
relationship. Politicians do not directly provide public services. They mandate 
policy to bureaucrats, and subsequently, bureaucrats organize frontline provider 
(doctors, nurses, teachers, etc.) to provide public services. 
 Any future studies are expected to be able to capture the complexity of the 
political agency relationships by taking into account other relevant variables. An 
example is political cohesion between the executive and the legislature. Political 
cohesion is generally taken as a political variable to capture the association 
between politicians in the parliament and executives. In political science, it is 
common to look at the strength of political association and its implication on 
various aspects. Stronger political cohesion may result in better public policy. In 
the context of local politics in Indonesia, the political affiliation from where the 
elected mayor comes can be taken as a proxy for political cohesion. The stronger 
the parliamentary back-up to the executives (proxied by the number of seats held 
by a party and its coalition that sponsor an elected mayor), the stronger is the 
political cohesion. 
 Future studies are also expected to measure the interaction effects of fiscal 
decentralization and the infrastructure index of public sector efficiency. The 
investigation is expected to help Indonesia’s government to find a minimum target 
for the infrastructure index so that the country’s efficiency in fiscal 
decentralization and resource allocation could be improved. 
 
7.5. Contributions of the Study 
Despite its limitation, this study makes major contributions from an empirical 
standpoint. First this is the first study in Indonesia that measures public sector 
efficiency in a comprehensive way, involving numerous indicators in Indonesia’s 
most prominent public sector categories. The efficiency score obtained from the 
calculations is beneficial in benchmarking public sector performance across 
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decentralized local governments. Second whilst most of Indonesia’s political 
studies claim a phase of protracted decentralization and democratization, it has 
been further revealed in this study that the protracted phase of decentralization 
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Appendix 1: Hausman Taylor test 
The test rejects null hypothesis indicating the rejection of RE specification. 
Model Estimate    Probability 
1  19.055767 0.0001 
2 11.793776 0.0027 
3 27.846997 0.0000 
4 15.971725 0.0003 
5 26.010088 0.0000 
6 13.156302 0.0014 
Source: Author’s calculation from section 5.3.1 using Eviews-6. 
Note:  
Estimate 1 and 2 stands for the PSE in the setting of new government formation 
characterised by the lost grip of Golkar domination in the assembly. Estimate 3, 
4, 5, & 6 stands for the PSE in the setting of new government formation 




Appendix 2: Per capita public spending (Kabupaten/Kota + 
Province), in million Rupiah. 
No. Province 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average 
1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 2.099 2.0781 2.655 3.620 2.613 
2 Sumatera Utara 0.885 0.8713 1.168 1.260 1.046 
3 Sumatera Barat 1.355 1.3355 1.711 2.063 1.616 
4 R i a u 2.478 2.3820 3.323 3.178 2.840 
5 Jambi 1.628 1.5995 1.990 2.360 1.894 
6 Sumatera Selatan 1.278 1.2560 1.601 1.727 1.465 
7 Bengkulu 1.398 1.3811 2.261 2.848 1.972 
8 Lampung 0.874 0.8627 1.045 1.049 0.958 
9 Kep Bangka Belitung 1.808 1.7549 2.418 3.034 2.254 
10 Kepulauan Riau 2.643 2.5178 3.691 3.324 3.044 
11 DKI Jakarta 1.713 1.6931 1.907 1.745 1.764 
12 Jawa Barat 0.583 0.5730 0.696 0.741 0.648 
13 Jawa Tengah 0.660 0.6563 0.812 0.913 0.760 
14 Dista Yogyakarta 1.036 1.0224 1.178 1.496 1.183 
15 Jawa Timur 0.678 0.6723 0.807 0.950 0.777 
16 Banten 0.686 0.6711 0.745 0.782 0.721 
17 B a l i 1.498 1.4767 1.718 1.877 1.642 
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 0.944 0.9278 1.137 1.264 1.068 
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur 1.235 1.2078 1.479 1.773 1.423 
20 Kalimantan Barat 1.402 1.3796 1.646 1.946 1.593 
21 Kalimantan Tengah 2.701 2.6691 3.140 3.907 3.104 
22 Kalimantan Selatan 1.480 1.4517 1.894 2.277 1.776 
23 Kalimantan Timur 5.325 5.1670 6.408 7.107 6.002 
24 Sulawesi Utara 1.529 1.5063 2.033 2.357 1.856 
25 Sulawesi Tengah 1.669 1.6307 2.055 2.321 1.919 
26 Sulawesi Selatan 1.201 1.1795 1.465 1.732 1.394 
27 Sulawesi Tenggara 1.482 1.4527 2.203 2.563 1.925 
28 Gorontalo 1.695 1.6610 2.135 2.577 2.017 
29 Sulawesi Barat 1.426 1.4160 2.249 2.292 1.846 
30 Maluku 2.193 2.1593 2.371 3.363 2.522 
31 Maluku Utara 2.787 2.6812 3.379 4.070 3.229 
32 Papua Barat 5.754 5.4943 7.230 10.069 7.137 
33 Papua 6.052 5.7072 8.041 8.935 7.184 
 
Average 1.884 1.833 2.381 2.773 
 






Appendix 3: Fiscal decentralization measured as a ratio of local government 
revenue to total spending (Kabupaten/Kota+Provinces). 
No. Local Government 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average 
1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 0.0697 0.0882 0.0835 0.0732 0.0786 
2 Sumatera Utara 0.2520 0.1979 0.1638 0.1868 0.2001 
3 Sumatera Barat 0.1746 0.1419 0.1266 0.1326 0.1439 
4 R i a u 0.1443 0.1364 0.1281 0.1718 0.1452 
5 Jambi 0.1995 0.1314 0.1228 0.1392 0.1482 
6 Sumatera Selatan 0.1690 0.1256 0.1101 0.1296 0.1336 
7 Bengkulu 0.1480 0.1004 0.1139 0.0858 0.1120 
8 Lampung 0.1919 0.1285 0.1185 0.1448 0.1459 
9 Kep Bangka Belitung 0.2643 0.1848 0.1429 0.1491 0.1853 
10 Kepulauan Riau 0.1219 0.1740 0.1708 0.2142 0.1702 
11 DKI Jakarta 0.6104 0.5151 0.5053 0.6553 0.5715 
12 Jawa Barat 0.3195 0.2510 0.2330 0.2619 0.2663 
13 Jawa Tengah 0.2498 0.2093 0.1913 0.2034 0.2134 
14 Dista Yogyakarta 0.2482 0.2114 0.2098 0.2049 0.2186 
15 Jawa Timur 0.2779 0.2126 0.2236 0.2302 0.2361 
16 Banten 0.3458 0.2825 0.2923 0.3373 0.3145 
17 B a l i 0.3599 0.2700 0.2917 0.3488 0.3176 
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 0.1200 0.1121 0.1079 0.1141 0.1135 
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur 0.0871 0.0790 0.0709 0.0689 0.0765 
20 Kalimantan Barat 0.1211 0.0998 0.0984 0.1033 0.1056 
21 Kalimantan Tengah 0.0992 0.0761 0.0775 0.0781 0.0827 
22 Kalimantan Selatan 0.2323 0.1791 0.1684 0.1857 0.1914 
23 Kalimantan Timur 0.1380 0.1253 0.1184 0.1386 0.1301 
24 Sulawesi Utara 0.1483 0.0998 0.0928 0.0952 0.1090 
25 Sulawesi Tengah 0.1384 0.0739 0.0655 0.0775 0.0888 
26 Sulawesi Selatan 0.1711 0.1438 0.1420 0.1426 0.1499 
27 Sulawesi Tenggara 0.1104 0.0734 0.0598 0.0883 0.0830 
28 Gorontalo 0.0996 0.0752 0.0738 0.0778 0.0816 
29 Sulawesi Barat 0.0741 0.0493 0.0339 0.0506 0.0520 
30 Maluku 0.0633 0.0515 0.0642 0.0582 0.0593 
31 Maluku Utara 0.0564 0.0485 0.0476 0.0638 0.0541 
32 Papua Barat 0.0280 0.0200 0.0313 0.0338 0.0283 
33 Papua 0.0496 0.0365 0.0392 0.0433 0.0421 
   Average 0.1783 0.1426 0.1370 0.1542   
 




Appendix 4.1: Socio-economic indicators in selected public sector categories (2005) 
No. Province 
Education Health Infrastructure 
Poverty 
NPE NSE IMR ATI Water 
1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam  95.48  78.39  39 3,156  11.54  28.69  
2 Sumatera Utara  92.58  70.73  26 13,401  23.48  14.68  
3 Sumatera Barat  91.84  66.09  32 3,443  21.15  10.89  
4 R i a u  93.86  71.00  22 3,175  3.79  12.51  
5 Jambi  92.33  62.72  32 1,980  16.40  11.88  
6 Sumatera Selatan  92.65  59.97  30 4,821  17.29  21.01  
7 Bengkulu  90.62   60.74  36 1,271  14.23  22.18  
8 Lampung  91.60   62.54  28 3,985  5.69  21.42  
9 Kep Bangka Belitung  89.98   60.82  24 851  3.74  9.74  
10 Kepulauan Riau  90.49   62.90  19 691  39.36  10.97  
11 DKI Jakarta  91.09   73.83  18 7,308  46.90  3.61  
12 Jawa Barat  89.49   58.27  37 28,541  12.91  13.06  
13 Jawa Tengah  93.39   66.32  24 17,523  14.86  20.49  
14 Dista Yogyakarta  94.40   81.20  19 1,241  8.82  18.95  
15 Jawa Timur  93.17   64.78  32 21,592  16.82  19.95  
16 Banten  90.91   60.39  35 6,240  13.78  8.86  
17 B a l i  91.57   69.01  25 1,282  40.19  6.72  
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat  90.91   65.41  66 3,563  14.68  25.92  
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur  88.07   38.67  46 2,320  19.53  28.19  
20 Kalimantan Barat  89.52   51.48  30 3,837  8.94  14.24  
21 Kalimantan Tengah  93.62   66.66  21 1,716  17.63  10.73  
22 Kalimantan Selatan  93.29   55.77  41 2,991  33.62  7.23  
23 Kalimantan Timur  91.16   67.09  26 1,648  43.11  10.57  
24 Sulawesi Utara  89.09   62.61  19 3,705  23.59  9.34  
25 Sulawesi Tengah  89.60   58.11  42 2,195  22.40  21.80  
26 Sulawesi Selatan  88.13   56.02  36 9,089  24.19  14.98  
27 Sulawesi Tenggara  90.57   62.12  38 2,301  27.79  21.45  
28 Gorontalo  82.62   45.01  50 1,342  15.94  29.05  
29 Sulawesi Barat  88.13   56.02  36 1,056  12.80  14.98  
30 Maluku  89.39   68.14  34 1,082  25.77  32.28  
31 Maluku Utara  91.75   60.04  40 567  22.02  13.23  
32 Papua Barat  72.56   44.21  29 555  16.77  40.83  
33 Papua  72.56   44.21  29 1,919  13.84  40.83  
  AVERAGE 89.89  61.55  32.15  
 
19.81  17.92  
 
Source: BPS Statistics Indonesia 
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Appendix 4.2: Socio-economic indicators in selected public sector categories (2006) 
No. Province 
Education Health Infrstructure 
Poverty 
NPE NSE IMR ATI Water 
1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 95.48 78.39  39.00  3251 10.93 28.28 
2 Sumatera Utara 93.96 73.08  27.00  16678 25.89 15.01 
3 Sumatera Barat 94.17 67.77  32.00  3650 23.05 12.51 
4 R i a u 94.72 72.93  28.00  2597 2.66 11.85 
5 Jambi 94.36 65.32  32.00  2610 16.76 11.37 
6 Sumatera Selatan 93.01 68.01  32.00  5101 19.02 20.99 
7 Bengkulu 93.89 66.73  33.00  1343 13 23 
8 Lampung 93.94 66.65  29.00  4614 4.93 22.77 
9 Kep Bangka Belitung 91.51 55.30  33.00  785 4.12 10.91 
10 Kepulauan Riau 93.66 72.01  28.00  2597 37.93 12.16 
11 DKI Jakarta 90.78 71.41  14.00  7301 39.73 4.57 
12 Jawa Barat 94.21 62.13  33.00  30515 12.79 14.49 
13 Jawa Tengah 94.05 67.67  25.00  17330 16.77 22.19 
14 Dista Yogyakarta 94.38 72.30  14.00  1232 14.17 19.15 
15 Jawa Timur 94.20 70.28  29.00  23068 17.78 21.09 
16 Banten 94.83 66.56  39.00  7745 12.92 9.79 
17 B a l i 93.33 70.15  21.00  1374 38.27 7.08 
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 94.50 69.62  51.00  3756 16.61 27.17 
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur 91.58 47.23  35.00  3772 20.33 29.34 
20 Kalimantan Barat 93.82 60.92  35.00  4513 9.27 15.24 
21 Kalimantan Tengah 95.97 67.69  29.00  1623 17.01 11 
22 Kalimantan Selatan 93.28 62.12  41.00  3577 34.72 8.32 
23 Kalimantan Timur 92.86 64.00  23.00  2056 48.29 11.41 
24 Sulawesi Utara 90.40 66.03  16.00  4149 28.72 11.54 
25 Sulawesi Tengah 92.87 62.97  41.00  2430 18.12 23.63 
26 Sulawesi Selatan 91.08 60.27  34.00  8446 25.5 14.57 
27 Sulawesi Tenggara 92.26 72.42  32.00  3187 28.09 23.37 
28 Gorontalo 90.48 52.31  34.00  1509 16.02 29.13 
29 Sulawesi Barat 91.67 55.19  34.00  1135 12.8 20.74 
30 Maluku 92.24 76.86  38.00  1546 23.79 33.03 
31 Maluku Utara 93.10 65.31  43.00  529 22.5 12.73 
32 Papua Barat 88.16 53.94  35.00  690 23.09 41.34 
33 Papua 78.11 47.36  35.00  2385 13.84 41.52 
  AVERAGE 92.63  65.18  31.64    20.29  18.83  
 









Appendix 4.3: Socio-economic indicators in selected public sector categories (2007) 
No. Province 
Education Health Infrstructure 
Poverty 
NPE NSE IMR ATI HPWS 
1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam  95.73   76.36  32.6   2,551   12.18  26.65 
2 Sumatera Utara  93.91   73.61  23.3  13,369   21.42  13.90 
3 Sumatera Barat  94.45   67.23  27.1   3,660   22.71  11.90 
4 R i a u  94.80   69.96  22.3   2,403    2.58  11.20 
5 Jambi  93.88   65.77  27.5   1,957   16.71  10.27 
6 Sumatera Selatan  92.69   64.97  25.6   4,941   17.82  19.15 
7 Bengkulu  94.21   68.73  29.4   1,333   11.15  22.13 
8 Lampung  94.04   68.30  25.8   4,541    4.08  22.19 
9 Kep Bangka Belitung  91.59   52.24  26.4     821    2.10  9.54 
10 Kepulauan Riau  93.50   71.34  20.6     774   25.47  10.30 
11 DKI Jakarta  93.27   71.26  8.4   8,312   34.26  4.61 
12 Jawa Barat  94.16   66.90  27.9  29,243   11.38  13.55 
13 Jawa Tengah  94.78   68.84  21.4  16,481   14.71  20.43 
14 Dista Yogyakarta  93.53   74.48  8.7   1,139   10.25  18.99 
15 Jawa Timur  94.45   69.02  25.4  22,945   16.36  19.98 
16 Banten  92.97   58.41  32   7,853    9.22  9.07 
17 B a l i  94.43   66.63  12.9   1,362   34.86  6.63 
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat  94.09   70.65  44.6   3,000   14.72  24.99 
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur  91.59   49.48  32.3   3,276   14.14  27.51 
20 Kalimantan Barat  93.48   54.62  28   3,936    7.43  12.91 
21 Kalimantan Tengah  95.42   60.07  22.8   1,171   15.70  9.38 
22 Kalimantan Selatan  94.00   59.27  34.9   3,200   35.30  7.01 
23 Kalimantan Timur  93.23   71.14  20.2   1,889   47.70  11.04 
24 Sulawesi Utara  90.75   65.95  12.1   3,753   19.64  11.42 
25 Sulawesi Tengah  92.04   59.04  35.9   1,954   14.80  22.42 
26 Sulawesi Selatan  92.06   60.36  28.2   6,336   23.26  14.11 
27 Sulawesi Tenggara  93.64   65.77  30   2,231   20.41  21.33 
28 Gorontalo  90.18   52.16  32   1,157   17.98  27.35 
29 Sulawesi Barat  92.17   52.21  28.2     822   10.26  19.03 
30 Maluku  93.45   70.08  32.6   1,104   17.66  31.14 
31 Maluku Utara  91.95   64.67  35.5     601   16.91  11.97 
32 Papua Barat  90.67   48.76  32.7     664   27.02  39.31 
33 Papua  80.92   48.60  31.7   1,839   14.43  40.78 
  Average 92.91  63.84  26.64    17.72  17.64  
Source: BPS Statistics Indonesia 
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Appendix 4.4: Socio-economic indicators in selected public sector categories (2008) 
No. Province 
Education Health Infrastructure 
Poverty 
NPE NSE IMR ATI HPWS 
1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 96.16 76.67 32.1 2795 12.18 23.53 
2 Sumatera Utara 94.25 73.95 22.7 14158 21.42 12.55 
3 Sumatera Barat 94.70 66.95 26.3 3697 22.71 10.67 
4 R i a u 95.24 69.70 21.8 2103 2.58 10.63 
5 Jambi 94.17 65.60 26.9 2227 16.71 9.32 
6 Sumatera Selatan 93.05 64.92 25 5217 17.82 17.73 
7 Bengkulu 94.63 68.64 28.6 1217 11.15 20.64 
8 Lampung 94.23 68.78 24.8 4643 4.08 20.98 
9 Kep Bangka Belitung 91.53 52.04 26 959 2.1 8.58 
10 Kepulauan Riau 94.95 72.00 20.3 600 25.47 9.18 
11 DKI Jakarta 93.71 71.35 8.2 7999 34.26 4.29 
12 Jawa Barat 94.09 67.21 27.1 30067 11.38 13.01 
13 Jawa Tengah 95.12 69.14 20.7 15503 14.71 19.23 
14 Dista Yogyakarta 94.28 74.42 8.5 1139 10.25 18.32 
15 Jawa Timur 94.53 68.90 24.5 22686 16.36 18.51 
16 Banten 93.34 58.28 31.3 7570 9.22 8.15 
17 B a l i 94.82 67.03 12.7 1431 34.86 6.17 
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 94.36 70.51 43.2 3123 14.72 23.81 
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur 91.67 49.56 31.2 3031 14.14 25.65 
20 Kalimantan Barat 93.94 54.77 27.4 3646 7.43 11.07 
21 Kalimantan Tengah 95.61 60.12 22.4 1118 15.7 8.71 
22 Kalimantan Selatan 94.15 59.53 33.9 3157 35.3 6.48 
23 Kalimantan Timur 93.59 71.19 19 1980 47.7 9.51 
24 Sulawesi Utara 91.24 66.39 11.5 4008 19.64 10.10 
25 Sulawesi Tengah 92.83 59.08 34.9 2101 14.8 20.75 
26 Sulawesi Selatan 92.15 60.62 27.4 6170 23.26 13.34 
27 Sulawesi Tenggara 94.24 65.95 29.1 2312 20.41 19.53 
28 Gorontalo 90.44 52.35 30.8 1176 17.98 24.88 
29 Sulawesi Barat 92.90 51.72 27.4 1060 10.26 16.73 
30 Maluku 93.77 70.01 31.8 923 17.66 29.66 
31 Maluku Utara 92.44 65.01 34.3 436 16.91 11.28 
32 Papua Barat 91.20 54.47 31.6 456 27.02 35.12 
33 Papua 82.90 48.56 30.7 2033 14.43 37.08 
  Average 93.34 64.10 25.88   17.72 16.22 
Source: Susenas, BPS, Republic Indonesia 
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Appendix 5: Macroeconomic performance 
No. Province 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
GR UR GR UR GR UR GR UR 
1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (10.12) 13.25 1.56  11.255 (2.36) 10.06  (5.27) 9.38 
2 Sumatera Utara 5.48  11.44  6.20  13.165 6.90  10.37  6.39  9.33 
3 Sumatera Barat 5.73  12.42  6.14  12.4 6.34  10.67  6.37  8.89 
4 R i a u 5.41  13.04  5.15  10.85 3.41  10.09  5.65  8.78 
5 Jambi 5.57  9.67  5.89  7.195 6.82  6.48  7.16  5.53 
6 Sumatera Selatan 4.84  10.69  5.20  10.715 5.84  9.87  5.10  8.27 
7 Bengkulu 5.82  7.53  5.95  6.475 6.03  4.90  4.93  4.44 
8 Lampung 4.02  7.66  4.98  9.445 5.94  7.94  5.26  6.73 
9 Kep Bangka Belitung 3.47  7.65  3.98  7.47 4.54  6.93  4.44  5.89 
10 Kepulauan Riau 6.57  10.20  6.78  11.465 7.01  8.94  6.65  8.25 
11 DKI Jakarta 6.01  15.25  5.95  12.855 6.44  12.92  6.18  11.61 
12 Jawa Barat 5.60  15.13  6.02  14.545 6.48  13.80  5.83  12.18 
13 Jawa Tengah 5.35  9.03  5.33  8.11 5.59  7.90  5.46  7.24 
14 Dista Yogyakarta 4.73  6.32  3.70  6.28 4.31  6.09  5.02  5.71 
15 Jawa Timur 5.87  8.48  5.77  7.955 6.11  7.12  5.90  6.33 
16 Banten 5.88  15.41  5.57  17.625 6.04  15.93  5.82  14.67 
17 B a l i 5.56  4.68  5.28  5.68 5.92  4.33  5.97  3.94 
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 1.71  9.61  2.77  8.93 4.91  7.02  2.63  5.67 
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur 3.46  5.14  5.08  4.315 5.15  3.85  4.81  3.72 
20 Kalimantan Barat 4.69  8.37  5.23  7.795 6.02  6.78  5.42  5.95 
21 Kalimantan Tengah 5.90  4.88  5.84  5.905 6.06  5.07  6.16  4.69 
22 Kalimantan Selatan 5.06  6.76  4.98  8.825 6.01  7.47  6.23  6.55 
23 Kalimantan Timur 3.17  10.11  2.85  12.77 1.88  12.45  4.82  11.26 
24 Sulawesi Utara 4.90  14.23  5.72  14.145 6.47  12.70  7.56  11.50 
25 Sulawesi Tengah 7.57  7.67  7.82  9.605 7.99  7.70  7.76  6.35 
26 Sulawesi Selatan 6.05  14.76  6.72  12.54 6.34  11.63  7.78  9.77 
27 Sulawesi Tenggara 7.31  9.93  7.68  8.545 7.96  6.67  7.27  5.89 
28 Gorontalo 7.19  11.92  7.30  8.695 7.51  7.21  7.76  6.35 
29 Sulawesi Barat 6.78  5.16  6.42  5.545 7.43  4.77  8.54  5.13 
30 Maluku 5.07  13.66  5.55  14.74 5.62  13.29  4.23  10.86 
31 Maluku Utara 5.10  10.99  5.48  7.72 6.01  7.20  5.98  6.76 
32 Papua Barat 6.80  10.25  4.55  10.67 6.95  9.82  7.33  8.48 
33 Papua (1.09) 7.22  (1.09) 5.165 4.34  5.27  (1.49) 4.62 
  AVERAGE 4.71  9.95  5.22  9.68  5.70  8.58  5.44 7.60 




Appendix 6: Democratic participation measured as a ratio of actual votes to 
the eligible votes. 









1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 3,009,965  2,266,713  1,838,915  0.75 
2 Sumatera Utara` 9,180,973  5,999,956  5,281,066  0.65 
3 Sumatera Barat 3,155,148  2,223,239  2,022,541  0.70 
4 R i a u 3,366,383  2,292,893  2,034,649  0.68 
5 Jambi 2,086,780  1,556,080  1,292,650  0.75 
6 Sumatera Selatan 5,192,693  3,982,645  3,458,250  0.77 
7 Bengkulu 1,214,171  907,816  1,752,775  0.75 
8 Lampung 5,351,733  3,978,504  3,491,266  0.74 
9 Kep Bangka Belitung 782,255  545,812  459,227  0.70 
10 Kepulauan Riau 1,131,676  673,412  593,568  0.60 
11 DKI Jakarta 8,502,619  4,327,596  4,091,951  0.51 
12 Jawa Barat 29,002,479  21,204,505  18,651,604  0.73 
13 Jawa Tengah 26,190,629  18,663,295  15,072,888  0.71 
14 Dista Yogyakarta 2,751,761  2,007,359  1,752,775  0.73 
15 Jawa Timur 29,514,290  20,201,770  16,289,604  0.68 
16 Banten 6,581,587  4,716,108  3,990,958  0.72 
17 B a l i 2,667,065  2,045,675  1,699,468  0.77 
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 3,135,420  2,354,271  1,962,300  0.75 
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur 2,760,518  2,247,057  2,051,582  0.81 
20 Kalimantan Barat 3,154,887  2,314,404  2,036,704  0.73 
21 Kalimantan Tengah 1,506,244  1,044,569  872,362  0.69 
22 Kalimantan Selatan 2,478,976  1,769,528  1,463,490  0.71 
23 Kalimantan Timur 2,349,862  1,578,755  1,355,072  0.67 
24 Sulawesi Utara 1,679,814  1,323,131  1,239,392  0.79 
25 Sulawesi Tengah 1,658,693  1,296,819  1,199,830  0.78 
26 Sulawesi Selatan 5,630,977  4,132,962  3,688,770  0.73 
27 Sulawesi Tenggara 1,487,818  1,120,277  993,592  0.75 
28 Gorontalo 688,272  572,519  532,055  0.83 
29 Sulawesi Barat 753,203  587,334  531,544  0.78 
30 Maluku 1,020,421  827,591  772,579  0.81 
31 Maluku Utara 691,863  550,236  519,735  0.80 
32 Papua Barat 521,735  423,752  381,121  0.81 
33 Papua 2,064,532  1,851,783  1,719,581  0.90 
 
Average 
   
0.74 






Appendix 7: Political fragmentation measured using Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index 
No Local Government Political Fragmentation 
1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 13.95 
2 Sumatera Utara 13.11 
3 Sumatera Barat 18.04 
4 R i a u 14.66 
5 Jambi 15.62 
6 Sumatera Selatan 14.15 
7 Bengkulu 12.80 
8 Lampung 14.05 
9 Kep Bangka Belitung 19.18 
10 Kepulauan Riau 12.83 
11 DKI Jakarta 15.48 
12 Jawa Barat 19.19 
13 Jawa Tengah 20.23 
14 Dista Yogyakarta 17.67 
15 Jawa Timur 21.31 
16 Banten 15.39 
17 B a l i 32.78 
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 13.52 
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur 19.18 
20 Kalimantan Barat 15.13 
21 Kalimantan Tengah 18.63 
22 Kalimantan Selatan 14.67 
23 Kalimantan Timur 17.68 
24 Sulawesi Utara 23.94 
25 Sulawesi Tengah 18.61 
26 Sulawesi Selatan 23.25 
27 Sulawesi Tenggara 16.42 
28 Gorontalo 29.79 
29 Sulawesi Barat 17.94 
30 Maluku 12.76 
31 Maluku Utara 14.39 
32 Papua Barat 18.12 
33 Papua 15.31 
 Average  
Source: Author’s calculation based on database pemilu 2004: peta daerah 





Appendix 8: Formation of new government measured as ratio of Seats held 
by Golkar and Political Islam parties to the total Seats in the local assembly. 
  
GOL2 ISL1 ISL2 
1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 0.19 0.38 0.56 
2 Sumatera Utara 0.22 0.21 0.29 
3 Sumatera Barat 0.28 0.36 0.52 
4 R i a u 0.25 0.29 0.42 
5 Jambi 0.24 0.24 0.49 
6 Sumatera Selatan 0.24 0.26 0.41 
7 Bengkulu 0.23 0.24 0.40 
8 Lampung 0.22 0.20 0.38 
9 Kep Bangka Belitung 0.20 0.40 0.45 
10 Kepulauan Riau 0.19 0.21 0.38 
11 DKI Jakarta 0.09 0.36 0.49 
12 Jawa Barat 0.29 0.29 0.42 
13 Jawa Tengah 0.18 0.17 0.42 
14 Dista Yogyakarta 0.15 0.18 0.48 
15 Jawa Timur 0.16 0.13 0.48 
16 Banten 0.26 0.36 0.49 
17 B a l i 0.20 0.02 0.04 
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 0.24 0.36 0.50 
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur 0.32 0.03 0.09 
20 Kalimantan Barat 0.24 0.15 0.23 
21 Kalimantan Tengah 0.29 0.16 0.31 
22 Kalimantan Selatan 0.22 0.36 0.56 
23 Kalimantan Timur 0.29 0.24 2.75 
24 Sulawesi Utara 0.36 0.04 0.07 
25 Sulawesi Tengah 0.33 0.21 0.32 
26 Sulawesi Selatan 0.41 0.27 0.39 
27 Sulawesi Tenggara 0.24 0.35 0.52 
28 Gorontalo 0.48 0.30 0.39 
29 Sulawesi Barat 0.33 0.23 0.30 
30 Maluku 0.21 0.25 0.30 
31 Maluku Utara 0.23 0.31 0.40 
32 Papua Barat 0.27 0.13 0.17 
33 Papua 0.27 0.07 0.17 
Source: Author’s calculation based on database pemilu 2004: peta daerah 







Appendix 9: Corruption perception Index and physical infrastructure index 





1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 5.87 55.79 
2 Sumatera Utara 3.84 45.23 
3 Sumatera Barat 4.64 54.45 
4 R i a u 3.55 51.07 
5 Jambi 5.57 43.36 
6 Sumatera Selatan 3.87 54.58 
7 Bengkulu 4.46 43.58 
8 Lampung 4.58 54.17 
9 Kep Bangka Belitung 5.03 47.12 
10 Kepulauan Riau 4.35 37.5 
11 DKI Jakarta 4.06 74.06 
12 Jawa Barat 3.67 51.45 
13 Jawa Tengah 4.58 65.29 
14 Dista Yogyakarta 6.43 61.06 
15 Jawa Timur 4.26 62.93 
16 Banten 4.57 61.22 
17 B a l i 4.25 67.03 
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 5.41 43.53 
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur 2.97 48.11 
20 Kalimantan Barat 3.81 44.15 
21 Kalimantan Tengah 6.1 36.64 
22 Kalimantan Selatan 5.11 60.59 
23 Kalimantan Timur 5.03 48.18 
24 Sulawesi Utara 3.98 62.62 
25 Sulawesi Tengah 4.5 46.3 
26 Sulawesi Selatan 4.7 61.45 
27 Sulawesi Tenggara 3.43 45.72 
28 Gorontalo 4.83 47.88 
29 Sulawesi Barat 4.08 20.14 
30 Maluku 4.32 39.65 
31 Maluku Utara 5.01 28.11 
32 Papua Barat 3.39 26.21 
33 Papua 5.01 28.17 




Appendix 10: Total factor productivity growth measured using Solow 
residual 
No. Local Government 2005 2006 2007 2008 AVG 
1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 2.047411 1.406185 1.459884 1.680133 1.648403 
2 Sumatera Utara 1.715134 1.371372 1.098047 1.420118 1.401168 
3 Sumatera Barat 1.617946 1.329084 1.224367 1.575549 1.436737 
4 R i a u 1.033612 0.256475 0.014113 1.109794 0.603498 
5 Jambi 1.959624 1.659151 1.310895 1.552018 1.620422 
6 Sumatera Selatan 1.451038 0.911273 0.689205 1.288613 1.085032 
7 Bengkulu 2.621841 2.81012 2.657518 2.448044 2.634381 
8 Lampung 1.703244 1.619848 1.58163 1.609921 1.628661 
9 Kep Bangka Belitung 1.17812 0.719893 0.48581 1.089805 0.868407 
10 Kepulauan Riau 1.003515 -0.04839 -0.63631 0.241174 0.139998 
11 DKI Jakarta 0.499935 -0.66762 -1.05384 0.504978 -0.17914 
12 Jawa Barat 1.729103 1.465581 1.302436 1.563704 1.515206 
13 Jawa Tengah 1.828213 1.524761 1.393875 1.570853 1.579426 
14 Dista Yogyakarta 1.184401 0.599628 0.371769 0.867662 0.755865 
15 Jawa Timur 1.619339 1.222639 1.159937 1.604753 1.401667 
16 Banten 1.425334 1.037021 0.87502 1.194162 1.132885 
17 B a l i 2.09195 1.917829 1.209161 1.345261 1.64105 
18 Nusa Tenggara Barat 1.553362 1.344908 1.125251 1.268508 1.323007 
19 Nusa Tenggara Timur 2.380776 2.23621 2.289769 2.079763 2.24663 
20 Kalimantan Barat 1.243004 0.748763 0.590445 1.024189 0.9016 
21 Kalimantan Tengah 0.787604 -0.03997 -0.27268 0.488987 0.240984 
22 Kalimantan Selatan 2.306784 2.001051 1.668282 1.720786 1.924226 
23 Kalimantan Timur 1.813677 0.901023 0.587319 1.789973 1.272998 
24 Sulawesi Utara 1.724465 1.270946 0.871534 1.122508 1.247363 
25 Sulawesi Tengah 1.632162 1.450798 1.23908 1.501367 1.455852 
26 Sulawesi Selatan 1.699971 1.630299 1.465549 1.470299 1.56653 
27 Sulawesi Tenggara 1.375069 1.111513 1.014302 1.243806 1.186172 
28 Gorontalo 4.025075 1.416961 1.287764 1.215764 1.986391 
29 Sulawesi Barat 2.437485 2.579188 2.093525 7.358044 3.617061 
30 Maluku 3.370976 3.987286 3.758024 2.993313 3.5274 
31 Maluku Utara 3.294489 3.565921 3.557104 2.642034 3.264887 
32 Papua Barat 0.731917 0.178291 0.074754 0.843222 0.457046 
33 Papua 1.515104 0.564977 0.147346 0.813855 0.76032 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
 
